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There have been widespread assumptions across the globe that the root cause of Boko Haram 
terrorism in Nigeria is religious rather than socio-economic. An investigation into this dichotomy 
allowed this study to fully demonstrate the root cause of Boko Haram’s terrorist actions as a twin 
phenomenon that emanated from religious injunctions and the non-fulfilment of socio-economic goals 
that are prompted by the violation of fundamental human rights, corruption, poverty, unconstitutional 
and undemocratic practices in the northern part of the Nigerian state. To achieve its aim of examining 
the root cause of the terrorism crisis in the latter country, the study critically appraised the public 
perceptions on the socio-economic context of the insurgency by investigating the pattern of its 
maintenance from 2009 to 2017, examining the socio-economic consequences of the crisis, and 
identifying possible techniques for resolving the problem. The study adopted a qualitative 
methodological approach using in-depth interviews involving forty (40) participants to interrogate the 
phenomenon of the insurgency by Boko Haram in Nigeria. The study advanced a theoretical 
integration of the social exchange, social conflict and rational choice theories to explain a combination 
of the factors that were found to produce, reproduce and sustain the crisis in Nigeria. Empirical 
evidence from the study demonstrated that the evolution of Boko Haram terrorism was not only 
religiously inclined but also subject to socio-economic phlebotomy, political and moral putrescence, and 
the dehumanization of people that stemmed from a combination of decades of mismanagement and 
pervasive corruption by various Nigerian leaders. The study concludes that, as long as the endemic 
socio-economic problems caused by global capitalism vis-a-vis unequal hegemonic power exchange 
as expressed in socio-political, ethno-religious and cultural forms persist in the Nigerian society, the 
terrorism insurgency will recur and remain an inevitable enterprise and indeed a normal social 
reaction to every undesirable state of affairs. Based on the findings, the study urges the need for the 
amelioration of the conditions of the vast majority of the Nigerian populace by making socio-economic 
facilities available to them through the political state. The study recommends that the Nigerian state 
must respond to a new paradigm in counter-terrorism strategies by shifting from a violent military 
approach to more appropriate culturally acceptable conflict resolution strategies in order to win the 
war against Boko Haram terrorism and to eradicate this menace from the Nigerian society. This 
approach can best be accomplished through intelligence gathering, an emancipatory struggle, 
collaborative efforts, peaceful negotiations and partnerships with local communities. 






1.1 Background to the Study 
According to Rapoport’s submission (2004), terrorism is adjudged to date as far back as 
the1880s. This scholar asserts that modern terrorism began in Russia in the 1880s and that, 
within the span of ten years, it spread to Western Europe, the Balkans and Asia. This wave 
of terrorism was anarchistic and targeted mostly prominent officials (ibid.). However, the 
rebirth of modern terrorism evolved with sophisticated technology into the 21st century and 
has gained a dominant popularity among nations and individuals (Rapoport, 2004:38). 
Several research findings have persistently argued that acts of terrorism have been unleashed 
on human settlements for centuries but that such acts have never attracted concerted global 
focal prominence until 11 September 2001. It was on this fateful day “that a seemingly 
indomitable and impenetrable technological state-of-the-art American security surveillance 
network was supplanted by forces of terror to apocalyptic proportions” (Ninalowo, 
2011:139). The twin towers of the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon 
building (headquarters of the American defence establishment) in Washington DC were 
simultaneously attacked by three hijacked passenger aircrafts that were used by terrorists as 
weapons of mass destruction (CNN Report, 2001 September 12; Awake, 2006:4). 
Thousands of human lives were lost and many were maimed. As a consequence of the 
magnitude of the impact of the terrorist calamity, sympathetic sentiments, anger, and 
condemnation were invoked globally. The degree of the damage, violence and outrage was 
indeed unprecedented. The strike against the United States (US) arguably became one of the 
most memorable historical events, and President George W. Bush declared a war “that 
would never end until every terrorist group of the global reach was found, stopped and 
defeated (Rapoport, 2004:46). It is undeniable that terrorism has a linkage with international 
security and, by extension, with the threat against world peace. In this context, the national 
security challenge that is posed by Boko Haram fundamentalists in Nigeria re-enforces the 
claim that security problems in a particular region on a globalized continent remain a 
security challenge to all elsewhere in the world (Tersoo & Terzungwe, 2015:34). However, 
as a strategy of the powerless against the powerful, it is not surprising that ethnic movements, 
political and social minorities as well as religious organizations often utilize acts of terrorism 
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to drive home their respective agendas (Rapoport, 1984). Writings about terrorism have been 
controversial not only because of its wide perspectives, but also because of the labyrinth of 
controversies generated by it (Anger, 2002). Tersoo and Terzungwe (2015:28) argue along 
the same lines, stating that “…just as diverse as the techniques of terrorists are, so are the 
contending issues about terrorism as  well as the tactics of terrorism and the strategies of 
curtailing  it from ravaging national security and world peace”. 
Terrorism remains an entrenched phenomenon in societies and has survived for centuries as 
a vibrant tool for those who believe in using it. However, in modern times the spate of 
terrorism is taking on new dimensions due to technological advancement, globalization, and 
its dominant popularity which was accentuated by the attack on the World Trade Centre 
(WTC) and the Pentagon building in the USA on September 11, 2001 (Tersoo & Terzungwe, 
2015:39). Put differently, although terrorism has always been practised, it has emerged as a 
significant international problem since the 1990s. Wittkopf and Kegley (1999:45) argue that 
the changing frequency of terrorism suggests a general trend of an increasing level of 
transnational terrorist activities since 1968, followed by a slight upsurge since 1987.  
Terrorism is universally conceived as “a deliberate, calculated and extreme use of violence 
or threatened violence, perpetuated by malice, to cause serious harm or violence against 
individuals, governments and their assets with the sole intention to attain socio-economic, 
political, religious or ideological goals, through intimidation or coercion or instilling fear on 
civilian population” (US Department of Defense, 2014; Federal Republic of Nigeria 
Terrorism Prevention Act, 2011:1). Terrorism is an incredibly difficult phenomenon to 
define. However, the most widely accepted definition of this concept is that of the State 
Department of the United States of America, which defines terrorism, in accordance with 
title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d), as “premeditated, politically motivated 
violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine 
agents, usually intended to influence an audience”. (US National Institute of Justice, 2011). 
According to the South African government, terrorism is “an incident of violence or threat 
thereof, against a person, a group of persons or property not necessarily related to the aim 
of the incident, to coerce a government or civil population to act according to certain 
principles” (Masuku, 2002). Although slightly differently worded, the commonality linking 
these definitions is that of violence being utilized to influence or force the actions of 
individuals or groups. 
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These definitions were adopted for the purpose of the current study. In light of the 
complexity of defining terrorism, the world has come to realize that there is no single 
definition of terrorism, as “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” (Laqueur, 
1987; Ganor, 2002). It is noteworthy that even those seeking sovereign statehood or 
independence, such as the Basques in Spain and Fatah and Hamas in Palestine, had at 
different times rationalized their attempts at terrorism (Rapoport, 1984:52).  
At this juncture it is important to note the difference between freedom fighters and terrorists. 
History has a number  of  personalities who fought for freedom in various contexts, such as 
Ernesto Che Guevara and Fidel Castro of  Cuba;  Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran;  Gerry Adams 
of the UK;  Osama  bin Laden of Saudi Arabia;Yasser Arafat of Palestine;  Samora Machel  
of Mozambique; Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya and Nelson Mandela of South Africa. It is also 
germane to mention that there are state sponsored or state supported forms of terrorism, for 
example the charges that the US levelled in the 1980s against Cuba, the Soviet Union, Syria, 
Iraq and Libya, among others. Similarly, others accused the US of sponsoring terrorist 
activities in Vietnam, Chile, Nicaragua and elsewhere (Schlagheck, 1990 cited in Wittkopf 
& Kegley, 1999).  
According to the Global Terrorism Index (2015:3), terrorism remains highly concentrated 
in just five countries of the world, namely Iraq, Nigeria, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Syria. 
These countries accounted for 78 per cent of the lives lost in 2014. However, terrorism is 
spreading to more countries, with the number of countries experiencing more than 500 
deaths escalating from 5 to 11 – a 120 per cent increase from the previous year. The six new 
countries with over 500 deaths are Somalia, Ukraine, Yemen, the Central African Republic, 
South Sudan and Cameroon (GTI, 2015).  
Also notable is the major intensification of the Boko Haram terrorist threat in Nigeria over 
the past few years. The country has witnessed the largest increase in terrorist deaths ever 
recorded by any country, increasing by over 300 per cent to 7 512 fatalities (GTI, 2015). 
Boko Haram, which operates mainly in Nigeria, overtook ISIL to become the deadliest 
terrorist group in the world. Evidence in support of this submits that the net deaths attributed 
to Boko Haram increased by 317 per cent in 2015 to 6 644, while in 2014, ISIL was 
responsible for 6 073 terrorist deaths (GTI, 2015). 
Boko Haram terrorism arguably remains one of the biggest threats to global peace and 
stability in contemporary times (Okoli, Al Chukwuwuma & Lortyer, 2014:44). Since the 
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dawn of this millennium, the incidence of terrorism has been on a steady rise worldwide 
with the manifestation of terrorism most evident in Africa, and in Nigeria in particular where 
the phenomenon has found expression in the emergence of Boko Haram terrorism (Okoli, 
Al Chukwuwuma & Lortyer, 2014). Since its advent, this particular sectarian insurgency has 
wreaked immense havoc in the country, especially because explosives and firearms are used 
with gruesome and fatal consequences (Awake June, 2008:6). A critical corollary of this 
violence is a dire humanitarian crisis that threatens human security in Nigeria where acts of 
terrorism are perpetrated by a Nigerian sect of militants popularly known as Boko Haram 
fundamentalists. Before now, different sects arose in Nigeria with a lesser militancy 
approach in prosecuting their respective objectives (DCCN, 2009). Prominent among them 
were the Odua People’s Congress (OPC) of the Yoruba race, the Bakassi Boys Movement 
for the Actualization of Sovereign State of Biafra (BBMASSOB) of the Igbos, and the Niger-
Delta militants in the southern part of Nigeria. Others without a particular identity also lurk 
dormant within the Nigerian system. However, prominent among these groups is the on-
going Boko Haram terrorism movement, which was the subject of investigation of this study.  
The term ‘Boko Haram’ is of the conception that western secular education is Islamically 
prohibited and that it is an aberration that is highly regarded as a sinful practice by the Boko 
Haram fundamentalists. A study that was conducted by Olagunju (2012) unfolds that, at the 
outset of the new millennium, this group sprang up under the leadership of Mohammed 
Yusuf who hailed from the north-eastern part of Nigeria. It was originally a small, religious 
Islamic organization and social movement that intended to articulate the collective interest 
of the poor masses. Therefore, the question of how the Boko Haram religious group waxed 
stronger and metamorphosed into a predatory, life-threatening phenomenon today remains 
an everyday challenge that cuts across different fields of academic study. It was this 
phenomenon that prompted the current investigation. 
However, based on the findings of the study, it is established that the transformation of Boko 
Haram into a horrific terrorist group is closely associated with failure of the political state 
to meet the basic needs of the citizens.  
Recently, abduction has become one of the several instruments of terrorism. The strategy 
has been exploited against the US ambassador to Guatemala, Haiti and Brazil; President 
Aramburu of Argentina (1970); the British ambassador to Uruguay; and even the entire 
executive body of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The OPEC 
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executives were released only after the terrorists had made a broadcast furthering the 
Palestinian cause over Austrian radio (Anger, 2002). In Africa, terrorism has taken root since 
the 1990s. For instance, the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania also experienced terrorist 
attacks by the Al- Qaeda group. Somalia and Kenya have also experienced different levels 
of terrorism by the Al Shabaab and Ansaru groups. Terrorists’ newly adopted tactic of 
abduction is a modern-day strategy that is made easier with the use more sophisticated 
weapons in the 21st century. This tactic has also been utilized in the Niger- Delta region of 
Nigeria. Most recently, Nigeria has become home to abduction by Boko Haram terrorists. 
The abduction of about 276 school girls from Chibok in the Borno state by the dreaded Boko 
Haram sect only a day after the bombardment of Nyanya in Abuja remains one of the most 
recent atrocities committed by this group (Vanguard, 2014; This Day, 2014).. 
Boko Haram terrorism is the deliberate and systematic use of violence to destroy, kill, maim 
and intimidate innocent citizens in order to achieve a goal or to draw national or international 
attention to their demands which may be impossible or difficult to achieve through normal 
political negotiation or on the battle field against the government’s army (Chukwurah, Eme, 
& Ogbeje, 2015). Terrorism, whether internationalized or localized, is always politically and 
socio-economically motivated, although it may also show other auxiliary motives such as 
religious, socio-ethnic, or cultural reasons. These motives constitute the ideology for which 
these terrorists seek sympathy at a national and global scale and for which they are prepared 
to ravage Nigeria. The Boko Haram sect is undoubtedly the most blood thirsty and destructive 
group and is notorious for its demonic brutality, mindless savagery and intense increase in the 
scope of its operations (Obioma, 2009). From harmless group of 12, it has in recent times 
escalated to more than 10 000 violent members (Akpan et al., 2012). According to Eve and 
Ibietan (2012:34), Boko Haram is “an indigenous salafist group which turned itself into a 
salafist Jihadist movement in 2009. The group was founded by Mohammed Yusuf in 2002 in 
the city of Maiduguri with the aim of establishing a Sharia government in the Borneo state 
under former Governor Ali Modu Sheriff. The founder established a religious complex that 
included a mosque and a school where many poor families from across Nigeria and 
neighbouring countries enrolled their children”. From the beginning, the group’s manifest 
stated that it rejected “…western education, institutions, and agencies that go with it, including 
government institutions. It prefers to have a sharia law applied all over the country, but if that 
is difficult to grant, they would rather have a separate Islamic state carved out of Nigeria, 
where they can practice their religion unhindered. If this is not granted, Nigeria would be 
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made ungovernable”. The government saw these demands as treasonable, unreasonable and 
unacceptable and, in an attempt to purge the group of its excesses, their leader, Mohammed 
Yusuf, died by an alleged extra-judicial killing in 2009. From that year onwards, under the 
assumption of a new leader named Abubakar Shekau, Boko Haram “reinvented violence and 
began what can best be described as the bombardment of northern Nigeria with [a] frequency 
and intensity that are quite unprecedented in the history of violence in Nigeria because those 
who escape death by day, sleep with one eye open by night” (Chukwurah, Eme & Ogbeje, 
2015:12). The Boko Haram sect has created widespread tension across northern Nigeria and 
various ethnic communities where it interrupted commercial activities and frightened 
investors to the extent that their activities generated concern among neighbouring countries. 
This unprecedented state of terrorism by the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria has ruined the 
tranquillity of life in the northern regions of the country. Alarmingly high rates of insecurity 
pervade the northern regions in particular and the nation in general, and the lack of security 
constantly creates serious concerns among average Nigerians.  
A host of previous studies suggest that the Boko Haram sect kicked off as a group of fanatic 
Islamic faithfuls who viewed themselves as a mouthpiece for the poor against all shackles of 
oppression in the north-eastern part of Nigeria (Olagunju 2012;Onuoha, 2010; 
Danjibo,2009.). Today, the sect has transformed and degenerated into a dreadful group of 
terrorists who continue to cause irreparable harm to the nation, more so than any set of 
militants has ever done.  
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
Following the widespread perception that the root cause of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria 
is religious rather than socio-economic, this research project was formulated to examine the 
socio-economic context of the crisis by focusing the relevant research questions on the root 
cause of the insurgency, the pattern of maintenance of the crisis, its socio-economic 
consequences on civil society, and the possible solutions to resolve the problem in Nigeria. 
Boko Haram, the ‘Nigerian Taliban’ that operates in the north-eastern parts of Nigeria, 
stepped up its violent actions against the Nigerian state and its citizens by unleashing a 
systematic campaign of bombings, kidnappings and drive-by shootings on diverse 
government and civilian targets since as far back as July 2009 (Adesoji, 2010). The crisis 
became worse in May 2013 when President Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of 
emergency in the worst hit north-eastern states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe. However, 
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according to Agbiboa (2013a:17), “these emergency measures failed emphatically and 
woefully and eventually turned the tide of the insurgency by strengthening the group's vigour 
to impose its will on Africa’s most populous country”. Of particular concern is the growing 
intensity of sophisticated arms and weapons employed by Boko Haram fighters in recent 
attacks, as shown in the seizures made by state security forces in northern Nigeria. Following 
an intensified state offensive onslaught against Boko Haram, thousands of Nigerians have 
fled into neighbouring countries because of the great fear of retaliatory attacks and general 
insecurity. In 2012,the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
announced that up to 10 000 Nigerians had fled to Niger’s Diffa region, while Cameroon 
was hosting in excess of 44 000 Nigerian refugees and another 2 700 had fled to Chad (cited 
in Agbiboa,2013a:19) The vast majority of these refugees were women and children. 
Meanwhile, some 650 000 people remain internally displaced in north-eastern Nigeria due 
not only to Boko Haram’s acts of domestic terrorism, but also to counter-terrorism initiatives 
and indiscriminate killings by the state-led Joint Military Task Force (JTF) (Baiyewu, 2014; 
Adrian, 2014). In an October 2014 report, the Human Rights Watch noted that Boko Haram 
had kidnapped over 592 persons, mostly girls, boys and women. Since  April 2016, more 
than 20 000 people have been killed by Boko Haram terrorists and about 2.3 million have 
been displaced since the group began its violent campaign in 2009 (The Nation ,2016 April 
20).  
In trying to address the question of the root cause of the crisis, several scholars have assumed 
that the successful conclusion of the 2011 general elections in Nigeria was accompanied by 
the dreadful re-emergence of the radical Islamic terrorist sect (Aro, 2013). The system has 
suffered an uninterrupted and dramatic increase in violence that has been instigated by this 
dreadful sect, and all periodic efforts by the Nigerian government to submerge the group have 
been counterproductive. During the course of prosecuting their objectives, this group has 
destroyed property worth billions of Naira, killed thousands of innocent people, and added 
to the religious misconceptions that plague Nigeria (Aro, 2013). Boko Haram terrorism has 
been described by many research analysts as an anathema to Nigeria’s sustainable 
development. This is evident in the sect’s bombing of the UN building in Abuja and other 
prominent government-owned structures. The sect has openly entrenched its niche in the 
Nigerian consciousness and has tirelessly destroyed life and property in the northern part of 
the country. In executing their cardinal objective, the Boko Haram fundamentalists continue 
to bomb government institutions, offices, police headquarters, army barracks, event centres, 
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schools, universities, churches, mosques, and private property (Peterside, 2014). The most 
deplorable part of their operations is that many of these suicide operatives are teenagers. This 
statement is supported in a report by the United Nations International Children’s Emergency 
fund (UNICEF) which states that more than 75% of the children that are involved in Boko Haram 
suicide bombings are girls, and that "the number of children involved in suicide attacks in 
Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger has risen sharply over the past years, from 4 in 2014 to 
44 in 2015"(UNICEF; cited in the Nation, 2016 April 12). This can be succinctly believed 
to be an attendant consequence of brainwashing vis-à-vis failed socio-economic and political 
situations of the country. 
More specifically, the last straw that broke the camel’s back was the abduction of a total 
number of 276 school girls on 15 April 2014 from the north-eastern town of Chibok in the 
Borno state  (The Punch ,2014 April 16). Following this traumatic incident, no or little 
productive efforts have been made by the Nigerian government, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and other organizations concerned with children’s welfare to salvage 
those children from the unprecedented disaster that befell them. It appears as if these girls 
were left to their own devices as the first who were found seemed to have escaped without 
assistance. For example, in 2014 a total of 57 managed to escape, and in May 2016 another 
girl was found. In October 2016 another 21 managed to escape. On 1 November 2016 and 
in January 2017 another 2 were found(Wikipedia, 2018). Moreover, there was recently a 
security alert by the State Chairman of the National Association of Nigerian Nurses and 
Midwives (NANNM) to inform all nurses in Nigeria that the US embassy in Nigeria had 
alerted them to the fact that Boko Haram was in desperate need of nurses to care for the sick 
and injured abducted girls. It was alerted that nurses would simply be abducted as well and 
that “no nurse should be in uniform outside the hospital premises” (NANNM, 2014). This 
alert marked the significance of the threat in Nigeria. 
Attempts to analyze the socio-economic consequences of Boko Haram terrorism brought the 
present situation in Nigeria into the limelight as the literature portrays nothing but a scenario 
that replicates the Hobbesian problematique which reflects the absolute enthronement of 
anarchy in human society. The level of insecurity that is experienced on a daily basis due to 
the monstrous activities of this sect has transcended beyond what the security apparatuses 
can cope with. The consequences of the anarchy created by Boko Haram terrorism has 
produced a great deal of adverse effects on the socio-economic, political, religious, 
educational and health advancement of the country. As a corollary, there is currently a 
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gradual breakdown of the country’s fiscal strength and national development because most 
resources have been channelled towards providing a lasting panacea and restoring peace to 
the nation. However, all these efforts have been to no avail. In effect, the Boko Haram sect 
is waxing stronger and has caused more havoc in Nigeria than any other sect of militants has 
ever done. In corroboration of this point, Emmanuel Oladosu (The Nation, 2013: 4) states 
the following:  
“Since the end of the civil war, no calamity of such enormous proportion has ever befallen 
the fledgling nation state more than the harrow unleashed by the dreadful sect, Boko Haram. 
Many innocent souls have been lost, [and] property worth billions of Naira have been 
destroyed. Hitherto, nobody is insulated from the attack. Government officials and buildings, 
traditional rulers, police and military formations as well as church worshippers are 
targets.”  
Nigeria is wracked by panic on a daily basis. It is therefore no wonder that Oladosu stresses 
that “the fear of the invincible agitators has become the beginning of wisdom”. It is suggested 
that certain factors that applied to other groups of Nigerian militants must have laid the 
foundation for the emergence of Boko Haram terrorism.  
Wole Soyinka, in an insightful article on the rise of Boko Haram, bitterly bemoans the fact 
that “when you get a situation where a bunch of people can go into a place of worship and 
open fire through the windows, you have reached a certain dismal watershed in the life of 
the nation” (Warner, 2012:38). It was also recorded that, between 20 and 24 January 2012, 
a spate of coordinated bomb attacks in Kano and Bauchi, in which almost two hundred 
people died, pushed Nigeria beyond the threshold of security (Warner, 2012:38). Boko 
Haram has introduced into the Nigerian public space a level of insurgency that has never 
before been witnessed in in this country. Suicide bombings, roadside shootings and bomb 
attacks characterize their modus operandi. Commencing with its engagement in simple 
attacks by employing simple weapons to create sectarian violence, Boko Haram has become 
audacious, sophisticated, and coordinated over time. It destroyed around 600 people in 
various attacks in 2011, and the number of casualties doubled in the first four months of 
2012 (Pothuraju, 2012:1). The initial demands of the group included the establishment of 
unadulterated Sharia law, the prosecution of those responsible for the extrajudicial killing of 
their leaders in 2009, and the release of their detained members (Sango, 2012:1). 
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Undoubtedly, their policy of suicide bombings, shootings and the killing of ordinary citizens 
is aimed at inciting ethno-religious violence in Nigeria (Sango, 2012:1). 
An influential factor that still fuels the maintenance of the crisis in Nigeria is the 
transnational nature of Boko Haram terrorism. This threat looms large as the group’s 
influence extends beyond Nigeria’s national borders to neighbouring countries where 
citizens’ lives are subjected to unprecedented levels of stress from Boko Haram terrorists. 
In light of this observed scope of the problem, it could well be that the transnational nature 
of the insurgency could be attributed to political, community and international support 
offered to the sect. This was an aspect that was explored in depth in the current study. 
Moreover, it was surmised that the problem was compounded by the group’s exponential 
rise and swift radicalization, and that Nigeria and its neighbouring countries would become 
increasingly embattled with issues of individual physical security even as they strive to 
suppress the decades-long economic hardships caused by the irrational policies of successive 
regimes. There is no doubt that Boko Haram’s reign of terror is ongoing and escalating and 
that it is plaguing the Nigerian system; yet there has hitherto been no sign of promising 
efforts to stop the mayhem. Instead, the Nigerian population is periodically exposed to new 
variants of terrorism. This complex situation seems to be entrenched in the Nigerian system 
and it makes it more complicated for Nigeria to win the war against Boko Haram.  
Rgardless of Boko Haram’s rationale for the insurgency that was given impetus in 2009, the 
magnitude of their actions and the years of the havoc that these terrorists wreaked on the 
Nigerian community seem to have left the Nigerian state with little or no hope of arresting 
the atrocious situation. This state of affairs opened the door for what might possibly be 
controversial insights into the root cause of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria.  
When formulating this study and during its execution, the researcher was driven by the belief 
that solutions to the problem could be attained through credible, confirmable and dependable 
answers to the research questions. This means that the root cause of the insurgency has to 
be established in order to address the influential factors that fan the flame of the crisis in 
Nigeria. 
1.3. Objectives of the Study 
The general aim of the study was to determine whether socio-economic or religious factors 
were drivers of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. The specific objectives were to:  
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i. examine public perceptions on the root causes of Boko Haram terrorism in 
Nigeria. 
ii. investigate the patterns that maintain Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. 
iii. examine the socio-economic consequences of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria; 
iv. identify possible techniques that can be adopted to resolve the problem of Boko 
Haram terrorism in Nigeria through the development of appropriate culturally 
acceptable conflict resolution strategies. 
1.4   Research Questions 
Based on the objectives of the study, this research work aimed at finding answers to the 
following research questions: 
i. What are the public perceptions on the root causes of Boko Haram Terrorism in 
Nigeria? 
ii. What patterns characterize Boko Haram terrorism and how do they maintain this 
form of terrorism in Nigeria? 
iii. What are the socio-economic consequences of Boko Haram terrorism in 
Nigeria? 
iv. How can Boko Haram terrorism be resolved in Nigeria? 
1.5 Aim and Scope of the Study 
This study essentially aimed at exploring people’s perceptions on the socio-economic 
context of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. The scope of the study was strictly streamlined 
to the socio-economic context of the insurgency. The study location was confined to the 
Federal Capital Territory of Nigeria. This is the north-central senatorial district which is one 
of the three senatorial districts in the north of the country. The territory is currently made up 
of six local government councils, namely: Abuja, Abaji, Gwagwalada, Kuje, Bwari and 
Kwali. However, the research study was restricted to Abuja Municipal Area Council for 
certain prominent reasons that shall be discussed in the methodology section of this thesis. 
The study population covered two different categories of stakeholders (i.e., male and female) 
with the age bracket ranging from the penal age of 18 and above. 
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Questionnaires were not administered to the participants. The study also did not involve any 
testing of hypotheses due to the nature of the research questions and the methods chosen for 
the investigation. Rather, the study adopted a qualitative methodological approach involving 
an ethnographic method of in-depth interviewing using semi-structured interviews as the 
research instrument. The choice for the adoption of an in-depth interview method was to 
gather a large body of credible and dependable primary data, which may not have been 
possible through a mere survey method. An audio recorder assisted in the procurement of 
oral and institutional data that were collected directly from the field as sources of 
information relevant to the study of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria.  It was argued that 
the chosen method would give greater leverage to the study due to its in-depth and qualitative 
nature. In the secondary data collection phase, relevant published scholarly literature, journal 
articles, newspaper reports, the electronic media, and various other print media were 
scrutinized and analysed. The secondary data were juxtaposed with the primary data for 
credibility, dependability and trustworthiness. 
1.6 Significance of the Study 
In light of the prevalence of the terror campaign that is sustained by members of the Boko 
Haram sect and the fact that all remedies have thus far been ineffectual, it is envisaged that 
the findings of the study will proffer new insights into the on-going discourse on the Boko 
Haram problematique. Most recent studies on the subject matter have not adequately 
addressed the cause and effect sequence of the sectarian phenomenon. In effect, there 
appears to be little or no conscious attempts to understand the socio-economic basis of the 
crisis and its humanitarian effects on national security in Nigeria. On the contrary, many 
people have channelled their respective opinions towards religious injunctions, particularly 
Islam, as the most viable context for the existence of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. 
Therefore, this research sought to fill this gap in the literature in order to add to the extant 
knowledge on the subject matter. It is also expected that the study will make valuable policy 
recommendations on how to reposition the fight against terrorism in Nigeria in order to 
eradicate this scourge.  
More importantly, the widespread assumptions about the cause of Boko Haram terrorism in 
Nigeria have made it difficult for many researchers, particularly those that have shown a 
high sense of research interest, to have a clear-cut understanding of the root cause of the 
crisis. The study was therefore fundamental in establishing the major cause of the Boko 
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Haram impasse in the country in order to nip in the bud all the hypothetical statements 
surrounding the cause of the problem. The study will therefore illuminate the direction that 
should be taken to tackle the menace in order to restore peace, stability and orderliness 
among the affected Nigerian communities. 
It has been widely acknowledged that the development and sustainability of the Nigerian state  
may remain difficult to accomplish if no further efficacious efforts are taken to arrest the on-
going situation of insecurity in the country. In this context, this study is necessary to alert the 
government, non-governmental and other organizations concerned to the needs of citizens 
who are impacted by the repeated havoc that Boko Haram inflicts on the social fabrics of the 
nation. Chief among these areas for retribution are socio-economic development, political 
stability, technological advancement, and the education and general health of the citizens. 
The study will also sensitize the youth, especially those whose lives have been battered by 
acute poverty and social instability, to the fact that they place themselves at risk by engaging 
in terrorism which could compromise their future dreams and their position as tomorrow’s 
leaders. It is hoped that, by taking positive steps towards addressing the various problems of 
the youth as well as making them realize that terrorism is not the last option to achieve their 
goals, the tremendous rate at which the youth degenerate into radicalism and terrorism in 
Nigeria will be reduced. Therefore, by creating various awareness programmes based on the 
findings of the study, incidences of violent terrorism may be radically minimized, if not 
completely eradicated, in the Nigerian society. 
The findings of the study will help policy makers and stakeholders who are involved in the 
provision of basic needs, information and services to the people to understand the adverse 
consequences of insecurity on the quality of life of the citizenry. This will enable them to 
design and adopt more appropriate policies and intervention strategies that will enhance the 
general well-being of the populace. More importantly, the study will sensitize the 
government and NGOs to the causes and impact of Boko Haram terrorism which should, in 
turn, motivate them to improve the socio-economic infrastructure of the country. This may 
safeguard citizens’ moral rectitude and ensure effective individual contributions to national 
development. 
Because the fire-for-fire approach that has been adopted by the Nigerian government to 
submerge the terrorist group has hitherto not produced the desired result, the study is crucial 
to send the message to the world that terrorism cannot be fought with conventional weapons, 
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but that the battle could be won by a diplomatic adoption of psychological and ideological 
strategies that employ peaceful negotiations on equal terms.  
It is undeniable that Boko Haram causes tragedy, panic, dispossession, social dislocation, 
irreparable loss of property and the disappearance and death of loved ones. As a 
consequence of the magnitude of this crisis and the impact of Boko Haram insurgence on 
Nigerian societies, the study will of necessity convey adequate information and ideas to the 
Nigerian state through fieldwork research. This will certainly offer significant steps forward 
towards operationalizing appropriate strategies for conflict resolution in Nigeria. 
1.7 Analytical Explanation of Key Concepts 
The seven basic concepts that were central to this study are clarified and operationalized in 
this section. This will undoubtedly help the reader to have a clearer picture of each of the 
seven concepts that were used in the study, and will also facilitate an understanding of 
the theoretical and empirical underpinnings of the study. 
1.7.1   Socio-economic context 
Socio-economic context delineates the perspective within which the phenomenon of Boko 
Haram insurgency can best be discussed and understood in this thesis. This equally describes 
the socio-economic status (SES) of people in relation to the economic and sociological 
classification indicating the close relationship between people’s relative to the standard of 
living or wealth and their social status or social position relative to other members of the 
society, based on their income, employment status, education, religion and cultural practices. 
The term ‘socio-economic context’, also widely referred to as ‘socio-economic status’ 
(SES), “is a loose, barely definable term used to define social, cultural, economic and 
environmental variables that influence an individual, group, community, society or nation” 
(ILO, 1986:34). Inherent in the usage of this term are variables such as socio-cultural 
practices that are peculiar to the group and economic and work activities. Socio-economic 
factors are “the sectors of an individual's activities and understandings that shape an 
individual as an economically active person” (ILO, 1990:44). According to the International 
Labour Organization (ILO), “culture, social understandings, religion, unemployment and 
education are the main elements that are explored by socio-economics. They also present 
the economic activity and the economic classes within a society and indicate the stage of 
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development of multiculturalism and integration within the developed states and the 
developing economies” (ILO:44). 
This study identifies socio-economic factors as the key variables responsible for the 
propagation of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. In this context, the study refers to 
poverty, joblessness, illiteracy, false religious doctrine, material deprivation, state-actor 
terrorism, bad governance occasioned by leadership deficit and failure, non-fulfilment of 
social contract as regards the provision of basic amenities to the citizenry by the political 
state, corruption, greed, political deceit and injustice as the offshoot of Boko Haram 
terrorism in Nigeria. 
1.7.2 Boko Haram 
There is neither an academic nor an international legal consensus regarding the definition of 
the concept ‘Boko Haram’. In the same vein, the international community has been dilatory 
to formulate a universally agreed upon and legally-binding definition of this concept. The 
complexity and nebulous nature of this concept arose from the fact that the term ‘Boko 
Haram’ is politically, socio-economically, religiously and emotionally charged. For this 
reason, “it has become an academic ‘Eden’ for many scholars due to the intricacies 
encountered in pinning down its etymological perception” (Okoro, 2012). Given the 
multiplicity of views that characterize the concept, it thus becomes onerously for anyone to 
manufacture the divergent views to come up with a working definition of the concept. 
However, an attempt would be made to pin down its conventional meaning in this study.  
By definition, the term ‘Boko and Haram’ originates from the Hausa/Arabic languages. 
‘Boko’ means animist, Western or non-Islamic education. ‘Haram’ on the other hand is an 
Arabic term meaning ‘forbidden’ or ‘sacred’. By Islamic definition, the word is used to refer 
to anything that is prohibited by the Islamic faith, while its antonym is regarded as ‘halal’ 
(Okoro, 2012). According to Okoro, “Boko Haram can be applied to certain forbidden acts 
or items such as food stuff, food ingredients, pork, alcohol, etc. … Ideologically, Boko 
Haram opposes not just Western education, but all the attributes of Western culture and 
modern science.” In other words, it declares Western or non-Islamic education as sinful. Put 
differently as agued by Okoro (2012:14), “any group that is opposed to Western culture and 
influence, depicted most poignantly by democracy and [the] Christian religion, will find a 
ready soul-mate in Boko Haram zealots”. Whichever way one looks at Boko Haram, it is 
comprehended as an attempt to provoke fear and to intimidate the main target audience, 
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which could either be  a government, a whole society or a group within a society. To 
Nwankwo (2014:19), “the goal of Boko Haram in Nigeria may be to impose an extreme 
interpretation of Islam and abolish Western education, and this may be the rationale for 
couching its atrocities under the guise of anti-Western education. It should be noted that all 
other aspects of Western culture-democracy, Christianity and so forth, are inseparable in any 
significant way from its educational component”. More specifically, Boko Haram is an 
Islamist movement that strongly opposes man-made laws and westernization. It is regarded 
as a Jihadist militant organization based in the north-east of Nigeria and northern Cameroon. 
As an indigenous group, it transformed itself into a Jihadist group and proposes that 
interaction with the Western world is forbidden. According to Nwankwo (2014), it supports 
opposition to the government of Nigeria. 
Furthermore, the nomenclature ‘Boko Haram’ is derived from a combination of the Hausa 
word ‘boko’ (book or Western education) and the Arabic word ‘haram’ (unlawful). If 
combined, Boko Haram means ‘Western education is unlawful’ (Onuoha, 2012). Boko 
Haram was derived as “a nickname given to the movement by outsiders by truncating a 
slogan repeated by the late Mohammed Yusuf on video discs, prohibiting not just the 
colonial European format of literacy but any collaboration with the neo-colonial state” 
(Manfredi, 2014:2). However, Boko Haram has rejected the designation ‘Western education 
is unlawful’; instead, it prefers the slogan, ‘Western culture is forbidden’. As a senior 
member of the group explained, “culture is broader, as it includes education but [is] not 
determined by Western education” (Onuoha, 2012:136). In northern Nigeria, a distinction is 
often drawn between makarantan boko (schools providing ‘Western’ education) and 
makarantan addini (schools for religious instruction) or makarantan allo (schools of the 
state that are understood to be Koranic schools)” (Danjibo, 2009:8). Across northern 
Nigeria, makarantan boko continues to be linked to endeavours by evangelical Christians to 
convert Muslims who fear southern economic and political domination. Isa (2010:322) 
argues that Boko Haram implies a “sense of rejection” and “resistance to imposition of 
Western education and its system of colonial social organization, which replaced and 
degraded the earlier Islamic order of the jihadist state”, otherwise known as the “Sokoto 
Caliphate”.  
1.7.3 Terrorism 
The term ‘terrorism’ derives from the word ‘terror’ meaning ‘to frighten’ in Latin. Alao 
(2011) observes that terror refers to panic and a state of emergency in Rome in response to 
17 
 
the approach of warriors of the Cimbri tribe in 105 BC. In contemporary times it has been 
adopted to mean:  
“A wide range of deployment of forces … targeted at a civilian population by 
disgruntled elements within the society to direct the attention of [a] government to 
the plight of militants or to force a change of government. Regardless of the problem 
associated with the definition, certain attributes of terrorism manifest in bombings, 
assassinations, armed assaults, kidnappings, hostage situations and hijackings” 
(Alao, 2011:21).  
The latter study agrees with Cunningham (2003) that a wide variety of actors, namely 
individuals such as Carlos Illych Ramirez (the Jackal) or the Unabomber, groups such as the 
Tamil Tigers, Provisional IRA, Hamas and Boko Haram, and institutions such as the 
Gestapo, the KGB, SAVAK and even governments and states such as the Taliban practise 
what could be defined as terrorism. Moreover, the engagements of America in Vietnam, 
Iraq, Pakistan, Libya and Egypt is also seen by some as acts of terrorism. Reich (1998) 
argues that terrorism is a strategy of resistance to oppression by modem states which evolved 
some half century after the French Revolution(1789), and the term describes a state or a 
regime of terror. 
According to the United States Department of Defence (2013:6), terrorism is “the calculated 
use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear [that is] intended to 
coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally 
political, religious or ideological”. Inherent in this definition are the three key elements of 
violence, fear, and intimidation. All three these elements compel the instigation of terror in 
the victims or those at the receiving end of the terrorist acts. The American Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI: 2013:6) defines terrorism as “the unlawful use of force and violence 
against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or 
any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives”. From a military 
perspective, the US Department of Defence (2014:3) comprehends terrorism as “the 
deployment of premeditated politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-
combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence 
an audience”. Kashima (2003) and Martin (2003) add to the scholarly debate about what 
constitutes terrorism by stating that what is blithely understood as acts of terrorism might be 
perceived as a struggle for emancipation from the shackles of oppression.  
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Terrorism has been described as a worldwide enigma, yet there is no universal consensus in 
terms of what constitutes a terrorist. The definition of terrorism remains so multifarious that 
several attempts put forward by various experts on the subject remain unresolved. According 
to Anger (2002), a commonly accepted definition of terrorism has been difficult to devise 
due to reasons of politics rather than semantics. This is because every party tends to define 
terrorism to suit its own purpose or motive. Dickson (2005), as cited in Tersoo and 
Terzungwe (2015), thinks that terrorism is the “premeditated use, or threat of use of violence 
or force, to gain political objectives through intimidation of a targeted audience…. It is an 
act of deliberate violence against individuals or groups”. It is important to note that 
Dickson’s definitional attempt may be seen as narrow because terrorists now pursue 
religious and economic ends as well as political ones. To Clausewitz (2009), terrorism is the 
continuation or extension of war, yet it differs from conventional kinds of war. The latter 
author argues that it transforms on occasion into guerrilla warfare, but unlike guerrillas, 
terrorists are unable or unwilling to take power or hold territory. According to Goldstein, 
(1999), terrorism refers to political violence that deliberately and indiscriminately targets 
civilians. Wittkopf and Kegley (1999:12) support Goldstein’s view when they reiterate that 
terrorism is, according to Title 22 of the United States Code (USC), “premeditated, 
politically motivated violence that is perpetrated against non-combatant (civilian) targets by 
sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience”. 
Similar to Dickson’s perception, Todd and Keith perceive terrorism as “the premeditated 
use of, or the threat to use, extra-normal violence or brutality to gain a political objective 
through intimidation or fear” (Todd & Keith, 1995). Although the instruments of terror are 
varied and the motivations of terrorists are diverse, experts agree that terrorism is “the use 
or threat of violence, a method of combat or a strategy to achieve certain goals that [are] 
aimed to induce a state of fear in the victim, as well as ruthless decisions that do not conform 
to humanitarian norms, and in which publicity is an essential factor in the terrorist strategy” 
(Laqueur, 1987 in Wittkopf & Kegley, 1999). The Nigerian Terrorism Prevention Act of 
2011 describes terrorism as “calculated and extreme use of violence or threatened violence, 
perpetuated by malice, to cause serious harm or violence against individuals, governments 
and their assets with the intention to attain political, religious or ideological goals, through 
intimidation or coercion or instilling fear on civilian population” (Federal Republic of 
Nigeria Terrorism Prevention Act 2011:1).  
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However, none of these cited definitions of terrorism, no matter how extensive or detailed, 
can claim to capture the whole idea of terrorism as used and understood by different people. 
It is on this account that some scholars argue that a comprehensive definition of terrorism 
does not actually exist and may not be devised in the predictable future. Based on this 
argument, the hyperbolized quotation argues that “one man’s terrorist is another man’s 
freedom fighter and one nation’s liberation movement can always be another’s terrorist 
organization”. For instance, Osama Bin Laden was an indispensable instrument in al-
Qaeda’s quest for freedom, but the Americans launched a US$3 billion project in August 
1998 by firing at least 15 American missiles at the US president’s orders against the same 
man (Gasper, 2001:3). In another instance the Jewish underground movement in Palestine, 
which was referred to as ‘terrorists’ in the 1930s, was suddenly described as ‘freedom 
fighters’ after the 1942 Holocaust (Dickson, 2005). However, in an attempt to comprehend 
the concept of terrorism, the scholar should seek the motive of a person or a group of people 
seek for the use of force against at non-combatant or civilians to attract or motivate an action. 
Therefore, whatever the argument of scholars may be regarding this subject, it is a truism 
that terrorism occurs on a global scale and that it ravages national security and world peace. 
Considering the theoretical and conceptual arguments of this study, two forms of terrorism 
were deemed relevant to this research, namely state-actors terrorism and non-state actors 
terrorism. 
(a) State-actors terrorism is also known as ‘state terrorism’. It is a form of terrorism that 
is practised by a government against its own people. It is said to be “a calculated use 
of violence,  force or threat against the people by instilling fear through the use of 
intimidation or coercion with a view of achieving specific goals and objectives” 
(Ogunrotifa, 2013). In the same vein, state-actors terrorism is a form of counter-
terrorist acts and tactics used by a state to suppress dissent, rebels,  anti-status quo, 
and violent opposition to its rule among its citizens. State terrorism entails the use 
of terrorism against weaker states and the use of state institutions to sponsor or 
provide logistical support for foreign combatant sects that engage in individual 
terrorism against their own state. For instance, in Nigeria the Joint Task Force (JTF) 
embarked upon a militarized campaign to fight against Boko Haram insurgents, 
which is a classic example of state-actor terrorism. Similar examples of this form of 
terrorism also cut across a wide range of global societies such as the United States, 
the United Kingdom, Australia, Europe and other parts of sub-Saharan Africa. 
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(b) Non-state actors terrorism is also called ‘individual terrorism’. It is a form of terrorism 
that is perpetrated by an individual or a group with a view to taking over a territory 
or championing a cause or expressing grievances over a general state of affairs with 
the purpose of intimidating or coercing a government, individuals or groups to accept 
their ideology or their course of action.  It is a kind of terrorism carried out by 
sect(s) or non-state actor(s) against the state and the ruling class with the aim of 
attaining certain objectives. They do not trust the police, courts or other state 
institutions, and whenever they feel aggrieved, they seek various means of diffusing 
their grievances such as through maiming, killing, disorderliness and violence. 
Individual terrorism includes suicide bombings, kidnapping of key political figures, 
wanton  destruction  of  lives  and  property,  assassinations,  and the killing  of  
individuals  believed to oppose their interests (Ogunrotifa, 2013). Examples of such 
groups are Boko Haram, Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, Al-Shabaab, and ISIS which operates 
in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, Somalia, Libya, Mali and the Middle East, as 
well as other individual terrorist organizations that operate in various parts of the 
world. 
1.7.4  Class 
Class connotes a group of people in society t ha t  have t h e  same relationship in terms of 
means of production and governance (Ogunrotifa, 2013). The class which owns and 
controls the means of production rules society. In the contemporary world, the capitalist 
system has generated a class system within societies that revolves around class 
differences. This thesis highlights four major categories of class that define the Nigerian 
society.  
 Ruling class: This refers to a broad group of people that controls the economic 
and political power of the state and of society. They are in possession of material 
wealth; they own the means of production and exercise power and authority to 
shape the pol i t i ca l  and  economic direction of the country. The ruling 
class t h u s  comprises the economic elite (capitalist/business sector leaders) as 
well as the political elite (representatives in government, people of political 
power, the wealthy, politicians, and hired political managers) of the country. 
 Middle class: This refers to a broad group of people that constitutes the 
administrative bulk of the governance structure. It is a class that stands or falls 
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socio-economically between the ruling class and the working class. 
Professionals such as lawyers, university lecturers, doctors, nurses, teachers, 
policemen, members of the armed forces, civil/public servants, engineers, and 
business managers abound in this class. The nature and attributes of the middle 
class depend on high educational status, professional qualifications, and 
lifestyles that are inclined towards those of the ruling class. 
 Working class: This term denotes a broad group of people that does not own any 
means of production and that is not related to the administrative structures and 
governance of the state or society. A wide range of  people falls  into 
this category and comprises people who sell their physical labour and often 
their  fundamental  human rights  to earn a living. They do not own mines, 
oil wells, land, capital, factories and other means of production but they 
contribute directly to the production processes. 
 Lumpen class: This category refers to peasants, artisans, the unemployed and 
other groups in the society that are regarded as ‘parasites’ that live and feed on 
the sweat and labour of other classes in the society. The members of the lumpen 
class a r e  a r g u a b l y  the majority of the population.  This group comprises 
millions  of teeming labourers,  peasant farmers,  jobless  graduates,  
underemployed  workers,  criminals,  beggars,  prostitutes,  the poor,  the aged  
and other social strata that lie outside the wage-labour system. Prior to the 
study, there were strong suggestions that it is this class that contributes most 
significantly to the increasing size and power of the Boko Haram sect although 
the sect has representatives from all four the classes of the Nigerian society. 
This point was a particular focus of the current study. 
1.7.5 Sect 
A sect (or often more commonly referred to as a ‘gang’) can be described as a small group 
of people who exhibit opinions that are contrary to those held by the masses of society, but 
who see themselves as the fighters for the rights of the majority. They are said to be non-
state actors or a group of people forming a distinct faction within a larger group on the basis 
of shared beliefs and specific objectives (Ogunrotifa, 2013). Sects usually comprise religious 
groups, ethnic militias, rebels, fascist organizations, and anarchist/insurgent groups. It is 
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noteworthy that the Boko Haram sect targets members of the lumpen class for recruitment 
and membership. In effect, the majority of the sect originates from the lumpen class. 
 
1.7.6 Conflict 
Marxists define conflict as “a class struggle, trial of strength, clash, or a disagreement 
between two or more parties … which usually results from material deprivation vis-à-vis 
[the] failure of the political state to distribute resources uniformly across the civil society” 
(See Giddens, 2010).  Such situations are believed by Karl Marx to create the ‘impetus’ or 
‘tonic’ for the transformation of various societies. Conflict as a social reality has been part 
and parcel of human existence. Whether it is in the ‘state of nature’ as described by Thomas 
Hobbes, or the history of ancient or modern empires, or even contemporary history that is 
marked by the emergence of the modern nation-states, all have witnessed one form of 
conflict or another. Africa, like other continents of the world, has witnessed series of 
conflicts. Some of these conflicts were anti-colonial and anti-apartheid struggles (South 
Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Namibia), civil wars (Nigeria, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, 
Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo), and communal cum 
ethno-religious and political conflicts such as Boko Haram in Nigeria, the Niger-Delta 
Militants, the Niger-Delta Avengers (NDA), the Fulani Herdsmen, the Tiv-Jukun, Ife-
Modakeke, Pan-Gamai, Hausa/Fulani-Birom, Afizere and Anaguta, to mention a few. 
Absence of conflict is a recipe for growth and development and the effects of conflict 
determine whether a society will move forward or backward. Because the absence of conflict 
is said to be an indispensable ingredient for the growth and development of any nation, the 
quest to resolve it has increasingly attracted the attention of policy makers, governments, 
non-governmental organizations and scholars across the global spectrum. 
1.7.7 Insurgency 
Scholars and theorists have offered different definitions of insurgency over time and space. 
Criticisms of widely held ideas and actions about insurgency began to occur in the works of 
the 1960s, and they are still prevalent in recent studies (Robert & Timothy, 2009). While 
some of these definitions are closely related, others are not overtly related but contain 
common elements; however, this still makes the subject technically difficult to understand.  
Liolio (2013:7) posits that “insurgency is not terrorism or conventional war, [but argues that] 
they share some similarities such as the use of force or guerrilla tactics to achieve an end 
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which is often political”. Basically, the difference between insurgency and terrorism lies in 
the scope and magnitude of the violence that is employed (Liolio, 2013). For instance, where 
terrorism rarely brings about political change on its own, insurgency attempts to bring about 
change through forceful use of arms. Terrorists often apply a wider range of force compared 
to insurgents. Moreover, where conventional warfare involves adversaries that are more or 
less symmetric in equipment or training, insurgency involves adversaries that are 
asymmetric and weak. Traditionally, insurgents seek to overthrow an existing order and 
replace it with one that is commensurate with their political, economic, ideological or 
religious goals (Gompert & Gordon, 2008). 
Kilcullen (2006:12) argues that insurgency is “a struggle to control a contested political 
space between a state (and a group of states or occupying powers) and one or more popularly 
based non-state challenger/s”. The author also tries to draw a line between classical and 
contemporary insurgencies. Thus, while the latter seeks to replace the existing order, the 
former sometimes strives for the expulsion of foreign invaders from a given territory, or it 
seeks to fill an existing power vacuum. In summary, insurgency connotes “an internal 
uprising [that occurs] often outside the confines of a state’s laws and it is often characterized 
by social-economic and political goals as well as military or guerrilla tactics”. Put 
differently, it is “a protracted struggle carefully and strategically executed to accomplish 
certain goals with an eventual aim of replacing the existing power structure” (Kilcullen, 
2006:12).   
Robert and Timothy (2009:13) view insurgency “as a rebellion against authority (for 
example, an authority recognized as such by the United Nations) when those taking part in 
the rebellion are not recognized as belligerents”. To them, “an insurgency can be fought via 
counter-insurgency warfare, and may also be opposed by measures to protect the population, 
and by political and economic actions of various kinds aimed at undermining the insurgents' 
claims against the incumbent regime”. When insurgency is used to describe a movement's 
unlawfulness by virtue of not being authorized by or in accordance with the law of the land, 
its use is neutral. However, when it is used by a state or another authority under threat, 
insurgency often carries the implication that the rebels' cause is illegitimate, whereas those 
rising up will see the authority itself as being illegitimate. Sometimes one or more 
simultaneous insurgencies may occur in a country. The Iraqi insurgency is a classic example 
of a recognized government versus multiple groups of insurgents. Robert and 
Timothy(2009) argue that some historic insurgencies, such as the Russian Civil War, “were 
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multipolar rather than straightforward models made up of two sides”. The Boko Haram 
insurgency, coupled with other existing insurgent groups, is a prominent example in the 
Nigerian context. 
Insurgency, like terrorism, has no single definition but it is often presumed to be 
synonymous with terrorism and guerrilla warfare, and in this context these terms are 
sometimes used interchangeably. A key distinction is that an insurgency is a movement; i.e., 
a political effort with a specific mission to accomplish some socio-political and economic 
goals. By the same token, the disparity between insurgency and terrorism comes down to 
the intent and the mission of the individual actors. In Tomes’s (2004) opinion, “insurgency 
movements and guerrilla forces could adhere to international norms regarding the law of 
war in achieving their goals, but terrorists are by definition conducting crimes under both 
civil and military legal codes”. The latter author (Tomes, 2004:8) also argues that insurgents 
differ in their use of tactics and techniques, but that the following four elements typically 
encompass and define an insurgency: 
i. Cell-networks which are used to maintain secrecy; 
ii. Terrorism which is always used to foster insecurity among the population; 
iii. Multi-faceted attempts to cultivate support among the general population; 
iv. Attacks against the government and the political state occur as a matter of 
course.  
1.8 Dissertation Overview 
The thesis comprises seven chapters.  
Chapter One is the introductory section and provides a brief descriptive essay on the research 
topic, the background to the research, and the statement of the problem. This chapter also 
illuminates the significance of the study and highlights the aim, scope, objectives and 
research questions. The key concepts that were deemed relevant and central to an 
understanding of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria are also elucidated.  
Chapter Two focuses on introducing the rationale for the study that was anchored in a review 
of relevant literature and other scholarly investigations. The chapter critically reviews 
previous studies and thus identifies the gaps in the literature with specific reference to Boko 
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Haram terrorism. The discourse attempts to address the relevant research questions that 
related to this phenomenon before the field work phase of the study was commenced.  
Chapter Three provides a theoretical framework for the study by illuminating relevant 
theoretical models which served as a blueprint according to which Boko Haram terrorism 
could be better investigated, explained and understood. The chapter explores the social 
exchange, social conflict and rational choice theories to account for the wide variety of 
factors that prompted and sustained Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria.  
Chapter Four focuses on a description of the methodological strategies that were employed 
in the execution of the study. The research design and methods are described and justified 
and the study setting (or study location) is discussed. The chapter also describes the various 
steps that were undertaken in generating and analyzing the qualitative data. The chapter 
systematically addresses the objectives of the study while incorporating excerpts from the 
data under specific themes. The discourse entails a detailed discussion of the ethical 
considerations that underpinned the study, with particular reference to participant 
anonymity, confidentiality, privacy and informed consent that were adhered to in the 
processes of selecting the participants and retrieving and analyzing the data. Finally, the 
chapter presents the strengths and limitations of the study and discusses how the challenges 
that were encountered were overcome in order to achieve the stated objectives of the 
research.  
Chapter Five focuses on the analysis, interpretation, and presentation of the data that were 
collected during the fieldwork phase of the project. The chapter also addresses the findings 
that emerged from the identified themes for comparative and reflective purposes.  
Chapter Six also discussed part of the study findings with reference to emerging themes for 
comparison and scholarly reflection 
Chapter Seven concludes this thesis. It presents a summary of the main findings, draws 
relevant conclusions, and offers policy recommendations and suggestions for future 







The concept of terrorism has become a major concern in philosophies, humanities and in 
the social sciences following the early writings of Thomas Hobbes, Talcott Parsons, 
Auguste Comte, Emile Durkheim, Karl Marx and other philosophers who critically delved 
into the discursive framework of the Enlightenment epoch and the qualitative effects of the 
French Revolution of 1789 on the European society (Fukuyama, 1992). Although none of 
these philosophers singled out terrorism as a study, each commented on it in the course of 
explaining other pertinent social vices at that time. Terrorism regained renewed academic 
vigour following the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 in Soviet Russia, the counter-
revolutionary violence of 1919 in Hungary, and the events of 1919 in Spain and 1925 in 
Germany. Coupled with the attendant crises of these events and the violence and social 
dislocations that heralded the cold war period (Fukuyama, 1992 cited in Ogunrotifa, 2013), 
terrorism became a force to be reckoned with. The post-cold war era did not usher in a new 
lease of peace and the end of terroristic history, as suggested by Francis Fukuyama (1992). 
Rather, it has been characterized by brutal killings and campaigns of terrorism and violence 
in countries such as Somalia, Afghanistan, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and 
the defunct Yugoslavia. The nature of conflict thus changed from international to local 
platforms where different state actors and non-state actors engaged in terrorism to express 
their discontent and to defend their respective interests. 
The escalation of terrorism and the wave of global insecurity that shaped the advent of the 
21st century were the products of unsettled issues that the cold war had generated 
(Ogunrotifa, 2013). Deepening contradictions and the fallout of these unresolved issues came 
to the fore following the attack on the New York Trade Centre and Washington DC in 2001, 
and terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004, in London in 2005, and in Oslo in 2011 on the one 
hand, and attacks in non-Western countries such as Somalia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, 
Yemen and Nigeria on the other hand (Onuoha, 2012; Ogunrotifa, 2013). 
In Nigeria, savage killings and wanton destruction of property characterize the on-going 
terrorist attacks by Boko Haram insurgents in the northern part of the country, whereas the 
recent Niger-Delta crisis in the southern region of the country was instigated by sectarian 
27 
 
groups and militants as a protest against the Nigerian state (Osaghea, 2005). According to 
Osaghea, Nigeria’s internal security remained extremely volatile following a spate of 
shootings, kidnappings, bombings and suicide assaults at the time. Almost every week 
during this period as argued by Osaghea, there were reports of attacks or threats, putting the 
security agencies on high alert. The carnage caused by a series of bombings of most towns 
and cities left over a hundred dead bodies in its wake, while charred remains of vehicles 
dotted the affected places and many public buildings went up in smoke.  
Globally, terrorism has permeated every facet of international society after the September 11 
attacks in the US, and the subsequent ‘war on terrorism’ has left few areas unaffected by the 
hysteria caused by the threat of terrorism. Since then, the study of terrorism has preoccupied 
the attention of scholars with a view to establishing a viable foundation for the peaceful 
resolution of conflicts in the contemporary epoch (Ogunrotifa, 2013). 
Basically speaking, the issues surrounding acts of terrorism have for centuries been a global 
scourge. As a result of this, the published works of distinguished scholars have raised and 
addressed many issues relating to these problems. In this context, a review of international 
research on Boko Haram terrorism revealed several explanations for why this phenomenon 
still persists in Nigeria despite many attempts to stamp it out. In an attempt to illuminate the 
findings of the various studies that have been conducted on the topic, the review of previous 
research and empirical studies is sub-divided into the following sections: 
i. Socio-historical springboard of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. 
ii. Boko Haram’s ideology and the human condition in north-eastern Nigeria. 
iii. The rationale for Boko Haram’s revolt. 
iv. Youth membership of Boko Haram terrorism. 
v. Constitutional issues and Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. 
vi. A panoramic and chronological overview of Boko Haram’s activities in Nigeria. 
vii. Attempted measures to submerge Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria.   
2.1.1 Socio-historical springboard of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria 
The historical conjecture of the birth of Boko Haram in Nigeria is robed with the chains of 
controversy. Different studies have persistently argued that the activities of Boko Haram 
fundamentalists kicked off in the year 2002, while some argue that it was an attendant 
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consequence of 2011 general elections. These submissions are sharply contradicted by a study 
that was conducted by Ekanem, Dada and Ejue (2012:232), who assert that the Boko Haram 
activities were predated to the 2011 general elections. They argue that this political era was 
not the first time in the Nigerian history that people engaged in different forms of political 
and ethnic revolt with some degree of religious undertone, particularly in the northern part of 
Nigeria. According to the latter scholars, Boko Haram has been in existence since the 1960s, 
but only began to draw attention in 2002. It is on record that this particular sect operated 
under the name ‘Shabaab Muslim Youth Organization’ with Mallam Abubakar Lawal as the 
leader from 1995. However, the leadership of the group shifted to Mallam Mohammed Yusuf 
when Mallam Lawal left Nigeria to continue his education in Saudi Arabia. It was the 
leadership of Mallam Mohammed Yusuf that allegedly guided the group to political 
influence and popularity (Joe, 2012). There is therefore no denying the fact that Boko Haram 
fundamentalism was officially founded by Mallam Mohammed Yusuf in 2002 in the city of 
Maiduguri in the north-eastern region of Nigeria, with the particular aim of establishing a 
Sharia government in Borno and its neighbouring state (Toni, 2011). From 2002, after 
Yusuf’s installation as the sect’s leader, Boko Haram styled itself after al-Qaeda and the 
Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Following Mohammed Yusuf’s declaration that 
democracy and Western education in Nigeria must be overthrown, military forces invaded 
the home of Boko Haram in Maiduguru and disrupted the organization, and they eventually 
captured Yusuf on 30 July 2009 (Onuoha & Ugwueze, 2014). 
In its early days, many observers saw the group as a small social movement that had been 
established to strive for the collective interest of the poor by correcting the political errors 
of the ruling class in the north-eastern part of Nigeria. Boko Haram was not a violent 
movement at its inception, but recently it has killed more than 5 000 civilians between July 
2009 and June 2014. This figure includes at least 2 000 deaths in the first half of 2014 in a 
series of coordinated attacks that occurred predominantly in the north-east, north-central and 
central regions of Nigeria (Sergie & Johnson, 2014). 
Historically, Boko Haram, as a small group with an Islamic doctrine, saw itself as a cohesive 
unit embarking on a vendetta to avenge the killing of its members. For this reason, coupled 
with its rejection of Western education, the group is often compared to the Maitatsine 
movement of the 1970s and 1980s in northern Nigeria (Toni, 2011; Agbiboa, 2013c; 
Thurston, 2016). The Maitatsine group, led by Mohammed Marwa, condemned the reading 
of books other than the Quran.  Marwa’s ideology originated from the fact that he claimed 
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to be a prophet in the image of Usman Dan Fodio – Boko Haram’s founding leader, as some 
Islamic scholars submitted. This also stems from the belief that Boko Haram’s ideology was 
inspired by the sect’s determination and commitment to eradicate what they thought were 
heresies and to implement the Sharia legal codes in Nigeria. To achieve this aim, Boko 
Haram has persisted in its belief that the political regime in Nigeria should change, because 
in its view a democratic and secular constitution contravenes the Sharia law and is an affront 
to the laws of Allah. Scholarly writings confirm that Boko Haram conducted its operations 
relatively peacefully during the first seven years of its existence. However, there were 
repeated warnings that the group was potentially dangerous and a threat to the government, 
but such warnings were ignored partly because the group had  once been used as a political 
leverage in the election of the then Borno state governor, Sheriff Musa (The Guardian, 
2009).   
Aliyu Tilde (2012) observes that, before the onset of the insurgency crisis, the sect’s leader 
(Muhammed Yusuf) wrote a series of letters to the Borno State government and the Borno 
Commissioner of Police in which he called for the compensation of the families of those who 
had been killed by the police during the funeral procession of their members who had been 
killed extra-judicially. He followed these letters with a personal visit to the police, but all 
appeals fell on deaf ears. He then urged the Inspector General of police and the Yar’adua 
administration several times to intervene, but nothing was done to b r i n g  the culprits 
to book. He began to issue threats to the government and the police, castigating Yar’adua’s 
government and labelling Yar’adua as an oppressor who led an unjust government. Muslim 
leaders and scholars who opposed his threat against the government were declared hypocrites 
and unbelievers, which is a dire insult in the Muslim faith. He and his members began to arm 
themselves while receiving support from many who sympathized with them and who held 
grievances against the ‘jungle justice’ approach of the Nigerian police. It is said that he 
received sympathy even from some non-Muslims who allegedly bailed him out on occasions 
when he was detained by the police on the ground of perceived breach of peace due to 
his threats to Yar’adua’s government (Tilde, 2012).  
The reciprocal action of Boko Haram to engage in the use of terrorism as a response to the 
use of state terrorism by the police and the Nigerian ruling class “is a dialectical process that 
is shared through socio-class relations” (Ogunrotifa, 2013). While the material condition for 
Boko Haram to strike and embark on a revenge mission was ripe, the catalyst for such a 
mission was linked to the perceived threat to its leaders and members, and until that 
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happened, the sect remained in the background while arming itself. As the sect was preparing 
for insurrection, the Nigerian government was aware of this fact and prepared to counter any 
aggression. The security information available to the government suggested that the sect 
might strike any time and, in order to prevent that, a pre-emptive strike under the code name 
‘Operation Flush’ was launched on the sect’s hideout in the Dutsen Tanshi area of Bauchi 
on 26 July 2009 by a joint security team. During this operation, nine of its members were 
arrested and materials for making bombs and other weapons were confiscated (Adesoji, 
2010:98). This led to a  reprisal attack on t h e  police and prison formations on the same 
day. The leader of the group, Yusuf, was subsequently arrested and he died later in police 
custody.  
The insurgency which started in Bauchi quickly spread to the six northern states of Borno, 
Yobe, Gombe, Kano, Kaduna and Katsina. This left hundreds of people dead and several 
houses, churches, police stations, prisons, government offices, schools and government 
property were burnt and destroyed (Adesoji, 2010:99). Danjibo (2009) notes that more than 
500 members of the sect were killed by government security forces in Borno. In Bauchi, 41 
persons, including a soldier and a police officer, lost their lives while in Yobe State, 43 
persons lost their lives. The sect also suffered some casualties. By the time the violence was 
curtailed, between 1 000 and 1 400 people had lost their lives with inestimable damage to 
property. The sect was said to have used propelled grenades, locally produced bombs and 
AK 47 riffles in carrying out these attacks against civil society (Danjibo, 2009). 
A study by Freedom Onuoha (2012) suggests that, in the aftermath of t h e  five- day 
revolt, over 3 500 people were internally displaced, more than 1 264 children were 
orphaned, and more than 392 women were widowed. In addition, 28 policemen and five 
prison warders, as well as an undisclosed number of soldiers, were killed. Properties 
w e r e  destroyed, including 48 buildings, three primary schools, more than 12 churches 
and a magistrate’s court. The Boko Haram uprising of 2009 was finally quelled when its 
founder—Mohammed Yusuf−was captured by the military and handed over to the police 
for interrogation. He died while in police custody, although the police and the Nigerian 
government denied that he was executed, claiming that he was shot when trying to escape 
from police custody. This claim was faulted by the Al-Jazeera news agency who reported 
that his body had been found in the street, still handcuffed. This raised concerns that he 
had been the victim of an extra-judicial execution. This is confirmed by documentary 
and video evidence made available by an online blog that  shows that t he  Boko Haram 
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leader and other members of the sect were extra-judicially executed by the security forces 
in the aftermath of the uprising (Onuoha, 2012). Onuoha also observes that the news of the 
crisis of 25 to 30 July 2009, which led to the alleged extra-judicial execution of Mohammed 
Yusuf, spread across the four northern states of Bauchi, Kano, Yobe and Borno. Reports 
reveal that the demise of the Boko Haram leader was an unfortunate incident that 
established the platform from which the Armageddon was launched by Boko Haram 
insurgents in the Nigerian state. The aftermath of this is experienced to this day. 
The use of state terrorism in the extra-judicial killing of t h e  Boko Haram leader 
suggests that this gruesome murder was a deliberate action by the Nigerian ruling class 
to establish its supremacy, and t h a t  i t  w as  a n  ac t i o n  worse than any o th er  fo rm  
o f  crime (Onuoha, 2010). The Nigerian government regarded his death as ‘justice’, but 
justice traditionally means a due process of law according to which a person who is accused 
of even the most heinous crime is entitled to appear before a court presided over by a judge 
and jury with a lawyer to conduct his defence. In other words, every person is entit led 
to a fair trial. Mohammed Yusuf had no trial. He was simply gunned down in the police 
station because the verdict had been decided in advance. If he was indeed guilty of treason, 
terrorism and other associated crimes, why not put him on trial? It is quite obvious that, 
from the standpoint of the ‘war against terror’, the capture of Mohammed Yusuf would 
have been more advantageous because of the intelligence that could have been gleaned 
from interrogating him and his supporters,  who were also killed. I t  c an  o n l y  b e  
s u r m i s e d  t h a t  the reason the Nigerian establishment did not want him alive was 
because a trial would have revealed some very uncomfortable and damaging information 
about his contacts and past links with members of the ruling class, especially state 
governors, politicians, police and other members of the security forces (Onuoha, 2010). 
Consequent upon the harsh brutality associated with state terrorism against the sect, Boko 
Haram members went underground following the death of its leader.  The group  went 
dormant  for more  than  a year  before  re-emerging  in 2010  with  a series  of 
assassinations (Onuoha, 2012). This violence was instigated under the leadership of Imam 
Abubakar Shekau, who assumed control of the sect following the death of Mohammed 
Yusuf. Boko Haram militants carried out violent operations against government targets in 
the north of Nigeria, the most notable being an assault on a Maiduguri prison which resulted 
in the release of 700 prisoners including Boko Haram members, and a bombing in the city 
of Jos that killed more than 80 people. The radical re-emergence of Boko Haram in 2010 
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marked the notorious advent of this crisis with a wave of terrorist attacks on police 
stations, banks, schools, tourist centres, military installations, churches, mosques, and 
entire communities in the north. From January 2010 to July 2017, the Boko Haram militants 
claimed responsibility for a series of killings and bombings in north-eastern Nigeria and 
other parts of northern Nigeria as well as those in neighbouring countries. These attacks 
have persisted to this day, leaving many military staff and civilians dead and wounded 
(Onuoha & Ugwueze, 2014) and generally devastating the areas where they strike. 
2.1.2 Boko Haram’s ideology and the human condition in northeast Nigeria 
Boko Haram’s ideology is embedded in deeply traditional Islamism in northern Nigeria, and 
is inspired by the Quranic phrase which states: “Anyone who is not governed by what Allah 
has revealed is among the transgressors” (Mustapha, 2012). By its own definition, Boko 
Haram claims to be ‘Sunni-Salafist’, which means that it is “devoted to an austere and 
fundamentalist interpretation of early Islam” (Mustapha, 2012). The Salafi doctrine holds 
that the temporal proximity to Prophet Mohammed is affiliated with the sincerest form of 
Islam (Barkindo, 2014). To him, Boko Haram is also jihadist, signifying a commitment to 
actively advance its cause. The following quote from Mohammed Yusuf supports the 
regressive and anti-democratic ideology of Boko Haram: “These European educated 
Muslims [Yan Boko] returned home only to confuse other Muslims, claiming that democracy 
is compatible with Islam, while jihad should only be for self-control”. As revealed by the 
words of Abubakar Shekau, Boko Haram stands for the principle that its members are “…for 
jihad, and our jihad is to put an end to democracy, to Western education and Western 
civilization…. The jihad is intended to make we, Muslims, return to the original state of 
Islam” (Zenn et al., 2013:50). The rejection by Boko Haram of everything that is Western is 
based on the notion of ‘the unity of God’ (tawhid), which argues against the sovereignty of 
states and for the sole sovereignty of God’s laws (hakimiyyah) as the only legitimate form 
of governance, which in this case is the Islamic Sharia (Zenn et al., 2013). Boko Haram’s 
approach reflects the identity and behavioural patterns of the Jama’a groups, which is “the 
establishment of small groups of a diffuse nature, which then infiltrate the parent non-
Muslim or pseudo-Muslim society, with the ultimate aim of establishing the Muslim Sharia 
state through a final violent stage” (Cook, 2011:8). For these groups, “violence is a 
sacramental act or divine duty executed in direct response to some theological demand” 
(Hoffman, 2002:88; Juergensmeyer, 2003:149-50; Piazza, 2009; Asal & Blum, 2005). Boko 
Haram is opposed to what it perceives as a Western-based incursion that erodes traditional 
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values, beliefs and customs among Muslim communities. Mohammed Yusuf, the group’s 
founder, told the BBC Hausa in 2009:  
“There are prominent Islamic preachers who have seen and understood that present 
Western-style education is mixed with issues that run contrary to our beliefs in Islam. 
Like the rain, we believe it is a creation of God rather than an evaporation caused by 
the sun that condenses and becomes rain. Moreover, [it is] like saying the world is a 
sphere. However, if all these scientific proclamations run contrary to the teachings of 
Allah, they are bound to be rejected. The theory of Darwinism will also be rejected in 
the same vein” (BBC, 2009).  
Furthermore, Mohammed Yusuf argued that Western education “is mixed with issues that 
run contrary to our beliefs in Islam… our land was an Islamic state before the colonial 
masters turned it to a ‘kafir’ [meaning ‘infidel’] land, and the current system is contrary to 
true Islamic beliefs” (Agbiboa, 2013b:5). This statement seems to confirm Juergensmeyer’s 
contention that “religious terrorists have goals of returning society to an ‘idealized version 
of the past’ and are therefore necessarily ‘anti-democratic’ and ‘anti progressive’” (Cronin, 
2003:330). For Cronin (2003:38), it is “the forces of history” that seem to be driving Islamist 
terrorism back to a much earlier time. This is illustrated by Boko Haram’s tendency to view 
Western missions and modernity as a jahiliyat (i.e., an ignorant) order. The jahiliyat, which 
displaced the pre-existing Islamic order in northern Nigeria, is often seen as coterminous 
with widespread poverty and suffering in the region (Zenn et al., 2013). As Yusuf’s former 
deputy, Mamman Nur, stated prior to 2009: “Dan Fodio, founder of the Sokoto Caliphate in 
1804, and other Islamic scholars carried out the jihad and ensured that Quranic laws were 
implemented”. He also argued that Allah did not interfere with this situation until Muslim 
leaders accepted the secular constitution from the Europeans. Since that time, there has been 
a universally accepted ideology that Allah took away the comfort and peace the Muslims 
used to enjoy and replaced it with suffering and poverty (Zenn et al., 2013:50).  
Many scholarly arguments have shown that Boko Haram’s ultimate objective is to overthrow 
the Nigerian government and create an Islamic state under the supreme law of Sharia – a 
goal which the group claims is inspired by Dan Fodio’s Caliphate (Zenn et al., 2013). In July 
2013, Boko Haram Islamists stormed a boarding school in Yobe in north-eastern Nigeria 
and set 29 students and one teacher ablaze. Following the killings, Abubakar Shekau, the 
current leader of the group, stated that the Quran teaches “that we must shun democracy, we 
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must shun the constitution, and we must shun Western education” (Agbiboa, 2013b:62). 
Akanji (2009:60) argues that Boko Haram members believe that “the best thing for a devout 
Muslim to do is to ‘migrate’ from a morally bankrupt society to a secluded place and 
establish an Islamic society under a strict form of Sharia devoid of political corruption and 
moral deprivation”. Adesoji (2010) argues that, “while the implementation of Sharia in 
twelve northern states appeared to have pacified some conservative Islamic elements in the 
north, its limited application was still condemned by the Boko Haram group”. According to 
Keller (1983:274), “an overreliance on threatening techniques not only present [sic] the 
image of a state which is low in legitimacy and desperately struggling to survive, but also in 
the long run, can do more to threaten state coherence than to aid it”. Agbiboa (2013b) finally 
submits that an effective counterterrorism policy in Nigeria must go beyond an exclusively 
security-driven logic to embed counterterrorism in an overarching national security strategy 
that does not only appreciate the ideological context in which Islamist radicalization occurs, 
but that also tackles poverty and the corruption-driven alienation felt by many in northern 
Nigeria. These factors contribute to Boko Haram’s support and justification for state 
insecurity. 
More importantly, Onuoha (2012:7) argues that “the religious illusions masterminded by the 
ruling class to divide members of the public will only materialize as much as the socio-
economic well-being of the people improves. Otherwise, such illusions would become a time 
bomb that will tear the society apart in the nearest future”. A c c o r d i n g  t o  Onuoha 
(ibid), “ t h e  acute poverty, unemployment, untold hardship and misery that were inflicted 
by the military on Nigerians vis-à-vis the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) [and] that 
were left unaddressed by the later democratic regime are evolving to impinge upon the 
consciousness of broad-ranging layers of the population”. The layers of the society that 
have been most affected by the socio-economic crisis are the working class and the lumpen 
class, and thus economic hardship finds expression more predominantly in northern Nigeria 
than in the southern parts (Onuoha, 2012). It is in this context that the response to widespread 
disenchantment with the Nigerian state and its ruling class has been exploited by Boko 
Haram. Mohammed Yusuf—the founder of Boko Haram−was an Islamic scholar and cleric 
who criticized Nigerian leadership, especially in the North, for its failure to develop Nigeria 
and improve the socio-economic livelihood of the people. He specifically blamed Western 
education for training the Nigerian ruling class in the act of looting treasury (FIRA, 2011). 
Boko Haram’s demonization of Western education can be seen as a socio-political response 
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to corruption and poverty brought by successive Nigerian leaders. Drawing its ideology from 
the Quran, Boko Haram’s leaders believe that the enthronement of an Islamic state on the 
basis of Sharia law remains the only solution to the crises caused by corruption, 
unemployment, poverty, moral decadence and socio-economic problems in Nigeria 
(Danjibo, 2009). For example, to enthrone an Islamic state, Mohammed Yusuf posited that 
modern state institutions such as the civil service, government departments, security 
formations—police, military and other uniform personnel−should be destroyed (Danjibo, 
2009:7). He then began his radical and provocative preaching against other Islamic sects, 
scholars and established political institutions (ibid). 
The Boko Haram ideology of Mohammed Yusuf, coupled with his teachings, found appeal 
within the ranks of frustrated members of the lumpen class in northern Nigeria. According to 
Adesoji (2010), Yusuf capitalized on the dwindling economic situation and the Almajiri 
system in order to attract a large number of followers, especially from among commoners 
(i.e., the lumpen class). Criminology posits that when gangs emerge, they fill vacuums that 
have been left vacant by society. In the Nigerian society that is plagued by a notoriously 
corrupt and repressive police force, a corrupt judiciary, a crumbling infrastructure, corrupt 
politicians and officials, and a ruling class that has created a grotesquely unequal society 
vis-à-vis its backward neo-liberal capitalist policies, the alienated members of the lumpen 
class have found solace in sectarian groups such as the Odua Peoples’ Congress, the Niger-
Delta Militant group, and Boko Haram. It has been argued that frustrated members of the 
lumpen class are alienated victims of society rather than the exceedingly violent, 
opportunistic criminals they are said to be (Adesoji, 2010). In fact, the quest by the northern 
ruling class to maintain their hold on society and the vacuum they created by not seeing 
education as a priority has been exploited by the Boko Haram sect (Adesoji, 2010). 
Mohammed Yusuf also capitalized on the Muslims’ resistance to Western education through 
strengthening the deeply entrenched Islamic educational system by establishing mosques and 
Islamic schools in which many poor Muslim families from across Nigeria and neighbouring 
countries enrolled their children (Ekanem, Dada & Ejue, 2012:233). This ploy has been 
described by critics as a recruiting centre for jihad and jihadists and to fight the state by 
establishing a training school for fanatics, die-hard members, and future suicide bombers. 
By capitalizing on the dwindling socio-economic situation in the north-eastern part of 




It is therefore no wonder that Adedeji (1989, cited in Ninalowo, 2004:163) argues as 
follows:  
“The ultimate goal of development in African societies, particularly in Nigeria, is to 
ensure the overall well-being of the people through the sustained improvement in 
their standards of living. It is this quintessential human aspect of development that 
underlies all other objectives that Africa will have to pursue, be it economic, socio-
cultural or political. Regrettably, the realization of the objective of raising the 
welfare of the people has proved elusive, particularly in north-east Nigeria. Instead, 
immiseration and suffering impact the majority of the population in this area with 
an increase in the number of people who live in abject poverty and those who are 
perpetually vulnerable and threatened by the adversities of nature as well as the 
malaise of socio-economic disruptions” (Adedeji, 1989:10).  
Moreover, human conditions in north-eastern Nigeria have been exacerbated by the greed 
and corruption of minority leaders, thereby leaving a large number of the citizens in 
perpetual poverty and frustration. It is in this context that this study attempted to 
demonstrate that Boko Haram terrorism has been a by-product of the dehumanization of 
the people living in the north-eastern parts of Nigeria.  
2.1.3. The rationale for Boko Haram’s revolt 
The philosophical understanding of Boko Haram’s rebellion is closely associated with quasi-
religious, socio-economic and political issues. Solomon (2013) provides evidence that the 
Boko Haram leader, Yusuf, was co-opted in 2002 by the then Borno state gubernatorial 
candidate, AliModu Sheriff, for the support of his large youth movement in exchange for 
the full implementation of Sharia and promises of senior government positions for his 
followers in the event of an electoral victory. The latter author stresses that, as the group 
rose to prominence, “the state’s religious commissioner made an arrangement to fulfil the 
promises of the government as earlier declared in their political manifesto. Unfortunately, 
he was accused of providing resources to Yusuf, while the government had never 
implemented full Sharia” (African Report, 2014 April 3).  However, having used Yusuf’s 
support as a vote-catching device, the politicians then discarded him. “Feeling used and 
embittered, Yusuf went on to form Boko Haram in 2002 with the sole intention of making 
it the mouthpiece for an innumerable number of aggrieved citizens” (Solomon, 2013). 
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Studies have shown that the evolution of the Boko Haram crisis is closely knit with the hiring 
and arming of youths for political ends in Nigeria (Aniekwe & Agbiboa, 2014). According 
to the latter authors, “more often than not, these jobless youths are used for political and 
economic gains and [are] later dumped”. For example, evidence from the 2003 elections in 
Nigeria shows how the then incumbent governor of Rivers state, Peter Odili, through the 
ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP), subverted the electoral process by exploiting 
youths and later discarding them. In an interview with Human Rights Watch, Tom Ateke, a 
leader of the Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV) movement, acknowledged the role he played in 
the 2003 elections when he noted: “Governor Odili had promised cash and jobs in great 
quantities for me and my boys, and in return, any place he sent me I conquered for him” 
(Aniekwe & Agbiboa, 2014:10). In Gombe state, a group of boys known as ‘Kalare’ proved 
to be “easy prey for politicians who offer[ed] them small amounts of money, drugs, alcohol 
and weapons in exchange for engaging in acts of intimidation and assault or simply to 
accompany their campaign in a demonstration of muscle” (ibid). Gaskia (ibid) notes that, 
with the elections in the Niger Delta in 2003, politicians from the major political parties 
“mobilized and surreptitiously armed groups of unemployed and disenchanted youths and 
deployed them to cause mayhem and manipulate the electoral process”. In this manner the 
party which controlled the state government got the upper hand. These political elite 
rivalries, coupled with a struggle for turf, contributed immensely to the rise of armed 
militancy and inter-militant armed violence which preceded the 2003 elections and became 
consolidated in the period between the 2003 and 2007 during the general elections in the 
Niger Delta (Aniekwe & Agbiboa, 2014:10).  
The 1999 Constitution of Nigeria states that there will be no state religion. This means that 
society is guaranteed freedom of religion and that any form of discrimination on the basis of 
religious belief is forbidden. Section 10 of the Constitution also specifies that Nigeria, or 
any of its sub-units, shall not adopt any religion as a state religion (Nigerian Constitution, 
1999:24). This stated position presupposes that Nigeria a secular state. However, the 
Nigerian experience is parallel to secularism in continental Europe which tends to ban 
religion from public life and confines it to the private sphere. In principle, secularism calls 
for the separation of government institutions and personnel from their religious counterparts. 




A more recent study by Thurston (2016) reveals that the separation of the state and religion 
is fundamental to the understanding of the rise of political Islam in Nigeria. Christianity and 
Islam are two major influences on the socio-economic, cultural and political life of the 
country. Each believes it has a special relationship with God that excludes other religions. 
This struggle for superiority is reflective of differences that belie a collective response to the 
violence behind religious fundamentalism in Nigeria. Rather than have a common platform 
for engagement, each perspective revolves around a domestic agenda that seeks greater 
access to resources and political influence. Though much has been written on political Islam, 
there is no general agreement on a single definition. This has created not only the problem 
of conceptualization, but also poses a corresponding problem of prefixing, as argued by 
Idahosa (2015). However, the issues generated by these polemics were not the focus of this 
study, yet this creates an assumption for the position of a conceptual plurality that is 
necessary for an understanding of political Islam, militant Islam, radical Islam, extremist 
Islam, fundamentalist Islam and revolutionary Islam. An understanding of these categories 
becomes necessary as they are believed to characterize political Islam with a high tendency 
for political polarity (Idahosa, 2015:19) 
Many studies that focus on Boko Haram activities in Nigeria make a clear-cut assumption 
that the rise of the sect occurred as a result of state neglect owing to corruption and the 
relative deprivation of a large percentage of the citizens by the government (Lukman, 
2007;Rogers, 2012;Onuhoa, 2014; Awojobi, 2014). Central to this argument is that 
escalating poverty in Nigeria is accentuated by unabated trends in youth unemployment and 
political corruption. The resultant cost is what is deemed to have created the right conditions 
for the rise of radical Islamist terrorism as is experienced with Boko Haram terrorism. 
According to Isa (2010:329), “the rising popularity of militant Islamist movements in 
northern Nigeria can be attributed to a combination of factors, including: increased 
inequality, injustices, poverty, failed social services as well as a failed Structural Adjustment 
Programme”. However, this perspective is fraught with over generalization in that it could 
explain the rise of militant Islamic groups in some countries while it fails to do so in others. 
For example, it does not fully explain the conditions that led to the spill-over effects of the 
activities of Boko Haram in Cameroon (officially the Republic of Cameroon; French 
the République du Cameroun) (Isa, 2010:330). 
Beyond the state neglect perspective that was expounded above, Isa (ibid) argues that the 
idea of a civilization clash between opposing socio-cultural entities is a powerful metaphor 
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with which to interpret the rise of radical Islam. Huntington (1996) warns that the victim of 
modern conflicts will not be empires or states, but civilization itself, and argues that there 
are eight categories of civilizations and purposes that have the potential to threaten global 
peace. Fundamentally, this conflict will occur between the Islamic and the Judeo-Christian 
faiths. The primary attachment of those who are caught up in the Islamic civilization is to 
their religion and not to their nation-state. This is currently exemplified by the philosophy 
that underpins the Islamic states in Iran and Syria (ISIS). According to scholars and 
observers such as Adesoji (2010),Pham (2011), Olagunju (2012), Pham (2016) and Thurston 
(2016), Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria is a product of an attempt by some northern states 
to Islamize the entire country. According to Olagunju (2012:10), it is thought that Boko 
Haram fundamentalists frown on Western education and, for this reason, many think that its 
members are actually illiterates. However, it has come to light that they are not illiterate, but 
are embarking on an ideological war to accomplish a set of stated goals. However, the 
findings of this study fully demonstrate that Boko Haram’s targets are Christians, Muslims 
and innocent Nigerian citizens regardless of their religious denomination, and this assertion 
makes the position of the authors listed above (Adesoji, 2010, Pham, 2011; Olagunju, 
2012;Pham, 2016; Thurston, 2016) inadequate to fully explain the Islamic fundamentalism 
of Boko Haram terrorism within the Nigerian context.  More specifically, widespread 
confusion about the rationale behind Boko Haram terrorism has caused numerous analysts 
to seek reasons for the sect’s revolt (Onuoha, 2012; Mustapha, 2012; Kukah, 2012; Agbiboa, 
2013a; Zenn et al., 2013). These scholars have collectively suggested a number of reasons 
for this phenomenon, namely: (a) A feeling of alienation among northern citizens from their 
more developed Christian southern counterparts in Nigeria; (b) rampant government 
corruption; (c) incompetent and brutal state security services; and (d) the belief that relations 
with the Western world breed a corrupt influence on citizens’ socio-economic needs.  A 
theory that has evolved among southern Christians is that Boko Haram is the handiwork of 
disgruntled northern Muslim politicians who desire to make life unbearable for a southern 
Christian president. This conviction was peddled by Nigerian Nobel Laureate, Wole 
Soyinka, during an annual African Studies lecture delivered at Oxford in 2011(Agbiboa, 
2013e). Conversely, among Muslims in the north the conspiracy theory is that the actions 
by Boko Haram cannot be attributed to Muslims, but that they should rather be attributed to 
the machinations of enemies of Islam who desire to bring the religion into disrepute. There 
is also another conspiracy theory in the north, which argues that President Goodluck 
Jonathan’s administration is funding Boko Haram “either to make Islam look bad or to 
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depopulate the north ahead of the 2015 elections” (Adibe, 2014). Another conspiracy theory 
of local provenance is the claim that Boko Haram is the work of the Americans because 
studies by US institutions have predicted that Nigeria would collapse by 2015 or 2030 
(Mustapha, 2012). However, quite often leaders in Nigeria abuse these conspiracy theories 
“to shift the blame for violence elsewhere, away from poor records of governance, state 
capacity, and representation” (Dowd & Raleigh, 2013:498).  
A recurrent issue in the Boko Haram literature is the extent of relative poverty and inequality 
in the north which has led some analysts to argue that underdevelopment is the main reason 
why extremist groups such as Boko Haram become so rebellious. For Mustapha (2012), 
“Boko Haram is the symptom of the failure of nation-building and democratic politics in 
Nigeria. It is the misguided cry of a disgruntled youth crushed by the socio-economic system 
on the one hand and then [being] repressed by the state on the other”. The northern cleric-
scholar, Rev. Matthew Kukah (2012:3), argues that a nuanced movement away from the 
poverty-conflict nexus to the bad governance-conflict nexus can explain Boko Haram’s 
rationale for revolt in Nigeria. For instance, Kwaja (2011:1) argues that “religious 
dimensions of the conflict have been misconstrued as the primary driver of violence when, 
in fact, disenfranchisement and inequality are the root causes of the phenomenon” Kukah 
states that religion is used to mobilize against modernity, which is seen as the root cause of 
social anomalies. According to Kukah, “in the eyes of the Boko Haram sect members, the 
persistence of corruption, collapse of public morality, injustice and so on could only be 
attributed to those who govern the nation. In their reasoning, those who govern us (yan boko) 
do so because they have acquired their tools by gaining Western education [boko]” (ibid). 
Kukah finds a kindred spirit in Christopher Clapham (2004:200), who argues more broadly 
that “the breakdown of law and order in African states was basically the result of the legacy 
of bad governance”. Similarly, Evans (1994:3) argues that “a downward spiral of economic 
decline, often exacerbated by official corruption and mismanagement, has created 
governments that are at or near the point of collapse and that are being challenged, often 
violently, by their own citizens”.  
Economic decline has hastened the process of national disintegration and vice versa. 
Explanations such as the above tend to draw on the human needs theory of social conflict 
which holds that all human beings have basic needs which they seek to fulfil, and that failure 
to meet these needs could lead to the outbreak of violent conflict (Rosati et al., 1990:156-
190 cited in Agbiboa, 2013a). According to Gurr (1970), “conflict is caused and escalated 
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to a considerable degree to unfulfilled needs – not only material needs, but also such 
psychological needs as security, identity, self-esteem, recognition, autonomy and a sense of 
justice”. He argues further that parties in conflict as well as in pursuit of their own security, 
interest, identity and related needs, undermine and threaten the security and identity of 
others.  
The human need theory resonates with the theory of relative deprivation which links 
economic disparity with the propensity of individuals to resort to violent political action. 
Gurr (1970) puts it succinctly, stating that “misery breeds revolt”. However, the nexus 
between relative deprivation and the onset of conflict has been criticized as simplistic 
because it fails to explain why some poor people or places do not participate in violence, 
and because it offers very little in the way of clear recommendation for policy-makers 
(Agbiboa, 2013b). People can in actual fact be advantaged while experiencing group-based 
relative deprivation (Leach et al., 2007:191−204). Conversely, people can be comparatively 
disadvantaged without experiencing their inequality as deprivation (Jost & Banaji, 
1994:1−27). Perhaps this explains why findings in social psychological research place 
relative deprivation as a likely contributor to radicalization (King & Taylor, 2011:610). This 
critique is bolstered by Krieger and Meierriek’s argument that “there is only limited 
evidence to support the hypothesis that economic deprivation causes terrorism…poor 
economic conditions matter less to terrorism once it is [sic] controlled for institutional and 
political factors” (cited in King & Taylor, 2011:3). Instead, they argue that “terrorism is 
closely linked to political instability, sharp divides within the populace, country size and 
further demographic, institutional and international factors” (ibid). Similarly, James Piazza 
(2006:171), who employed a series of multiple regression analyses on terrorism incidents 
and casualties in 96 countries from 1986−2002, argue that “variables such as population, 
ethno-religious diversity, increased state repression, and most significantly, the structure of 
party politics are found to be more significant predictors of terrorism than the ‘rooted-in-
poverty thesis’”. To complement this argument, this thesis adds that socio-economic factors 
cannot simply be wished away in the quest to understand Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria.  
Every social indicator one can think of puts the northern states at the bottom of the Nigerian 
social pile. For example, one legacy of disunity that was bequeathed to Nigeria by the British 
colonialists is the unequal educational development of the north and the south (Akinola, 
2014). At independence in 1960, northern Nigeria had only been loosely administered by 
the British colonial authorities and had not approximated the economic and educational 
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development of the south (Cook, 2014:5). In 1965 the north, comprising more than half of 
the national population, had only 10% of the national primary school population. In terms 
of higher education, northerners made up 8% of the total student population compared to 
48% of the East, 5% of Lagos, and 39% of the West (Agbiboa, 2013a: 51). Akinola (2014) 
claims that the assumption of the iniquitous Boko Haram ideology that ‘Western education 
is evil’ has its genesis in the once hostile attitude of northern traditional rulers to Western 
education. The hostilities of the Emirs and Islamic clerics of the north to Western education 
and yan boko were appreciated by Sir Lord Frederick Lugard (first Governor General) and 
his colonial successors, not least because of the need to preserve the prestige and authority 
of the Emirs (ibid). In other words, the disparity between the two regions (north and south) 
emanated from the fact that the activities of Christian missionaries, de facto pioneers of 
education in the colony, were restricted to the south and the pagan areas of the north (ibid). 
According to Akinola, most of Nigeria’s political leaders since independence from Britain 
in 1960 have come from the north. If they had been visionary, they would have appreciated 
the need to redress the historic imbalance in education between the regions of the Nigerian 
federation. It is not that they do not know that education is important. In fact, their own 
children receive education at the best schools and universities Europe and America can offer. 
Akinola thus finds it amazing that “they seem comfortable with the poverty and servitude 
that surround the populace” (Akinola, 2014). 
In early 2013, Nigeria’s Bureau of Statistics (NBS) figures revealed that, despite favourable 
economic performance, Nigeria’s poverty rate increased from 54.7% in 2004 to 60.9% in 
2010. In 2011, 100 million Nigerians lived in absolute poverty and 12.6 million more were 
moderately poor. The worst hit by poverty are young people, especially in northern Nigeria 
(Onuoha 2014:6). Given the level of poverty in the north, it appears that Boko Haram 
terrorism is being used as a form of protest with a view to drawing attention to the region’s 
plight as well as bait to draw the most impoverished into the group. According to Elegbe, 
“unemployment is higher in the north than in the south. Mix this situation with radical Islam, 
which promises a better life for martyrs, and you can understand the growing violence in the 
north” (Agbiboa 2013:52). Similarly, as Komolafe argues, even if unemployment and 
poverty are not the main factors in radicalization in Nigeria, the tendency to produce suicide 
bombers is greater in a community defined by mass misery and joblessness than one in which 
the basic need for food, education, health, housing, and sanitation are met for the majority 
of the people (Komolafe, 2012; Omonobi & Marama, 2014; Onuoha 2012:6). While feelings 
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of disenfranchisement from mainstream society are not uncommon among the youths, in a 
few cases such emotions prompt them to adopt the identity of a terrorist or suicide bomber. 
Yet, as Schwartz et al. (2009:540) contend, feelings of disenfranchisement, when coupled 
with fervent adherence to traditional, dichotomous ‘us versus them’ religious principles 
justifying violence against those perceived to threaten one’s religious or cultural group, a 
strong prioritization of the group over the individual, and a belief that one’s group is morally 
superior to the group being attacked, may combine to make terrorism considerably more 
likely. Erikson wrote some four decades ago about the lure of terrorism for youths who 
perceived their personal and group identities as being threatened. However, historical and 
technological development have severely encroached upon deeply rooted or strongly 
emerging identities (i.e., agrarian, feudal, patrician) on a large scale, and youths feel 
endangered individually and collectively, whereupon they become ready to support 
doctrines offering a total immersion in a synthetic identity (e.g., extreme nationalism, 
racism, or class consciousness) and a collective condemnation of a totally stereotyped enemy 
of the new identity. Moreover, the fear of loss of identity which fosters such indoctrination 
contributes significantly to the mixture of righteousness and criminality which, under 
totalitarian conditions, becomes available for organized terror and for the establishment of 
major industries of extermination (Arena & Arrigo, 2006:21). 
Focusing on the poverty-terrorism discourse, Okoro (2014) submits that after more than fifty 
years of independence (1960−2014), the majority of Nigerians still cannot meet their basic 
human and socio-economic needs. A large percentage of the youth lacks access to food, 
quality education, effective healthcare service delivery, pipe-borne water, proper shelter, 
and employment opportunities. Yet, in the face of these deprivations, the political elites 
embezzle public funds and engage in ostentatious living. The inability of the government to 
bring about good and effective governance for its citizens, particularly in the northern 
regions of Nigeria, has thus created what Omede (2011:93) refers to as “frustration of rising 
expectations” which has in turn resulted in various forms of violence in the region, including 
such crimes as kidnapping, armed robbery and terrorism, which have reached their acme in 
recent times.   
Okoro (2014) argues that government corruption and its attendant mass poverty are rampant 
throughout the country, but that the rate of poverty in the northern region is higher than the 
national average. Indeed, several studies clearly indicate that about 75% of Nigeria’s 
northerners live in poverty compared to 27% in the south (Pothuraju 2012:3). Similarly, a 
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study on national poverty levels by the Central Bank of Nigeria also offers that the ten states 
with the highest levels of poverty are located in the northern region. Conversely, the ten 
states with the lowest levels of poverty are all southern states; as a result, 70% of the people 
living in the north live on less than US$1 per day (US$1 = N150) (Lukman, 2007).  
Sadly, the data presented by Lukman (2007), Rogers (2012) and Okoro (2014) paint a pretty 
dismal picture of the socio-economic situation in Nigeria, which reinforces the argument of 
this thesis that citizens are repulsed by the government’s weakness and failure to provide in 
people’s basic human needs. This argument is supported by the example of Niger-Delta 
militants who utilize violence as a bargaining chip to obtain concessions from the 
government. This violent approach is presumed to come in the aftermath of the failure of 
non-violent strategies such as protests or negotiations that were initially adopted to negotiate 
the provision of improved means to address the socio-economic needs of the citizens. All 
the above factors, strengthened by the youth’s disillusionment, caused youths in the northern 
states to join armies that are in the hands of extremists such as Abubakar Shekau. In fact, it 
is undeniable that this is the platform upon which the Boko Haram terrorists base their 
arguments for the rationale to destroy lives and property as a way of reacting to the corrupt 
governance by the nation’s political leaders, particularly in north-eastern Nigeria. The chart 
in Figure 2.1 essentially buttresses the argument that poverty cannot be wished out of those 







Figure 2.1: Zonal incidence of poverty in Nigeria by different poverty measurements. 
(Source: Rogers 2012:3). 
 
 
2.1.4 Youth membership of Boko Haram terrorism 
Boko Haram is an extremist sect in Nigeria that has caused devastating damage in northern 
Nigeria and threatens the stability of Nigeria as a whole. Boko Haram draws its members 
mainly from across a broad spectrum of societies, but a preponderant number of members 
are poor, disaffected youths, unemployed high school and university graduates, and former 
‘almajiris’, or destitute children  (Adesoji , 2010). In his study of Boko Haram activities in 
Nigeria, Adesoji (2010) found that the sect was able to attract more than 280 000 members 
from across northern Nigeria as well as from Chad and the Niger Republic. Its membership 
also includes some wealthy, educated and influential people (Suleiman, 2007:25). The group 
is known to sustain its operations through diverse sources of funding, including membership 
dues, donations from politicians, financial assistance from foreign terrorist groups, raiding 
of banks, and ransom from kidnapping (Suleiman, 2007). The sect also extorts money from 
residents of the areas it controls as well as from wealthy persons whom they intimidate into 
paying protection fees to avoid being attacked by them (Onuhoa, 2012). In support of 
Suleiman’s (2007) submission, Tonwe and Eke (2013) stress that the sect draws followers 
from across the 19 states of northern Nigeria, the Republic of Niger, Chad and Sudan.  Its 
 North Central North East North West South East South  South South West
Food poverty 25 35 35 25 22 20
Absolute Poverty 40 50 50 45 45 38
Relative Poverty 50 55 55 50 50 44










membership is extended by the phenomenon of ‘almajiris’ (street children), which is a 
popular practice whereby children are sent to live with and study under renowned Islamic 
teachers in some cities in northern Nigeria. As pointed out by Onuhoa (2012), “these almajiri 
live and study under appalling conditions, thereby making them vulnerable to recruitment 
into extremist sects like Boko Haram, largely through indoctrination”.  
According to a 2010 survey, “the almajiris in Nigeria number up to 9.5 million and are 
predominantly located in northern Nigeria” (Agbiboa & Okem, 2011). A recent analysis of 
144 imprisoned Boko Haram members suggests that the median age of the sect members is 
thirty years (ibid). Boko Haram members are also drawn from the Kanuri tribe, which makes 
up roughly 4% of the Nigerian population, and is concentrated in the north-eastern states of 
Nigeria, including Bauchi and Borno. Members are also recruited from the Hausa-Fulani 
group (making up 29% of the northern population) which resides throughout most of the 
northern states. More interestingly, John Campbell (2013:14) argues that “revolted foot 
soldiers are likely drawn from unemployed youths in northern Nigeria, [which is] a region 
of profound poverty. Many of them attended Islamic schools where they learned little other 
than to memorize the Quran. They are most often children of peasants, rootless and homeless 
people in a big city. They can bond through a common radical Islamic sensibility, inchoate 
rage, and the prospect of earning little money as terrorists”. Mustapha (2012) argues that 
Boko Haram provides education, basic services and informal-sector jobs to its supporters, 
most of whom are marginalized people with little education, or lower middle-class elements 
with some education but with few prospects in the oppressive competition and corruption of 
Nigerian society. The Governor of Borno state, Kashim Shettima, once explained that, 
despite Boko Haram’s “misguided ideology, its slain leader – Mohammed Yusuf − retained 
the loyalty of his supporters by providing one meal a day to each of his disciples. He also 
had a youth empowerment scheme, under which he helped his disciples to go into petty 
trading and wheelbarrow pushing. He also arranged cheap marriages between sect members, 
which enabled many of them to marry, which gave them personal dignity and self-worth” 
(Shettima, cited in Mustapha, 2012). It would seem that Schwartz’s (2009) argument that 
“the terrorist identity offers the individual a role [model] in society, albeit a negative role 
model, which is commensurate with his or her prior expectations and sufficient to 
compensate for past losses” is justified. According to Arena and Arrigo (2006:23-24), group 
membership provides a sense of potency, an intense and close interpersonal environment, 
social status, potential access to wealth and a share in what may be a grandiose but noble 
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social design”. Schwartz (2009:3) further argues that “the powerful psychological forces of 
conversion in the group are sufficient to offset traditional social sanctions against violence. 
To the terrorists, their acts may have the moral status of religious warfare or political 
liberation”. Moreover, reports in 2012 strongly linked some senior members of the Nigerian 
security sector to Boko Haram (The Punch, 2012; Vanguard, 2012).  In February 2012, 
Commissioner for Police in charge of criminal investigations in Abuja, Zakari Biu, was 
dismissed from the Nigeria Police Force for his role in the escape of a Boko Haram suspect 
named Kabiru Sokoto, who was believed to have masterminded the bombing of St. 
Theresa’s Catholic Church in Madalla, Niger State, in which more than 40 people died. 
Sokoto’s escape also led to the dismissal of the former Inspector General of Police, Hafiz 
Ringim (Agbiboa, 2013a:5). The sacking of Ringim generally had to do with his inability to 
check the Boko Haram onslaught. In 2013, Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan claimed 
that Boko Haram was the enemy within his government. In his words: “Some members of 
Boko Haram are in the executive arm of government, some of them are in the 
parliamentary/legislative arm of government, while some of them are even in the judiciary. 
Some are also in the armed forces, the police and other security agencies” (Agbiboa, 
2013a:23).  
It is undeniable that, since Nigeria’s return to democracy in May 1999, armed non-state 
groups have significantly weakened the country’s internal security milieu, largely using 
young men as foot soldiers (Walker, 2014). Among these groups, Boko Haram, has grown 
to become a serious national and international concern to national security with estimates of 
the death toll from Boko Haram attacks ranging as high as ten thousand fatalities. With Boko 
Haram and other groups seemingly gaining strength, questions arise as to why young men 
join them in the first place and what the government and other actors can do to prevent it.  
Nigeria commissioned a study in 2013 by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP, 2013) 
in collaboration with the CLEEN Foundation.  The resultant report, entitled Why Youths Join 
Boko Haram? present the findings of surveys, interviews and focus group discussions that 
were conducted in north-eastern Nigeria. The findings suggest that poverty, unemployment, 
illiteracy, abuse of power, false religious teachings and weak family structures may 
contribute to making young men vulnerable to radicalization and Boko Haram terrorism. 
According to Onuoha (2014), in all six the states of north-eastern Nigeria that were surveyed 
by USIP (2013), there was unanimity that the initial ignorance of religious teaching is the 
leading factor that influences the adoption of extreme religious views, especially among the 
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youth who are profoundly influenced by negative perceptions of Islamic doctrines. The lack 
of deep knowledge of true religious teaching is partly related to three observable threats in 
the recent practice of religion in Nigeria, namely the proliferation of sects in both Islam and 
Christianity, the proliferation of independent preachers in both religions, and the increasing 
reliance on preachers rather than on the holy books themselves. As a result, young people 
become vulnerable to recruitment and radicalization by independent and roaming preachers, 
extremist groups, and religious ideologues who often distort religious injunctions. 
Moreover, National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) figures that were released in early 2013 also 
identified a high incidence of unemployment and poverty that prevailed in the northern state 
as the second most important reason why the youth engaged in radicalization and Boko 
Haram terrorism.  
Findings of the United State Institute of Peace also suggests that children with difficult 
upbringings are more vulnerable to extremist views. The growing number of children 
without adequate parental guidance is a societal condition that has contributed to the 
problem of youth radicalization in northern Nigeria. It is argued that children who lack a 
protective social environment are more likely to be exploited and cheaply recruited into 
terrorism. Komolafe (2012) argues that children from broken homes, abandoned and 
orphaned children, and children who are in the custody of relatives are the most vulnerable 
to being used to perpetrate extreme violence. Komolafe stresses further that it is not 
surprising that terrorist groups such as Boko Haram are tapping into this situation to achieve 
their violent objectives (ibid). 
The outcomes of this study buttress the findings by the United States Institute of Peace 
(USIP, 2013) and the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS, 2013) that the poor democratic 
government in Nigeria provides a breeding ground for unemployment, poverty, corruption, 
false religious interpretations of Islamic doctrines, illiteracy, abuse of power, and poor 
family structures, all of which predispose numerous youths in the north of Nigeria to 
embrace Boko Haram terrorism as a means of survival.  
However, sufficient evidence has been found to show that human conditions during the 
military regime were not as miserable as the picture portrays shortly after Nigeria’s 
transition to democracy in 1999. But it is also undeniable that the advent of democracy laid 
a dark foundation for the denial of fundamental human rights vis-à-vis unequal distribution 
of power, privilege and resources that are contrary to the Bill of Rights and the Constitution 
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of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. It was established by this study that one of the terrible 
aftermaths of the democratic government is undue autonomy and the power vested in 
bloodthirsty civilians all because of political offices within their domain. This created a wide 
avenue for law enforcement agencies, particularly the police, to unleash their brutality on 
innocent citizens. With the transition to a democratic government, discipline disintegrated 
within the socio-political system and was replaced by corruption, exacerbation of adverse 
human conditions, as well as the intermittent enthronement of more severe poverty that led 
to various replications of anarchies across Nigerian societies. Consequently, armed groups 
such as Boko Haram terrorists, Niger-Delta militants, Fulani herdsmen, and the recent 
Niger-Delta Avengers (NDA) could then leverage on this platform to recruit and train the 
youth for activities ranging from errand running to illicit killings and suicide bombings 
(Walker, 2012). According to Cook (2014), rather than address the crisis of capitalism that 
compels more and more frustrated members of the lumpen class to join sectarian groups, the 
ruling class has turned on stepping up its repressive use of a state terrorism strategy by 
arming the police and other securities forces against the sect. The response of the Nigerian 
state to the orgy of violence and threats by Boko Haram has thus created the implication that 
the Nigerian ruling class is not ready for peace-making; rather, it is prepared to clamp down 
on the sect given the state instrument of terror that is at its disposal to wipe out the group 
(Cook, 2011; Cook, 2014).  
Onuhoa and Ugwueze (2014) opine that Boko Haram activities demonstrate the urgent need 
to address youth radicalization and religious extremism in northern Nigeria, as they have 
resulted in the destruction of private and public property, grievous bodily injury and death, 
and the displacement of thousands of people. Ignorance of true religious teachings is the 
most important condition for the youth to acquire radical views of religion, and such flawed 
teachings are often propagated by roaming, independent preachers. USIP (2013) submits 
that poverty and unemployment, false religious doctrine, political corruption, brutality and 
abuse of power by members of the security forces, illiteracy, poor parental upbringing, and 
neglect of children are factors that influence young people’s vulnerability to falling prey of 
violent extremism. Boko Haram has leveraged on this vulnerability to deepen their process 
of recruitment and radicalization, especially in northern Nigeria. Thus, any attempt to 
effectively weaken the insurgency in northern Nigeria must consider these factors. Finally, 
addressing the conditions that make it possible for terrorists to recruit youths from the pool 
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of young men in Nigeria can significantly diminish the strength of terrorism, if not 
completely eradicate it in the region (Onuhoa & Ugwueze, 2014). 
2.1.5. Constitutional issues and Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria 
Idahosa (2015) argues that the primary motive behind Boko Haram’s deadly insurgency in 
the north-east of Nigeria is to enshrine Sharia laws as state laws. Idahosa stresses that section 
1, sub-section 1 of the Nigerian Constitution (1999:15) specifies that “the Constitution is 
supreme and its provision shall have binding force on all authorities and persons throughout 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria”. Also, in sub-section 2, the Constitution specifies that “the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria shall not be governed, nor shall any person or group of persons 
take control of the government of Nigeria or any part thereof, except in accordance with the 
provision of this Constitution”. Furthermore, section 38, sub-section 1 stipulates that “every 
person shall be entitled to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, including freedom 
to change his religion or belief, and freedom (either alone or in community with others and 
in public or in private) to manifest and propagate his religion or belief in worship, teaching, 
practice and observance” (The Nigerian Constitution, 1999:39). 
However, the Constitution does recognize the role of the judiciary in section 6, sub-section 
5 by giving recognition to (a) the Sharia Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory, 
Abuja; (b) a Sharia Court of Appeal of a state; (c) the Customary Court of Appeal of the 
Federal Capital Territory, Abuja; (d) and a Customary Court of Appeal of a state”. Given 
the constitutional provisions stated above, a daunting problematiqe in Nigerian politics 
surrounds its secularity. Secularism as used in this context and as explained by Idahosa 
(2015) is the separation of religion and government. This implies the primacy of the rules of 
secular society over their religious equivalent. 
One of the most toughly debated and so far unresolved issues in Nigeria today centres on 
the secularity of its constitution. While section 10 of the Constitution states that “the 
Government of the Federation or of a State shall not adopt any religion as state religion” 
(See the Nigerian Constitution,1999), the controversy over the status of Sharia laws has 
generated much heat in the country. This has been complicated by the adoption of Sharia 
laws in nine northern states in the country. However, non-Muslims in these states have 
argued that the imposition of Sharia laws violates the right to freedom of religion and affects 
non-Muslims, although they are supposed to be exempt from such laws. At the last 
Constitutional Conference held in the country, the Christian Association of Nigeria’s (CAN) 
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delegates argued vehemently that the current Nigerian Constitution is Islamic rather than 
secular (Idahosa, 2015). 
As argued by Bagobiri and Bosun (2014), “Islam is mentioned in the Constitution 28 times, 
Muslim 10 times, Sharia 73 times, Grand Khadi 54 times but Christ, Christians and the 
church were [sic] never mentioned”. In these authors’ opinion religion is being used as a 
manipulative tool to truncate the Nigerian state. Conversely, advocates of Sharia legal codes 
have referred to the provisions of the Nigerian Constitution as a justification for the 
application of Sharia laws as an integral part of Islam. Some have described attempts to stop 
or curb the implementation of Sharia laws as a violation of their right to freedom of religion 
as Muslims. In fact, they view the current Nigeria penal codes as Judeo-Christian. To 
adherents of neither the Christian faith nor the Muslim beliefs, the greatest culprit is the 
Nigerian government which annually spends tax-payers’ money on religious pilgrimages. 
They fault the above practice on the ground that it tends to exalt two religions (Christianity 
and Islam) above all others in the country. By implication, it means Nigeria is not a secular 
state but a dual-religious state. 
Given the complicated nature of the interpretation accruable to the execution of the 
provisions of the Nigerian Constitution, attempts at supplanting it by the Boko Haram sect 
appear palpable; at least to the members of the sect and those favourably disposed to their 
beliefs. However, the complexity of the issue, as well as its intensity, seems to be mutually 
inclusive. This is particularly so because the problems generated by the holistic application 
of the Nigerian Constitution across the country tend to be seen as illegitimate. The attempts 
to extend the application of Islamic laws outside its domain have historically occupied a 
contentious position in Nigeria. This intensifies the corresponding problem of the fusion of 
religion and politics, which re-emphasizes the position of Sharia laws and their 
unconstitutionality within the Nigerian context (Idahosa, 2015) 
2.1.6. A panoramic and chronological overview of Boko Haram activities in Nigeria  
Boko Haram has been described as a dynamic phenomenon and a persistent societal problem 
that ravages the Nigerian state. The activities of this organisation have resulted in one of the 
worst holocausts and greatest calamities of cataclysmic proportions in human history 
(Nkwede, Abah & Nwankwo, 2011). Since 2009, the Nigerian Joint Task Force (JTF) has 
been deployed to the north-eastern parts of Nigeria to quell Boko Haram violence. 
Unfortunately, the role of and abuses by this security force have conspired to worsen the 
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dire security condition in the area. In addition to the failure of the JTF to protect lives and 
property, it has also lost the trust of the people (which is an important resource in the battle 
against the insurgent group), as communities have also been abused by this armed force. 
Also, the high-handedness with which members of the JTF have prosecuted the fight against 
insurgency has helped diffuse membership of the group from urban centres to the rural areas, 
which has exacerbated collateral damage (Nkwede, Abah, & Nwankwo, 2011).  
At the closing quarter of 2009, mass graves were discovered across the north-eastern regions 
of Nigeria. Some of these graves held hundreds of shallowly buried corpses. Moreover, 
Nkwede et al. (2011) found that over three million Nigerians had been displaced, thousands 
had been abducted, and over a 100 000 were killed within a couple of years of Boko Haram’s 
insurgency in Nigeria. The rise of Boko Haram has therefore heightened the state of 
insecurity in Nigeria and beyond, triggering deadly bomb attacks on police forces, 
government officials, places of worship, public institutions and innocent civilians (Nkwede 
et al., 2011). 
Following its re-emergence, Boko Haram carried out its first terrorist attack in Borno state 
in January 2010, claiming the lives of four people with many people injured. In June of the 
same year its new leader, Abubakar Shekau, instructed members of the group to commence 
retaliatory attacks of security forces and traitors but to spare civilians. This dramatic change 
of events was the watershed of a chain reaction of suicide attacks that extended beyond 
Borno state for the first time. In September 2010, Boko Haram broke 105 of its members 
out of prison in Maiduguri along with over 600 other prisoners. This later transcended to 
several areas of northern Nigeria (Martin, 2013; The Guardian, 2012; Peace and Security 
Council Report, 2012). Since then, Boko Haram has increased the frequency and intensity 
of its attacks with increased suicide bombings and assassinations. Many believe that Boko 
Haram is leading an armed insurgency against corruption, abusive security forces and 
economic disparity in northern Nigeria and feeding off tension that has existed between the 
Muslim dominated north and the Christian dominated south of Nigeria.  
In 2011, with improved operational capabilities, Boko Haram launched a series of attacks 
against both soft targets and security posts. For example, in June six police officers were 
killed at the Abuja police headquarters. However, the group’s attack on the United Nations 
building in Abuja in which 11 UN staff members and 12 other people died, with more than 
100 injured, seemed at the time to suggest that the group’s ambitions were broader than 
53 
 
initially believed (Richard, 2012). In fact, the group carried out a further 115 attacks in 2011, 
killing 550 innocent citizens. At the end of 2011, Boko Haram had maintained a steady rate 
of attacks with individuals, groups, security forces and religious leaders as their prime 
targets. 
In 2012, the implementation of the emergency rule in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states in 
Nigeria marked a turning point in Boko Haram terrorism in the country. A few days after 
the state of emergency had been declared, the group embarked on a series of small-scale 
attacks on Christians and ‘strangers’ (non-indigenes) resident in northern Nigeria (Richard, 
2012). Members of the police force who had been drafted in by government to protect fleeing 
southerners became prime targets. In Kano, Boko Haram carried out a deadly assault on the 
police building on 20 January, killing 190 members. Given the upsurge of their ‘success’ 
against security forces, many began to question the loyalty of the members of the Nigerian 
security force. This came to a head on 8 January 2012, when the Nigerian President, 
Goodluck Jonathan, announced that Boko Haram had infiltrated the army and the police as 
well as the government (The Guardian, 2012). The year 2012 thus marked the significant 
progress of Boko Haram terrorism into even more terrible and catastrophic ventures than 
ever before. 
The year 2013 witnessed the introduction of a new dimension of terror as Boko Haram 
terrorists engaged in transnational insurgency. Early in that year, the conflict spilled over 
the Nigerian national borders to involve all four geographically contiguous countries in the 
sub-region, namely Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. Added to this innovation is the fact 
that Boko Haram, in association with its splinter group Ansani, was linked to a number of 
kidnappings. The group kidnapped on different occasions seven French nationals in the 
north of Cameroon in February, a French priest and a further eight French citizens and 
obtained ransom payments for their release (Bureau of Counterterrorism, 2014). 
Furthermore, the increased insecurity in north-eastern Nigeria led the government to extend 
the state of emergency in May 2013. This development was welcomed by increased tension 
in the three affected states (Adamawa, Borno and Yobe) as Boko Haram heightened the 
tempo of its insurgent activities. As such, the total number of internally displaced persons 
increased from 250 000 to 650 000 – an increase of 309% − with thousands of others fleeing 
the country (Adrian, 2014). 
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The most notorious act of Boko Haram so far took place on 15 April 2014, when about 276 
girls from Chibok town in Borno state were kidnapped (The Punch, 2014). Although over 
50 of them managed to escape, the incident brought the group pervasive global attention. 
The girls’ plight featured on ‘Bring Back Our Girls’ posters all over the world. Within the 
same period, Boko Haram announced the formation of Islamic Caliphate which included 
Gwoza, a strategic town in north-eastern Nigeria. The town of Bama, 70 kilometres from 
Maiduguri, was also captured, which increased the reach of the new caliphate. Despite the 
aggression of the Nigerian security forces against Boko Haram and its alleged collaborators 
since 2009, the group has continued to recruit new members to this day. The upward trend 
in violence suggests that the more the security forces intervened, the worse the crisis became. 
At the dawn of 2015, Boko Haram grew in magnitude and controlled about 20 local 
government areas in north-eastern Nigeria (a territory the size of Belgium). Assisted by its 
foreign allies, the Nigerian army declared in recent times that it had pushed back the 
insurgent group out of all but three local government areas in Bornu state (Braun, 2015). 
President Jonathan was criticized for not doing enough to tackle the insurgency in the north-
east. In a pre-election campaign, his main challenger, Muhammadu Buhari’s chance was 
boosted by a reputation for toughness gained when he was a military ruler in Nigeria between 
1983 and 1985 (Braun, 2015). 
Indeed, more than 13 000 people have been killed and some 1.5 million made homeless in 
the Boko Haram conflict since 2009 (Wall Street Journal,2015). In addition, cross-border 
attacks launched from Boko Haram strongholds in Nigeria have threatened to destabilize the 
neighbouring countries of Cameroon, Chad and Niger in the sub-region with increased 
security threats. To combat this menace, a sub-regional coalition force supported by the 
African Union Force was created. After a series of negotiations, on 30 November 2014, a 
coalition force made up of soldiers from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria was 
formed. Its task was primarily to fight Boko Haram terrorism in the sub-region (The Wall 
Street Journal, 2015). 
Apart from the foregoing, on March 6 in 2015, the African Union endorsed the creation of 
an additional regional force of up to 10 000 soldiers to join the fight against Boko Haram. 
This regional force claimed a series of successes in rebel-held territory as part of an operation 
to clear and control north-eastern Nigeria in time for the country’s general elections 
rescheduled for March 28 after an initial postponement from March 14. These were 
55 
 
particularly active in the Gamboru area of Nigeria on the border with Cameroon. A parallel 
joint Niger-Chad offensive retook Damasake from the insurgent group on March 27 in 2015 
(Nossiter, 2015). This came in the wake of the announcement by the Nigerian military that 
its troops had recaptured the town of Gwoza from Boko Haram on March 20, 2015. Gwoza 
is important to the extent that it was in this town that the terrorists declared their caliphate 
in 2014. 
As the onslaught against Boko Haram intensified, Abubakar Shekau pledged allegiance to 
the Islamic State (IS) on 7 March 2015. While on the one hand the declaration could be seen 
as an attempt by the group to rescue its sinking ship (given the fact that its previous 
allegiance was with al Qaeda), on the other hand Boko Haram has the potential to raise the 
spectre of violence and a stronger propaganda campaign that the Nigerian army, even with 
its influx of new weapons and African Union support, is much less equipped to combat 
(Braun, 2015). 
President Jonathan’s optimism about the recapture of towns initially seized by Boko Haram 
within a month passed for a swift victory after six years of bloody conflict. Two weeks 
before the rescheduled elections in Nigeria, Boko Haram was said to have suffered more 
than it had for years (Braun, 2015). Though there was public relief that the insurgency was 
being blunted by the change in fortune for the group, it was unclear how effective the 
military operation had been. The rapid chains of success by the Nigerian army in partnership 
with its allies left many Nigerians wondering why it took until the final days of the election 
campaign to begin submerging the insurgent group. Many questions were asked how the 
government managed to repress the insurgent group within a few weeks as it could not 
accomplish this in the previous several years (Braun, 2015). 
An important lesson should be learnt from the experiences of the Nigerian armed forces in 
dealing with Boko Haram. One lesson is that, after the declaration of the state of emergency 
in the north-east, Boko Haram went underground only to re-emerge later with more sinister 
tactics. Once again, the coalition forces should be mindful of a repeat performance. While 
the efforts of the multi-national forces should be applauded, it should be borne in mind that 
because none of the group’s leaders has either been captured or killed, the campaign of the 
multi-national force ran the risk of breaking the group into splinter units. The argument is 
that each sub-unit could resort to guerrilla warfare to promote the ideology of the group. 
Consequently, Boko Haram may retreat from rural areas (where it currently faces intensive 
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bombardment by the allied forces) to infiltrate urban areas where it may regroup as multiple 
cells which will eventually become conduits for insurgency (Idahosa, 2015) 
At the opening of 2016, the threat posed by Boko Haram loomed larger, not only over 
Nigeria’s national security, but also over the Nigerian citizenry and its neighbouring 
countries, with people having their daily lives subjected to frequent incidents of stress, 
danger, fear  and death. However, with the advancement of a multinational task force in the 
wake of 2016 under the administration of General Muhammadu Buhari, the strength of the 
terrorist sect dramatically waned, with many members of the sect killed while the most 
powerful and notorious kingpins of the sect were arrested in a swift military operation by 
multinational troops (Ngwaogu,2016). Moreover, the appointment of Abu Musab Al-
Barnawi as the new leader of the sect by the Islamic States (IS) on 5 August 2016 
precipitated  an unprecedented dichotomy within the group, which resulted in a split in the 
group and thus a further weakening of the terrorist force (Ikuomola, 2016). 
However, at the beginning of 2017, the 7 January Boko Haram attack on the Nigerian army 
base in the Buni Yadi area of Yobe state in which five soldiers lost their lives debunked the 
fast-spreading rumour that the sect had been submerged in Nigeria. There has been no 
concrete evidence hitherto that Boko Haram has been defeated in Nigeria. In fact, as it is 
driven out of some territories, it establishes colonies in new geographical areas. In the past, 
Boko Haram managed to melt into the countryside and the slums of urban centres where it 
regrouped and eventually resurfaced. Therefore, although regional onslaughts by a 
multinational task force might have truly turned the tide against Boko Haram, the truth is 
that it still poses a significant threat to designated sub-regions in Nigeria. Realistically, 
before there could be any evidence of Nigeria winning the war against Boko Haram 
terrorism, Boko Haram’s most notorious leader, Abubakar Shekau and his deadly guerrilla 
force must be apprehended and the last of the Chibok girls must be recovered from captivity. 
Clearly, the Boko Haram era of terror outbursts shows no signs of abating, despite Nigerian 
President Muhammadu Buhari’s New Year address which claimed that Boko Haram had 
been ‘beaten’ (News24, 2017). However, the overarching focus of the current thesis was not 
on the activities of the sect, but on the myriad of contributory factors that fan the flames of 
the insurgency of this terrorist group. Factors such as community support, international 
organization support, lack of an adequate information system, security deficiency, pervasive  
elite and political  corruption, military and police brutality against citizens, continued 
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economic challenges, decrepit and underdeveloped infrastructures, as well as inadequate and 
deceptive reporting were closely scrutinized. From the standpoint of Maiangwa et al. (2016), 
one way of resolving the Boko Haram impasse would be to address the causal efficacy of 
each of the foregoing trigger factors. The study envisioned that, should these issues be 
addressed, the strength of the terrorist force might become drastically weakened and the 
likelihood that the discontented, aggrieved and frustrated youths of northern Nigeria who 
gravitate towards terrorism as a livelihood option will become significantly reduced, if not 
completely eradicated in the region. Table 2.1.6 presents a synopsis of the panoramic and 





Table 2.1.6: A Panoramic and Chronological Overview of Boko Haram Activities from 2009 
to 2017.  Sources:  (i)  Nkwede et al. (2015). (ii)  Onuoha & Ugwueze. (2014).(iii)  "Who are 
the Boko Haram Islamists?" (2016, July 05). (iv) Boko Haram activities: Timeline of Boko 
Haram Insurgency (2017, July 25) 
S/N     DATE NATURE AND PLACE OF ATTACK NUMBER OF 
CASUALTIES 
1 26 Jul, 2009 First clash with the security agencies in 
Bauchi state after an all-night attack on 
Dutse-Township police station 
42 people killed 
including 39 sect 
members, 2 policemen 
and 1 soldier 
2 27 Jul 2009 First attack in Yobe state during an 
invasion of the Potiskum Divisional 
Police Headquarters 
4 killed including 3 
policemen and 1 fire 
service officer 
3 29 Jul, 2009 Confrontation with security men at 
Mamudo village, along 
Potiskum/Damaturu Road, Yobe State 
33 members of the sect 
killed 
4 29 Jul, 2009 An all-night battle with combined 
security operatives at Railway Terminus, 
Maiduguri 
Unreported scores 
killed and operational 
base of the sect 
destroyed 
5 13 Mar, 2010 Attack in Northern part of Jos, Plateau 
state 
300 people killed 
6 8 Sept 2010 Attack at Bauchi central prison No record of death but 
prisoners were freed 
unlawfully 
7 24 Dec, 2010
  
Bomb explosion in Barkin Ladi, Jos, 
Plateau State 
30 people killed 
8 31  Dec, 2010 Explosions at Mogadishu mammy 
market, Abuja 
About 10 people killed 
9 28 Jan, 2011 Attack on the ANPP governorship 
candidate’s convoy at Lawan Bukar 
ward, Maiduguri 
7 people killed 
including the 
governorship candidate 
10 2 Mar, 2011 Attack on DPO Mustapha Sandamu’s 
residence at Rigasa area of Kaduna 
2 policemen killed 
11 30 Mar, 2011 Bomb explosion in Damaturu A policeman was 
injured 
12 2 Apr, 2011 Bomb explosion at Dutse-Township 
police station 




13 4 May, 2011 Attack at Maidugari prison on Kashim 
Ibrahim Way. 
A prison warder was 
killed 
14 5 May, 2011 Attack in Maiduguri Government House 2 people killed 
including the Duty 
Officer and a 13-year-
old boy with another 
injured 
15 9 May, 2011 Attack on the residences of 2 Islamic 
clerics, sheikh Goni Tijani and Mallam 
Abur,a t Mairi and Bulabulum warse in 
Bauchi state 
The 2 Islamic clerics 
were killed 
16 9 May, 2011 Chairman of NURTW Bauchi state was 
Attacked 
1 person died – the 
chairman 
17 13 May, 2011 Bomb explosion at London Chinki, 
Maiduguri 
2 people killed 
18 15 May, 2011 Bomb explosion at Lagos street, 
Maiduguri 
5 people injured 
including 2 soldiers and 
3 policemen. Also, a 
police man was shot 
dead same day in the 
city. 
19 29 May, 2011 Bomb explosion in Bauchi military 
Barrack 
14 people killed 
20 29 May, 2011 Bomb explosion at Zuba, a suburb of 
Kubwa in Abuja 
8 people lost their legs 
21 31 May, 2011 Attack on Shehu of Boron’s brother 1 person killed – the 
Shehu’s brother 
22 1 Jun, 2011 Attack on police station in Maiduguri 5 people killed 
23 12 Jun, 2011 Attack on a drinking joint in Bulumutu, 
Maiduguri 
4 people killed 
24 16 Jun, 2011 Bomb explosion at police Headquarters, 
Abuja. Also, bomb explosion at Damboa 
town, Maiduguri 
2 people killed, 4 
children killed 
25 20 Jun, 2011 Attack on Kankara police 2 people killed 
26 9 Jul, 2011 Clash between Boko Haram and the 
military in Maiduguri. Alos, bomb blast 
in a church at Suleja, Niger state 
31 people killed. 4 died 




27 11 Jul, 2011 Bomb explosion at a relaxation joint in 
Fokados street, Kaduna 
Unreported scores 
killed with many more 
injured 
28 12 Jul, 2011 Attack on a moving military patrol 
vehicle with IED in Maiduguri 
5 people injured 
29 15 Jul, 2011 Bomb explosion in Maiduguri 5 people injured 
30 23 Jul, 2011 Bomb explosion close to the palace of the 
Shehu of Borno 
3 soldiers injured 
31 25 Jul 2011 Bomb explosion near the palace of a 
traditional ruler in Maiduguri 
8 people killed 
32 26  Aug, 2011 Attack on the United Nations building in 
Abuja 
25 people killed with 
about 60 more injured 
33 12 Sept, 2011 Bomb explosion in a police station in 
Misau, Bauchi state 
7 people killed 
including 4 policemen 
34 13 Sept, 2011 Attack on the military after a raid in 
Boko Haram hideouts in Bauchi state 
About 4 soldiers injured 
35 17 Sept, 2011 Attack on Mohammed Yusuf’s brother-
in- law  two days after paying host to 
Obasanjo 
1 person – Babakura 
Fugu  killed 
36 3 Oct, 2011 Attack at Baga market in Maiduguri 3 people killed 
37 4 Nov, 2011 Attack in Damaturu, Yobe state About 150 people killed 
38 27 Nov, 2011 Attack in Geidaam, Yobe state 7 people killed 
39 18 Dec, 2011 Bomb detonation in Shuwari, Maiduguri 3 sect members died 
40 22 Dec, 2011 Bomb explosion and gunshots in Borno 
State 
4 people killed and 
several others injured 
41 24 Dec, 2011 Bomb explosion in Jos About 80 people killed 
42 25 Dec, 2011 Bomb explosion at St. Theresa’s Catholic 
Church in Madalla, Niger state 
About 50 people killed 
and several others 
injured 
43 30 Dec, 2011 Attack in Maiduguri 7 people killed 
44 5 Jan, 2012 Attack in a church  in Gombe 6 people killed 
45 6 Jan, 2012 Attack in Christ Apostolic Church, Yola, 
Adamawa state. Also, attack at Mubi, 
Adamawa 
17 people killed. Also, 




46 20 Jan, 2012 Multiple attacks in Kano About 250 people killed 
47 22 Jan, 2012 Attack at 2 churches and the headquarters 
of Tafawa Balewa LGA in Bauchi state 
About 10 people killed 
48 26  Jan, 2012 Bomb explosion in Sabon Gari, Kano 
State 
Untold number of 
people  injured 
49 28 Jan, 2012 Attack in Gambiru Ngala, Borno State 1 killed 
50 29 Jan, 2012 Attack in Gambiru Ngala, Borno state 2 killed 
51 30 Jan, 2012 Attack in Maiduguri environs 6 killed including 2 Air 
force officers 
52 4 Feb, 2012 Attack in Damboa town, Borno state 2 killed 
53 5 Feb, 2012 Attack in Yobe An SS man killed 
54 7 Feb, 2012 Attack at Kano market and military 
Barrack 
5 people killed 
55 7 Feb, 2012 Another attack in Kano 10 people killed 
56 10 Feb, 2012 Shoot out with soldiers in Maiduguri 4 people killed 
57 10 Feb, 2012 Attack in police station in Shagari 
Quarters, Kano state 
No casualty recorded 
58 12 Feb, 2012 Tip-off in Maiduguri Some members of Boko 
Haram killed 
59 15 Feb, 2012 Prison break in koton karji prison, Kogi 
state 
A warder killed and 199 
prisoners freed 
60 15 Feb,2012 Attack on policemen in Minna, Niger 
State 
2 policemen killed 
61 17 Feb, 2012 Attack I Geidam, Yobe state 2 people killed 
62 17 Feb, 2012 Attack in Maiduguri metropolis 5 people killed 
63 19 Feb, 2012 Bomb explosion near a church in Suleja 
on the outskirt of Abuja 
5 people killed 
64 11 Mar, 2012 Suicide bomb attack in a church in Jos, 
Plateau state 
4 people killed with 38 
others injured 
65 8 Apr, 2012 Bomb explosion on Easter Sunday near a 
church in Kaduna 




66 29 Apr, 2012 Bomb attack at a lecture theater used as 
Christian worship in the University of 
Kano 
19 people killed 
including 2 professors 
67 3 Jun, 2012 Suicide car bomber drove into a church in 
Yelwa during Sunday service 
About 12 people killed 
68 10 Jun, 2012 Attack on a church congregation in Biu 
town, Borno state 
Unreported number of 
people killed 
69 1 Oct 2012 Attacks at Adamawa state University, 
Federal Poly, and the school of Health 
Technology and also University of 
Maiduguri in Borno state 
About 43 students 
killed 
70 1 Oct, 2012 Attack in Minna, Niger state 2 policemen killed 
71 7 Oct, 2012 Confrontation between the military and 
the sect members in Damaturu, Yobe 
state 
About 32 people killed 
including 30 members 
of the sect and 2 
civilians 
72 8 Oct, 2012 Reprisal attack for the death 10 people killed 
73 14 Oct, 2012 Attack at Dongo Dawa village in Gwari 
L.G.A of Kaduna state 
24 people killed 
74 28 Oct, 2012 Attack in Kaduna 8 people killed and 100 
injured 
75 28 Oct, 2012 Suicide bomber struck at St. Rita’s 
Catholic church in Angwar yero, Kaduna 
state 
8 people killed 
76 29 Oct, 2012 Attack at a drinking bar in Gindin Akwati 
Barkin Ladi, Plateau state 
6 people killed 
77 21 Nov, 2012 Attack in Maiduguri by the sect 10 people killed 
78 22 Nov, 2012 Attack on ladies believed to be on 
miniskirts in Maiduguri 
20 women killed 
79 24 Nov, 2012 Bomb explosion in St. Andrew’s 
Anglican church at the Armed forces 
command and staff college Jaji, Kaduna 
state 
15 people killed 




81 1 Jan, 2013 Shootout in Maiduguri 4 people killed 
including 13 sect 
members and a soldier 
82 2 Jan, 2013 Attack on a police station at Song town 
of Adamawa state 
4 people killed 
including 2 policemen 
and 2 civilians 
83 4 Jan, 2013 Attack on a military check-point in Marte 
town of Adamawa state 
7 people killed 
including 5 sect 
members, a soldier and 
a policeman 
84 19 Jan, 2013 Attack on a contingent of Mali-bound 
Nigerian troops, in central Kogi, Kogi 
state 
2 soldiers killed and 5 
others injured 
85 19 Jan, 2013 Attack on Emir of Kano’s convoy 5 people killed mostly 
the Emir’s security 
Guards 
86 21 Jan, 2013 Attack of a market in Damboa town 18 people killed mostly 
local hunters 
87 23 Jan, 2013 Attack at Gwange area of Maiduguri 5 people beheaded 
88 27 Jan, 2013 Attack of Gajiganna village near 
Maiduguri 
8 civilians killed 
89 1 Feb, 2013 Clash with the military in two forests 
outside Maiduguri 
17 sect members killed 
90 8 Feb,2013 Attack on 2 polio clinics in Kano 10 polio immunization 
workers killed and 3 
others injured 
91 10 Feb, 2013 Attack in potiskum, Yobe state 3 North Korean doctors 
killed 
92 15 Feb, 2013 Bomb attack against military patrol 
vehicle in Maiduguri 
2 suicide bombers dies 
and 1 soldier injured 
93 16 Feb, 2013 Attack on a construction company in 
Bauchi State 
1 security employee 
killed and 7 foreign 
nationals abducted 
94 19 Feb,  2013 French family taken hostage in Cameroon 
near the Nigerian border 
No casualty reported 




95 20 Feb, 2013 Attack of a military patrol vehicle in 
Maiduguri 
3 people killed 
including a suicide 
bomber and 2 civilians 
96 18 Mar, 2013 Bomb explosion in a luxurious bus park 
in Kano 
More than 70 people 
killed and several 
Others 
97 16 Apr, 2013 Clash between the JTF and the sect 
members in Baga, Borno state 
Over 200 people killed 
mostly civilians 
98 18 Jun, 2013 Bomb blast at Maiduguri, Borno State 22 people mostly 
civilians were killed 
99 6 Jul, 2013 Attack on government boarding school in 
Mamudo village Borno state 
Sporadic shooting and 
throwing of explosives. 
At least 43 people were 
killed, mostly, students 
100 29 Jul, 2013 Coordinated bomb blasts in Sabon Gari, 
Kano state 
At least, 6 people died 
and 6 others injured 
101 4 Aug, 2013 Military base and police post in Bama, 
Borno state 
12 soldiers and 7 police 
officers were killed 
102 11 Aug, 2013 Ngom village near Konduga, Borno state Shoot-out, 12 people 
were killed 
103 11 Aug, 2013 Mosque in Konduga, Borno state Coordinated attacks 
including shooting and 
throwing of bomb, 44 
worshippers killed and 
26 others injured 
104 28 Nov, 2013 Attacks on residents of Sabon Gari 
village in Damboa District, Borno state 
More than 17 people 
were killed 
105 30 Nov, 2013 Coordinated attacks at Baga in Ningi 
Villages 
Scores of people were 
killed including 7 
Fishermen 
106 2 Dec, 2013 Around 200 Boko Haram gunmen 
dressed in military uniform launched 
coordinated attacks on an air force base 
in Maiduguri 
Scores of people killed 
107 20 Feb, 2014 Coordinated attacks at Bama More than 115 people 
killed 




109 25 Feb, 2014 Attacks on Federal Government Boarding 
School at Buni/Yadi 
About 59 people mostly 
students were killed 
110 15 Mar 2014 Boro Haram clash with the military at 21 
Armoured Brigade, Nigerian Army, 
Borno 
More than 350 people 
were killed 
111 5 Apr, 2014 Attacks on Buni/Gari village mosque More than 17 people 
were killed 
112 9 Apr, 2014 Multiple attacks on Dikwa, Kala Balge, 
Gambugla and Gwoza villages in Borno 
More than 210 people 
killed 
113 14 Apr, 2014 Bomb blast at Nyanya motor-park, Abuja More than 100 people 
killed ,over 200 others 
badly injured 
114 15 Apr, 2014 Attack at a Government Senior 
Secondary School, Chibok, Borno state 
Over 275 girls were 
reportedly abducted 
115 26 Apr, 2014 Attack in military unit at Blabili, Dandoa, 
Borno state 
More than 44 people 
killed 
 
116 1May, 2014 Bomb explosion in a Taxi Park at Nyanya 
Abuja 
More than 25 people 
killed and above 71 
others injured 
117 2 May, 2014 Attack on commuters along Maiduguri 
Beneshiek-Damaturu Road. 
About 10 people killed 
118 5 May, 2014 Book Haram attack in Gamboru village, a 
border town with Cameroon 
About 300 hundred 
people killed and 11 
girls abducted 
119 19 May, 2014 Bomb explosion in Sabon Gari Kano Over 10 people killed 
and several others 
injured 
120 20 May, 2014 Bomb blasts at Jos Terminus market, 
Plateau  state 
About 150 people killed 
121 21 May, 2014 Attack on Alagarno, a village in Borno 
state close to Chibok 
About 17 people killed 
122 24 May, 2014 Bomb explosion in Jos football viewing 
Center 
Unspecified number of 
people killed 
123 28 May, 2014 Attack by gunmen at Gurmushi, Borno 
state 




124 2 Jun, 2014 Bomb blast at a bar and a brothel in 
military base, Mubi, Adamawa state 
More than 60 people 
killed 
125 3 Jun, 2014 Boko Haram attacks at Attagara, 
Agapalawa and Agamjara, Gwoza Local 
Government Area of Borno state 
More than 100 people 
were killed 
126 15 Jun, 2014 Attack at Borno market  More than 15 people 
were reportedly killed 
127 17 Jun, /2014 Bomb blast at football viewing center at 
Damaturu, Yobe state 
About 21 killed and 
others seriously injured 
128 23 Jun, 2014 Suicide bomb attack at Kano School of 
Hygiene Technology, Kano state 
About 8 people killed 
and many others injured 
129 25 Jun, 2014 Bomb attack at a shopping mall in Abuja About 24 people killed 
and many others badly 
injured 
130 29 Jun, 2014 Gunmen attack at some churched in 
Chibok community, Borno state 
Actual number of 
deaths yet to be 
unraveled 
131 14 Jul, 2014 Attack in Borno About 26 people were 
killed 
132 23 Jul, 2014 Boko Haram attack in Kaduna About 39 people were 
killed 
133 24 Jul, 2014 Suicide bomb attack on Buhari’s convoy 
in Kaduna 
More than 82 people 
were reportedly killed 
134 31 Jul, 2014 Boko Haram attacks in Yobe mosque and 
another female suicide bomb attacks in 
Kano 
About 18 people were 
reportedly killed 
135 2 Jan, 2015 Attack on WAZA Town 11 people killed and six 
others injured 
136 3 Jan, 2015 Boka Haram insurgents Attack on Baga 
Massacre,Town, Borno State 
2,000 people killed, the 
entire town razed 
137 24 Jan, 2015 Boko Haram burnt down Kambu village 
near Maiduguri, Borno State 
15 people killed and 
several others injured 
138 25 Jan, 2015 Book Haram rebels launched a large 
offensive attack on Nigeria forces in 
Maiduguri, Borno State 
8 civilians, 53 militants 
and unknown number 
of soldiers killed 
139 28 Jan, 2015 Attack on a town in Adamawa State 40 people killed 
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140 2 Feb, 2015 A female suicide bomber attacks minutes 
after the president of Nigeria leaves an 
election rally in city of Gombe State 
1 person killed and 18 
people injured 
141 15 February, 
2015 
A suicide bomber attacks a city of 
Damaturu 
16 killed and 30 people 
wounded 
142 20 Feb, 2015 Boko Haram attack on Chibok town, 
Borno State 
34 killed 21 injured 
143 22 Feb, 2015 A suicide bomber attacks a market in 
Potiskum, Yobe State 
5 killed and dozens 
wounded 
144 7 Mar, 2015 Bomb blast at Maiduguri, Borno State 54 died and 143 injured 
145 28 Mar, 2015 Boko Haram attack on Dukku town in 
Gombe State 
15 voters including 
House of Assembly 
candidate killed 
146 1 Apr, 2015 Attack on Mubi town, Adamawa State Many buried alive, 
houses razed, thousands 
displaced 
147 22 Jun, 2015 Maiduguri Mosque Bombing, in Borno 
State 
30 killed and several 
others injured 
148 2 Jul, 2015 Mosque Massacre in Kukawa Borno 
State 
48 killed and unknown 
number wounded 
149 5 Jul, 2015 Bomb attack in a church Potiskum area of 
Yobe State 
5 killed 
150 6 Jul, 2015 Bomb attack on the central city of Jos, 
Plateau State 
44 people died and may 
others injured 
151 15 Jul, 2015 Attack on Bosso town 16 civilians killed 
152 25 Jul, 2015 Boko Haram attacks Maikadiri village in 
Maiduguri,Borno State 
21 persons killed and 
many injured 
153 26 Jul, 2015 Bomb attack at Damaturu market, Yobe 
State 
19 persons died and 
several others injured 
154 6 Aug2015 Boko Haram attack at Tadagara and 
Dunbulwa villages in Yobe State 
9 persons shot dead and 
looted thatch-roofed 
mud houses and shops 
155 19 Aug, 2015 Boko Haram attach at Kukuwa-Gari 
village in Yobe State 




156 17 Nov, 2015 Bomb blast in the northeastern city of 
Yola 
32 persons and 80 
others wounded 
157 27-28 Jan, 
2016 
Bomb attack on the north eastern city of 
Maiduguri & Dalori village 
Death toll of at least 65 
persons killed 
158 29-31 Jan, 
2016 
Bomb attack on the north eastern city of 
Maiduguri & Dalori village 
Death toll of about 100 
persons reportedly 
killed and about 62 
injured. 
159 14Feb, 2016 Boko Haram Gunmen attack on Yakhari 
& Kachifa Villages of Kano 
About 30 people killed 
and many others injured 
&  At least 92 militants 
were killed & over 850 
villagers were freed 
160 16 Mar, 2016 Suicide female bomb attack on Umarari 
Village, Maiduguri, Borno State 
22 persons killed and 
many injured 
161 19 Apr, 2016 Boko Haram ambush on army general 
officer’s Convoy (Brig. General Victor 
Ezugwu), Borno State 
1 soldier killed and 2 
others injured. 
162 20 Apr, 2016 Boko Haram ambush on army contingent 
at Kareto Village, Borno State 
1 soldier killed and 24 
others injured. 
163 21 Apr, 2016 Boko Haram landmines attack in Yobe 
State 
5 persons killed and 9 
others injured. 
164 13 May, 2016 Boko Haram suicide bomb attack in 
Maiduguri, Borno State 
15 persons killed and 
many others wounded 
165 21 May, 2016 Boko Haram gunshot attack at Bosso 
village 
6 persons killed 
166 3 Jun, 2016 Boko Haram attack on Mafa/Dikwa road 
at Ajiri village of Borno state. 
1 soldier killed and 1 
JTF civilian injured 
167 4 Jun, 2016 Boko Haram attacked the city of Bosso 
and areas in Niger. Many places in the 
city were torched and shot at.  
There were also several 
deaths and injuries on 
the attackers’ side. At 
least 32 people were 
killed and 67 injured.  
168 6 Jun, 2016 Boko Haram attack  on Darak, 
Cameroon 
Ten fisherman were cut 




169 7 Jun, 2016 Boko Haram attack on Bosso village in 
southern Niger  
26 soldiers killed and 
50,000 fled the region 
170 12 Jun, 2016 Boko Haram attack on various homes in 
Mairari, Nigeria 
4 women were dragged 
out of their houses and  
killed publicly 
171 14 Jun, 2016 Boko Haram attack on Lake Chad in 
Cameroon 
10 fishermen were 
killed by the  militants, 
and soon after 42 more 
were killed 
172 15 Jun, 2016 Boko Haram attack on Katuva Village, 
Damboa town 
6 vigilantes killed 
173 17 Jun, 2016 Boko Haram gun battle in the region of 
Diffa southern Niger town of Bosso. 
7 policemen killed and 
many injured 
174 18 Jun 2016 Boko Haram attack at funeral at 
Kudakaya village, Madagali LGA of 
Adamawa State 
18 mourners, mostly 
women, killed and 
some declared missing 
175 20 Jun, 2016 Boko Haram militants attack on Wumbi 
in Nigeria making the second attack in a 
week 
At least 2 people were 
killed and many were 
seriously injured. 
176 25 Jun, 2016 A series of attacks by Boko Haram 
militants in Gouzoudoum and 
Kaldjiwa,Cameroon 
At least 4 civilians were 
killed. 
177 26 Jun, 2016 Boko Haram attack on four remote 
villages in northeast Borno state 
(Zangebe, Maiwa, Algaiti and Mainar) 
1 JTF civilian died and 
5 000 persons rescued 
178 30 Jun, 2016 Suicide bomb attack targeted at a mosque 
and a video club in Djakana, Cameroon 
At least 15 people were 
killed and dozens 
injured  
179 4 Jul, 2016 Boko Haram Attack in northern Nigeria.  Two people were 
injured and  three 
female suicide bombers 
were killed 
180 8 Jul, 2016 Suicide bombing attack on a Mosque in 
Borno 
At least 9 people were 
killed and dozens 
injured 
181 9 Jul, 2016 Boko Haram militants raided a town with 
guns and explosives in Borno  




182 12 July 2016 Boko Haram attack in Borno state  
involving the Nigerian Army  
Resulting in the deaths 
of 25 militants. Two 
soldiers were killed 
during the attack 
183 20 Jul, 2016 Boko Haram ambush on Borno Gongo 
village 
3 civilian JTF and 16 
soldiers missing 
184 1 Aug 2016 Boko haram village raid on Borno Gongo 
village 
9 Christian villagers cut 
down, 3 churches 
burned 
185 10 Aug, 2016 Boko Haram militants attack Borno 
village square 
burned 60 houses, shot 
four villagers dead, and 
abducted one child 
186 19 Aug, 2016 Boko Haram battle with the Multinational 
Air Force in the village of Taye in Borno 
state 
No casualties  were 




wounded while about 
300 militants including 
three senior Boko 
Haram commanders 
(Abubakar Mubi, 
Malam Nuhu and 
Malam Hamman) 
reportedly killed 
187 20 Aug, 2016 Boko Haram attack on the village of 
Kuruburu 
7 people killed with 
machine guns and 
dozens abducted 
188 21 Aug, 2016 Boko Haram attack on a village called 
Kuburvwas between Chibok and 
Damboa, Borno state) Boko Haram 
suicide bombing attack on a market in the 
city of Mora 
11 persons killed and 
women raped; at least 3 
people killed and 
another 24 injured. 
189 27 Aug, 2016 Boko Haram attack on a military patrol 
near Chad's border with Niger[ 
 4 Chadian soldiers 
brutally killed and some 
injured 
190 4 Sep, 2016 Camel-riding Boko Haram assailants near 
Chad’s border 
5 people killed and 
many wounded; houses 
burned 
191 14 Sep, 2016 Boko Haram clashes with Niger armed 
forces  near the village of Toumour in 
Niger's southeast Diffa region 
at least 30 Boko Haram 
militants and 5 Niger 
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armed forces soldiers 
killed  
192 17 Sep, 2016 Boko Haram clash with Chad and Niger 
soldiers in Niger 
At least 38 insurgents 
from terrorist group 
Boko Haram were 
killed and two soldiers 
were also injured in the 
operation. 
193 18 Sep, 2016 An attack by Boko Haram fighters in 
Borno state. 
The Nigerian army 
dispelled reports that 8 
people were killed in 
the attack. 
194 19 Sep, 2016 Boko Haram attack on soldiers battling in 
Malam Fatori 
 40 Nigerian soldiers 
reported dead 
195 22 Sep, 2016 Boko Haram suicide bombing attack in 
Cameroon's far north in Djakana. 
Three civilians were 
killed and a few were 
injured. 
196 25 Sep, 2016 An ambush on the army by the insurgents 
in Borno towns of Miyanti and 
Dareljamal in Kaduna state  
Four soldiers and 
civilian JTF members 
died. 
197 25 Sep, 2016 Boko Haram members attacked a Chad 
National Army position near the border 
with Niger.  
Four soldiers were 
killed and six others 
were injured. Seven 
terrorist were killed. 
198 26 Sep, 2016 A landmine attack and ambush by Boko 
Haram on Sunday in Borno forest near 
the Sambisa forest 
The Nigerian army lost 
an officer and three 
soldiers in the 
operation. 
199 11 Oct , 2016 Suspected members of the Boko Haram 
attack a village in Borno state 
Five persons were 
killed in the attack. 
200 12 Oct, 2016 Boko Haram explosion in Maiduguri, 
Borno State 
About 18 people were 
reported dead.  
201 17 Oct, 2016 Boko Haram attack on Monday in north-
eastern Nigeria 
20 soldiers reported 
dead 
202 24 Oct, 2016 Boko Haram suicide bombing in the far 
north region of Cameroon. The other 
attack was carried out in the northern 
locality of Waramide.  
Three people were 
killed in Cameroon, 
five people were 
wounded while three 
people were killed in 
the other attack. 
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203 29 Oct, 2016 Suicide bombers attack on Saturday in 
the northeastern Nigerian city of 
Maiduguri 
at least eight people 
killed 
204 1 Nov, 2016  A car bomb exploded near a military 
checkpoint in Northern Nigeria in Gubio. 
Nine civilians were 
killed and many were 
wounded. 
205 5 Nov, 2016 Boko Haram militants in a gun battle 
with the Army in Borno state, Nigeria 
An army officer and six 
soldiers were killed. 
206 8 Nov, 2016 Boko Haram gunmen attacked a remote 
area of northern Nigeria in Maru. 
Two Boko Haram suicide bombers 
exploded improvised explosive devices in 
Maiduguri.  
A terrorist attack was launched in 
Banibagou, Niger. 
 Boko Haram fighters raided a village in 
the far northern region of Cameroon. 
More than 30 gold 
miners were killed. 
Four people died and 
six others were injured.  
At least five Nigerien 
soldiers were killed and 
three others injured. 
Two civilians were 
killed, three soldiers 
injured and 100 houses 
were set on fire. 
207 11 Nov, 2016 An early morning bomb blast in the 
Umulari area of Maiduguri.  
Two persons were 
killed 
208 12 Nov, 2016 240 Boko Haram fighters surrendered in 
south-west Chad. 
They had killed an 
innumerable number of 
people. 
209 16 Nov, 2016  Boko Haram ambush on the military 
troops 
 
One soldier died and 
eight others were 
injured. This was the 
event that led to the 
death of B.U. Umar, a 
Lieutenant Colonel. 
210 18 Nov, 2016 Boko Haram suicide bombing attacks in 
Maiduguri, Borno state  
It caused the death of 
six persons, injuring 
many more in multiple 
bomb blasts. 
211 22 Nov, 2016 Boko Haram attack on a military base.  A 
woman with explosives also tried to enter 
an army post next to the Kolofata camp 
on Monday, but she was shot down. 
Six soldiers were killed 
while the surrounding 
houses were burned. 
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212 23 Nov, 2016 A  suicide bomb attack in Maiduguri 
 
At least two persons 
were killed. 
213 24 Nov, 2016 Two young female suicide bombers 
attacked a town in Cameroon's far north 
region of Mora early on Thursday .  
At least four people 
were killed and some 
injured. 
214 28 Nov, 2016  Boko Haram ambush on the military 
troops in Borno state  
 
About  30 insurgents 
were killed by soldiers 
while many soldiers 
were severely injured. 
215 9 Dec, 2016 Madagali suicide bombings  The incident killed 57 
and injured 177. 
216 11 Dec, 2016   Two suicide bombing attack in 
Maiduguri 
3 people were killed  
217 13 Dec, 2016 Boko Haram militants attacked a military 
base in Borno state village of Kamuya  
scores left dead  
218 17 Dec, 2016  Boko Haram deadly attack in Sambisa 
Forest against the the JTF 
 
A member of the 
civilian Joint Task 
Force (JTF) was injured 
during the operation. 
219 23 Dec, 2016  Boko Haram militants with the Nigerian 
army in the Sambisa forest. 
Terrorists are on the 
run. No casualties were 
recorded  
220 25  Dec, 2016 A suicide bombing attack in Mora, 
Cameroon 
left at least 2 people 
dead and injured 5 
others 
221 26 Dec, 2016 2 suicide bombers struck in Maiduguri.  Only one of the 
attackers was said to 
have died, the other was 
reportedly captured 
before striking.  
222 28 Dec, 2016 Boko Haram battled with the army in 
southern Niger 
 
31 Boko Haram fighters 
surrendered, many 
wounded but none  
reported dead 
223 4 Jan, 2017 Suicide bombers attempted to detonate 
their vests at a market in the northeastern 
Nigerian city of Madagali.  
3 girls killed 
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224 7 Jan, 2017 attack on a Nigerian army base in Buni 
Yadi of Yobe state 
5 soldiers killed.  15 
Boko Haram militants 
killed after the army 
launched retaliatory 
strikes 
225 10 Jan, 2017 Two female bombers attack  residences 
in the Kalari area -  disguising as visitors 
 
3 people cut down 
226 13 Jan, 2017  Boko Haram militants in Kangarwa 
village, Borno state.  
Another four suicide bombing attacks  in 
Madagali town 
Nigerian soldiers killed 
and 27 injured at least 9 
people and 10 Boko 
Haram militants killed 
227 14 Jan, 2017 Roadside bombing by Boko Haram 
terrorists in Borno state 
5 soldiers and 10 
attackers killed    
228 14 Jan, 2017 Boko Haram militants’ operation in 
Gnam-Gnam, Cameroon 
At least 17 people 
killed 
229 16 Jan, 2017 Two teenage suicide bombers attacked 
Nigeria's University of Maiduguri 
3 people including a 
professor killed 
230 21 Jan, 2017 Boko Haram attack on a military base in 
southeast Niger 
2 soldiers killed  and 7 
wounded  
231 23 Jan, 2017  Boko Haram invaded a village in Borno 
state  
8 people killed and 
abducted an unspecified 
number of women and 
children  
232 25 Jan, 2017 Boko Haram in multiple suicide bombing 
attacks in Maiduguri, Nigeria 
Killed 4 and wounded 2 
 
233 29 Jan, 2017 Boko Haram attacked a convoy of 
motorists along a recently secured 
highway in Borno state, Nigeria  
Killing at least 7 people 
and injuring many 
others 
234 30 Jan, 2017 Boko Haram militants in Maiduguri, 
Nigeria. Boko Haram attack on the same 
day  in Fotokol, Cameroon  
15 people killed 1 man 
killed and 3 injured 
235 31 Jan, 2017 A suicide bomber stormed the Dalori 
quarters mosque, in Maiduguri, Nigeria 
during morning prayers. 
1 prominent member of 
the mosque killed 
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236 2 Feb, 2017 Dreaded Boko Haram attack along 
Cameroon's border with Nigeria  
A UN independent 
contractor and 4 others 
killed 
237 7 Feb, 2017 Boko Haram village attack in Borno state A security member and 
a civilian killed  
238 11 Feb, 2017 Boko Haram ambush in Borno state. 
Boko Haram on the same day invaded a 
village in Borno State.  
7 soldiers killed and 19 
injured 
Setting ablaze dozens 
of residential houses 
injuring many 
 
239 13 Feb, 2017 Boko Haram invaded Mifa community in 
Chibok Local Government Area of Borno 
state 
An Islamic scholar 
killed and breaking the 
hands of a boy 
240 17 Feb, 2017 Boko Haram suicide bombing in 
Maiduguri, Borno state. 
2 civilians were killed 
and  8 attackers killed 
by the police 
241 13 Mar, 2017 Boko Haram militants’ operation in  
Maiduguri, Borno state.  
 
3 Nigerian men 
executed and 3 and men 
accused of being 
Nigerian military spies 
242 30 Mar, 2017  Boko Haram Islamists exhibited two 
separate raids in north-eastern Nigeria 
 
About 22 girls and 
women were abducted 
in the exhibition. 
243 5 May, 2017 Boko Haram attack on Kaiga army post 
in the Lake Chad region.  
 
 
On the  same day, two female suicide 
bombers attacked in northeastern  
Nigeria, Maiduguri 
9 Chadian soldiers 
killed; some 40 Boko 
Haram militants also 
killed as the army 
responded to the attack 
at the Kaiga post 
5 people confirmed  
dead 
244 13 May, 2017 Suicide bombing at the University of 
Maiduguri in northeastern Nigeria 
 




245 15 May, 2017 Nine members of the insurgent group 
attacked  on motorcycles in Amarwa, a 
suburb of Maiduguri  
11 farmers killed on 
their land with 
machetes; killers 
escaped into the forest 
246 16 May, 2017 Three female suicide bombers attacked a 
herding community in northeastern 
Nigeria. 
2 people killed and 7 
injured 
247 19 May,2017 Three suicide bombers on Friday 
detonated explosives inside a university 
campus in Maiduguri, northeastern 
Nigeria.  
Killing four people and 
few were wounded 
248 20 May, 2017 Suicide bombing and gunshot attacks 
within recently liberated Borno 
communities. 
At least 7 people were 
dead and more than 40 
injured from gunshots 
in separate attacks by 
Boko Haram. 
249 2 Jun, 2017  Attack by Boko Haram extremist. 
Violence erupted in the region bordering 
Chad and Nigeria. 
11 people were killed 
by two suicide 
bombers. 
250 8 Jun, 2017 Boko Haram suicide bombers staged 
multiple attacks targeting mosques where 
Muslim worshippers were praying. The 
attack occurred while soldiers were trying 
to repel another group of Boko Haram 
fighters, who were trying to invade the 
city 
14 persons killed and 
24 injured 
251 9 Jun, 2017 Explosion attack by a bomb concealed in 
a polythene bag. 
Bomb explosion attack in a military base 
by a female suicide bomber.  
2 teenaged boys killed, 
3 others injured. 
A soldier was killed 
during the attack. 
252 10 Jun, 2017 Ten members of the Nigerian jihadist 
group raided the village of Hambagba, 
near Gwoza, on the Cameroon border.  
They kidnapped six 
people and killed four 
others. 
253 14 Jun, 2017 Boko Haram raided the villages of 
Komdi and Tuyan, near Chibok.  
They kidnapped six 
people and killed ten 
others. 
254 16 Jun, 2017  Boko Haram suicide bomber in the Far 
North Region. 
Two civilians were 
killed in the attack. 
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2.1.7  Attempted measures to submerge Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria  
The Nigerian state has responded to the Boko Haram crisis with what Agbiboa (2013e) 
describes as both “soft-hand” and a “heavy-hand” approaches. These two approaches are 
best understood as running concurrently rather than sequentially. The soft-hand approach 
has involved attempts to engage Boko Haram members in political negotiations or dialogue. 
At the state level, the soft-hand approach has involved overtures and rapprochements to 
Boko Haram insurgents. For example, the former governor of Borno state, Ali Modu Sheriff, 
255 18 Jun, 2017  Suicide attack in the Nigerian state of 
Borno, in the northeast of the country. 
 
At least 12 people died 
and 11 others were 
wounded in attacks by 
five suicide women. 
256 20 Jun, 2017 Suspected Boko Haram militants in an 
ambush on a police convoy in northeast 
Nigeria's Borno state. 
They killed two people 
and wounded six others. 
257 22 Jun, 2017 A double suicide attack on Wednesday in 
Cameroon's restive Far North. 
 Six civilians were 
killed. 
258 26 Jun, 2017 Suicide bombers in multiple blasts in 
northeastern Nigeria, Maiduguri. 
Nine people were killed 
and 13 others wounded. 
259 29 Jun, 2017 Suicide bombers in two blasts in a 
refugee camp near the city of Diffa, in 
Niger. 
Two people were killed 
and 10 others wounded 
260 30 Jun, 2017 Two Boko Haram suicide bombers blew 
themselves up in the city of Kerawa, in 
Niger 
A civilian was killed. 
261 1 Jul, 2017 Four Boko Haram suicide bombers blew 
themselves up in the city of Mora, in 
Cameroon. 
A civilian was killed 
and four were injured. 
262 3 Jul, 2017 Boko Haram Islamist militants in 
southern Niger. 
A suicide bomber exploded his bomb in 
the middle of a group of people, a locality 
in the Mora subdivision of the Far North 
region. 
Militants killed nine 
people and abducted 
dozens killing 4 in 
Homaka  
263 11 Jul, 2017 Boko Haram  public attack  in northeast 
Nigeria  Four Boko Haram suicide 
bombers in the northeast Nigerian city of 
Maiduguri 
Eight villagers were 
executed 19 people 




allegedly paid the sum of N100 million, or US$ 620 000, to mollify the anger of the group 
when their leader was killed in 2009. The then current Governor Kashim Shettima, who 
came after Ali Modu Sheriff, called on Boko Haram to come forward for dialogue on July 
16, 2011 (Aghedo 2012:866). According to Integrated Regional Information Networks 
(INRIN, 2012), “Datti Ahmad, President of the National Supreme Council on Sharia, who 
is believed to have had the respect of Yusuf, attempted to reach out to the group; but contact 
was broken off by Boko Haram who accused the Nigerian state of terrible faith after the 
media got wind of the talks”. 
More recently, Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan established a 26-member amnesty 
Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of Security Challenges in the North. The 
committee was headed by Nigerian Special Duties Minister Kabiru Tanimu who had a  three-
month mandate to try to convince Boko Haram to surrender its arms in exchange for a state 
pardon and social integration (IRIN, 2013). According to a presidential statement, the 
committee was given the task “of identifying and constructively engaging key leaders of 
Boko Haram and developing a workable framework for amnesty and disarmament of 
members of the group” (Agbiboa 2013d). The committee was composed of former and 
current government officials, religious authorities, and human rights activists (ibid). 
However, Shekau responded to the amnesty entreaties by saying that his group had done no 
wrong and that an amnesty would not be applicable to them, arguing that it was the Nigerian 
government that was committing atrocities. In his words: “Surprisingly, the Nigerian 
government is talking about granting us amnesty. What wrong have we done? On the 
contrary, it is we that should grant you pardon” (Chiles, 2013; Agbiboa 2013c). In a video 
released on 13 May 2013, Shekau vowed not to cease his group’s violent campaigns to 
establish an Islamic state in Nigeria (IRIN, 2013). Barely a week after Boko Haram refused 
Nigeria’s amnesty offer, the group launched two devastating back-to-back attacks in the 
north of the country. In the first attack, members of Boko Haram, disguised in military 
uniforms and driving buses and machine gun-mounted trucks, laid siege to the town of Bama 
in Borno state, killing 55 people, mostly police and security forces, and freeing over 100 
prison inmates (Fox News, 2013). In the second wave of attacks that came days later, Boko 
Haram members killed 53 people and burnt down 13 villages in central Nigeria’s Benue 
state where violent confrontations between pastoralists and nomads had been commonplace 
(BBC News, 2013). 
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The violent attacks led the Nigerian president to declare a state of emergency (BBC  News, 
2013) in Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe – three northern states where Boko Haram had been 
most active – in an attempt to restore order and reclaim control of the territories (Agbiboa 
2013a). In a pre-recorded address broadcast to the Nigerian public on 14 May 2013, 
President Jonathan said, “What we are facing is not just militancy or criminality, but a 
rebellion and insurgency by terrorist groups which pose a very serious threat to national 
unity and territorial integrity” (BBC News, 2013). Jonathan further stated that “it would 
appear that there is a systematic effort by insurgents and terrorists to destabilize the Nigerian 
state and test our collective resolve” (Fox News, 2013). Jonathan’s speech threw the ongoing 
Islamic insurgency into stark relief, at one point describing how fighters had laid waste to 
state buildings and had taken women and children hostage (Agbiboa 2013c:65). According 
to Jonathan, the actions of the insurgents “amounted to a declaration of war and a deliberate 
attempt to undermine the authority of the Nigerian state and threaten its territorial integrity. 
As a responsible government, we will not tolerate this” (ibid). 
Against this backdrop, the Nigerian president vowed to “take all necessary action  to put an 
end to the impunity of insurgents and terrorists” by arresting and taking into detention 
suspects, launching assaults on Boko Haram hideouts, locking down suspected Boko Haram 
enclaves, initiating raids, and arresting anyone possessing illegal weapons (IRIN, 2013).  
The second response of the Nigerian state can be referred to as a heavy-handed approach 
(Agbiboa, 2013e) which has always been the preferred option against insurgents, as it 
involves the use of state security forces to mount an aggressive pursuit and crackdown of 
Boko Haram members (Onuoha 2012:5). To this end, the Nigerian government established 
a special Joint Task Force (JTF) and launched Operation Restore Order (JTORO). In the 
biggest campaign to date against Boko Haram, President Jonathan ordered some 8 000 
soldiers to the region in a direct military offensive against Boko Haram members, making it 
the largest military deployment since Nigeria’s Civil War (Agbiboa, 2013a). 
However, members of the JTF have often been accused of killing innocent people in the 
name of counter-terrorism. In Borno state, for example, the JTF resorted to extralegal 
killings, dragnet arrests, and intimidation of the hapless Borno residents (HRW, 2012). As 
noted by Solomon, “far from conducting intelligence-driven operations, the JTF simply 
cordoned off areas and carried out house-to-house searches, at times shooting young men in 
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various homes” (HRW, 2012:9). After a series of interviews with residents in the city of 
Maiduguri, Human Rights Watch reported the following: 
“During raids in communities, often in the aftermath of Boko Haram attacks, members 
of the security forces have executed men in front of their families; arbitrarily arrested 
or beaten members of the community; burned houses, shops, and cars; stolen money 
while searching homes; and, in at least one case, raped a woman. In addition, 
government security agencies routinely hold suspects incommunicado without charge 
or trial in secret detention facilities and have subjected detainees to torture or any 
other physical abuse” (HRW, 2012:58). 
In a firefight between the JTF and Boko Haram in Baga, a village in near Lake Chad near 
Nigeria’s border with Cameroon, up to 187 people were reportedly killed and 77 were 
injured (Premium Times, 2013). At least 2 000 houses, 64 motorcycles and 40 cars were 
burnt in the wake of the attack (ibid). Baga residents accused the JTF, and not Boko Haram, 
of firing indiscriminately at civilians and setting fire to much of the fishing town (Chiles, 
2013). According to Marchal, in incidents like these “the Nigerian state apparatus kills even 
more civilians than Boko Haram does” (JTF, 2012:1). Recently, US Secretary of State, John 
Kerry, issued a strongly-worded statement that read: “We are deeply concerned by credible 
allegations that Nigerian security forces are committing gross human rights violations 
which, in turn, only escalate the violence and fuel extremism” (Al Jazeera, 2013). Yet some 
have argued that the US is in no credible position to be ‘deeply concerned’ about the use of 
violence and disrespect for human rights in Nigeria, because the US itself continues to apply 
an arguably similar or even worse strategy in its self-declared ‘global war on terror’ in 
regions in Africa and the Middle East, especially since the epochal 9/11 attacks (Gow, 2013 
cited in Agbiboa, 2013e). In the final section of this article, Agbiboa argues that a declared 
war on terror has only a limited capacity to make a real difference because it can never 
address the underlying conditions that shape groups like Boko Haram and al-Qaeda who 
reject the prevailing order and develop radical positions, or opt to use extreme violence in 
the first place. It is therefore necessary to appreciate the broader context in which 
radicalization occurs. 
According to Agbiboa (2013e), it is equally important to note that the soft- and heavy-
handed approaches of the Nigerian government have divided Nigerians into two groups: 
those who support the use of coercion on the one hand, and supporters of conciliation on the 
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other. Advocates of a coercive approach to tackling terrorism argue that force rather than 
dialogue is more effective in dealing with terrorist organizations, and therefore some argue 
that the Nigerian government had no choice but to take military action against Boko Haram. 
As argued by a prominent Nigerian constitutional lawyer, Yahaya Mahmud, “No 
government anywhere will allow a group to usurp part of its territorial sovereignty. The 
declaration of a state of emergency was necessitated by the constitutional obligation to 
restore a portion of Nigeria’s territory taken over by Boko Haram terrorists, which involves 
the suspension of constitutional provisions relating to civic rights” (IRIN, 2012). Other 
observers, however, worry that the stick response of the Nigerian government will force 
Boko Haram to shift their bases, with grave consequences for Nigeria and neighbouring 
countries. As Nigerian political scientist Kyari Tijani argues, “Boko Haram cannot face 
Nigerian troops in conventional war; the troop deployment to northern Borno means they 
will move out to other towns and cities with less military presence and launch a guerrilla 
war, which is deadlier” (ibid). Tijani’s statement seemed prophetic when, on 6 July 2013, 
alleged Boko Haram fighters attacked a boarding school in Potiskum (a small city in 
northeast Nigeria) before dawn, killing 41 people and leaving 29 students burnt alive while 
university administrative blocks and hostels were also terribly affected. The alleged Boko 
Haram gunmen were reported to have emerged from caves in the Rocky Mountains (Adamu, 
2013). Following this strike, Shekau released a 15-minute video on YouTube expressing full 
support for the violent attacks, denying that Boko Haram fighters killed children. Wagging 
his finger, Shekau warned, “School teachers who are teaching Western education: We will 
kill them! We will kill them!” In the video that was received by the Associated Press through 
intermediaries, Shekau also denied that he was negotiating a ceasefire with the Nigerian 
government: “We will not enter into any agreement with non-believers or the Nigerian 
government,” he said, speaking in his native Hausa language. Shekau added that the Qur’an 
teaches that “we must shun democracy, we must shun Western education, and we must shun 
the Constitution”. At the end he expressed himself in the English language  to denounce the 
Western world, blaming it for accusing him of trying to destroy Islam and working tactically 
to make the Qur’an insignificant and unimportant (Elombah, 2013).  
It is obvious that all efforts made by the Nigerian state to submerge the Boko Haram crisis 
have not had the desired effect, but have failed gallantly. In particular, the concerted efforts 
by the Joint Task Force to restore social order and to recover the Chibok girls and bring 
peace back to the northern region have seemed to fail dismally. Consequently, current 
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President Muhammadu Buhari resorted to opening a second-term negotiation agenda with 
the Boko Haram sect by requesting the assistance of the United Nations (UN) as negotiator. 
President Buhari told the United Nations Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, that Nigeria 
would welcome intermediaries from the global body as part of his administration’s 
commitment to swapping the abducted schoolgirls from Chibok with Boko Haram fighters 
in custody. Speaking during a bilateral meeting with the UN scribe during the 71st UN 
General Assembly in New York, President Buhari said that the Nigerian government “would 
be willing to bend over backwards to get the Chibok girls released from Boko Haram’s 
captivity”. He stressed that the challenge that they faced was to gain access credible and 
bona fide leaders of Boko Haram with whom they could discuss the situation. According to 
the President, the split in the insurgent group was not helping matters. Government had 
reached out, ready to negotiate, but it became difficult to identify credible leaders of the sect. 
He stated that the government would welcome intermediaries such as UN members to 
intervene and address the impasse (Ehikioya, 2016). 
2.1.8.  Conclusion 
An intensive review of relevant literature on Boko Haram terrorism has demonstrated that 
previous studies focused all their attention on the historical, ethno-religious and quasi-
political contexts of the crisis. These studies also elucidated the rationale for rebellion, youth 
membership of Boko Haram terrorism, its ideology, and the activities of the sect, chiefly 
from 2009 to date. There was relatively little attempt by previous studies to dig deeper into 
the socio-economic context of the crisis and to raise a constructive response to the reasons 
why Boko Haram terrorism has been maintained for such a long period of time, and why it 
has been able to sustain such violent and brutal attacks on the Nigerian state and citizenry 
despite all efforts to stamp it out. Therefore, this study made a scholarly attempt to 
systematically investigate how Boko Haram terrorism was maintained in Nigeria from 2009 
to 2017. To date, there still remains widespread assumptions about the root cause of Boko 
Haram terrorism in Nigeria.  
This study therefore endeavoured to examine the root cause of the crisis from a critical 
examination of people’s perceptions across a sampled group of different stakeholders in 
Nigeria. This approach was deemed necessary to shed light on the many hypothetical 
submissions about the root cause of Boko Haram terrorism in the country. Moreover, 
because none of the recommendations put forward by previous studies has resulted in the 
desired outcome of a peaceful Nigeria, this study was necessary as it adopted a completely 
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different approach towards addressing the Boko Haram crisis. The focus of the study was 
on the development of culturally appropriate and acceptable conflict-resolution strategies. 
Against the backdrop of the gaps in the literature on Boko Haram terrorism discourse, this 
study sought to illuminate empirical evidence to address crisis. In this context, relevant 




 CHAPTER THREE  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1   Introduction 
This chapter provides a theoretical framework for the study by illuminating relevant 
theoretical models which served as a blueprint according to which Boko Haram terrorism 
could be better investigated, explained and understood. The chapter explores the social 
exchange, social conflict and rational choice theories to account for the wide variety of 
factors that prompted and sustained Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. In addition, the study 
also reviewed a number of theoretical approaches that share a related but distinct point of 
view with the current study. The theories were discussed to compare and juxtapose the 
different theoretical approaches that the previous scholars have adopted to explain the 
phenomenon of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. 
Terrorism, regardless of the lens through which it is viewed, is adjudged to be one of the 
greatest threats that humanity faces. Therefore, the causes of this phenomenon remain a 
controversial debate among citizens globally. One of the prominent assumptions of the 
behaviourist school of thought is the notion that the root causes of terrorism, war and 
violence are entrenched in human nature, human want and human behaviour, and this creates 
a significant relationship between intra-personal conflict and conflict that pervades the 
external social order, such as the phenomenon that is manifested in Boko Haram terrorism 
in Nigeria (Eneanya, 2015). Acts of terrorism have always been described as the by-products 
of unresolved conflict and the incapacity of the government or authorities concerned to 
submerge these challenges. The reflection that the root causes of such conflicts are not 
completely identifiable and that appropriate strategies to resolve or manage the scourge are 
elusive, was what gave impetus to this current study. Scholars have, at different times, 
propounded various theoretical models to explain the causes and prevalence of terrorism in 
human society. In this process, scholarly attempts to search for a peaceful and stable society 
have led to the emergence of various predominant theories to explain the trend of intrastate 
violence and social insecurity, namely the frustration-aggression and the relative deprivation 
theories (Dollard et al., 1939; Maiangwa et al., 2016; Gurr, 1970, 2000), the state failure 
theory (Rotberg, 2002, 2003; Zartman, 1995), and the resource curse theory (Bannon & 
Collier, 2003; Collier, 2003; Collier & Hoefller, 1998; Le Billon, 2005).  Adekanye (2007) 
highlights a number of factors that largely explain the processes that metamorphose into 
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conflict situations and that can as well give birth to terrorism. These factors are structural 
background conditions as well as precipitating and trigger factors. Maiangwa et al. (2016) 
advance that the state failure and frustration-aggression theories explain the grievances that 
propel Boko Haram members to resort to terrorism. Eneanya (2015) attempts to explain the 
cause of Boko Haram insecurity through the lens of the instinct theory of frustration-
aggression, the relative deprivation theory, the social learning theory, and the social identity 
theory. Faleti (2006) adopted a completely different approach to examine the causes of 
terrorist acts in Nigeria by looking through the lens of the psycho-cultural perspective. He 
asserts that psychological, religious and other cultural contradictions are the fountain of 
conflict and that such conflicts are intractably perennial. He stresses that religious influences 
in terms of Islamic jihads and solidarity with global Islamic fundamentalists motivate other 
jihadists to engage in violent acts. Faleti adds that the terrorist activities of Al-Qaeda, the 
Taliban, Al-Shabaab and ISIS in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, Somalia, Libya, Mali 
and the Middle East motivate others to learn their mode of operations and military tactics, 
which are eventually imported for domestic insurgencies (Faleti, 2006). Festinger (1951) 
developed a theory about the communication of social influences, which he refers to as 
cognitive dissonance. This is one of the most significant psychological concepts that sheds 
light on terrorist behaviour. Cunningham (2003) observes that “men prefer a situation of 
stability in respect of values, behaviour and their environmental conditions. When people 
experience a difference between what they perceive and what they desire (cognitive 
dissonance), they seek to reduce this dissonance by reducing this gap through actions, 
filtering information or altering perceptions”. To Cunningham, cognitive dissonance is 
therefore experienced whenever there is a polarity between preferred value and actual value 
states. Such a situation has the tendency to produce hatred, anxiety, fear and the desire to 
hurt or eliminate the source. The polarities that manifest within economic, social, cultural, 
political and religious spheres form the micro level of analysis that could be regarded as the 
structural background conditions for generating violence in society.   
3.1.1 Understanding Boko Haram terrorism: a liability shift perspective 
Cunningham Jr. (2003) stresses that the liability shift theory serves as the root of terrorist 
strategy. This theory assumes that governments view states and local government areas 
within their jurisdiction as an asset that must be defended against internal or external 
aggression. The theory further proposes that acts of terrorism will cost the government 
valuable lives and money and that it needs to defend its asset against a sustained terrorist 
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campaign, such as the losses that are experienced through Boko Haram insurgency. The 
theory assumes that after a government has suffered significant losses, its asset will become 
a liability instead and the government will decide to forfeit the asset and cut its losses. In 
this context, the goal of Boko Haram terrorists is to destabilize the country and make it 
ungovernable, as this could lead to the collapse of the state, leaving them room to impose an 
Islamic way of life on the populace. This goal is anchored in the assumption that, during 
anti-terrorist campaigns, government will overreact and become oppressive in order to 
combat terrorism, and that this will expose weaknesses in the government to the populace, 
as was evidenced by the extra-judicial killing of Mohammed Yusuf, the founder of the Boko 
Haram sect. In turn, the populace will withdraw its support for and allegiance to the 
government and develop sympathy for the sect. Although this theory has been criticized, it 
offers a significant reflection on the philosophy that drives the Boko Haram sect and 
engenders an appreciation for the reasons why the government has been unable to overcome 
the challenges posed by the sect.  
 
3.1.2 Understanding Boko Haram terrorism: a poverty-breeds-conflict hypothesis  
In his bid to unravel the cause of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria, Awojobi (2014) adopted 
the poverty-breeds-conflict hypothesis to establish a correlation between poverty and 
insecurity. He based his argument on the finding brought forward by various scholars that 
most of the conflicts in developing countries are caused by the prevalence of poverty. Also 
prominent among these scholars is Kanbur (2007), who argued that there was causality from 
high poverty rates to conflict when he was trying to establish the inequality link between 
poverty and conflict. Ford (2007) and Bellows and Miguel (2006) also reveal that poverty 
is the major cause of conflict in Africa. Rice et al. (2006), Collier and Hoeffler (2002), 
Fearon and Laitin (2003), and Walter (2004) posit the poverty assists to protract a conflict 
once it has started. Various research findings have shown that, when income drops, there is 
a probability for conflict to surface or become reignited. According to Collier and Hoeffler 
(2004), studies by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (Oxford University), James Fearson and 
David Laitin (Stanford University), and Professor Nicholas Sambanis (Yale University) 
have given credence to this hypothesis by stating that poverty cannot be left out of those 
factors that generate violent conflict in society. Despite the significant contribution of this 
theory to the understanding of violence across human societies, scholars like  Solimano  and  
Formisano (2005), Sanchez  and  Nunez  (2001), Sanchez, Rubio  (2000) and Gaitan  (1995) 
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raise an objection to this hypothesis, contending that it is not only poverty that can generate 
violence. They stress that violence, particularly terrorism, could also be influenced by men 
of the ruling class who hold a high social status in society. Conversely, empirical evidence 
from the works of Collier and Hoeffler (2002). For example, Collier and Hoeffler (2002) 
examined conflicts in Africa and the outcome of their studies indicated an interface between 
income and conflict, which signifies that low income can generate conflict. Gurr (1970) and 
Burton (1997) argue that insecurity, terrorism, conflict and violence are caused by a high 
poverty rate in most societies. Sarmiento and Bacerra (1998) and Sarmiento (1999) are the 
leading scholars on the poverty- breeds-conflict hypothesis 
Ted Gurr’s deprivation theory also subscribes to this assumption. This theory explains the 
reasons for youth involvement in violence and radicalization. According to the deprivation 
theory as submitted by Leeds (1978), “aggression is always an attendant consequence of 
frustration” and “frustration always lead [sic] to aggression”. Odumosu (1999) shares Lead 
and Gurr’s idea and submits that “the poor are led to violence due to the relative deprivation 
of human basic needs”. Awojobi (2014) argues that “frustration, lack of income and 
unemployment must have prompted the youth in northern Nigeria to become the foot 
soldiers of Boko Haram terrorists”.  
Many theoretical approaches may be applied to blame Boko Haram terrorism on the high 
rate of poverty in Nigeria, yet these submissions have constantly been debunked by the 
coercive security apparatus of the state as well as some security experts who claim that Boko 
Haram  terrorists have representatives within the government and cabinet (Richard, 2012; 
Guardian 2012). However, Kastina (1999) argues that although much controversy surrounds 
the cause of Boko Haram terrorism, the fact remains that even if the sect has its antecedents 
in religious injunctions, its springboard is a huge reservoir of poor, unemployed urban 
youths from diverse parts of the country. According to him these youths, who have 
completely become disenfranchised and whose lives have been battered by abject poverty, 
are readily available to be employed as foot soldiers who commit all sorts of atrocities such 
as maiming, brutal killings and suicide bombings in the name of religion. This assertion is 
also pronounced in Onuoha’s (2014) empirical study entitled Why do youth join Boko 
Haram? The latter author submits that poverty plays a major role in luring law-abiding 




3.1.3 Understanding Boko Haram terrorism under the lens of Freudian political 
psychology 
The contributions of early psychologists (such as Freud’s political psychology) in 
understanding why people tend to exhibit violent behaviours cannot be underestimated as 
they postulate that there is a human instinctive impulse (Thanatos) which sometimes 
instinctively predisposes humans towards aggression, destruction and death. Freud refers to 
this as the ‘death instinct’. In contrast, the second instinct (Eros) is a human instinctive 
impulse that strives for self-preservation, pleasure, leisure and comfort, and it also has an 
aversion to danger. Freud refers to this as the ‘life instinct’. With particular reference to 
Thanatos, Marcuse (1966:29) states that “the death instinct is destructiveness not for its own 
sake, but for the relief of tension and aggression. The descent towards death is an 
unconscious flight from pain and want. It is an expression of the eternal struggle against 
suffering and repression”. Thus, from the standpoint of the Sigmund Freud-Marcuse thesis, 
in response to situations the death instinct (Thanatos) always strives to gain dominance and 
ascendancy over the life instinct (Eros), thereby generating violence in place of peace and 
harmony. Boko Haram terrorism can therefore be understood within the nexus of the 
Sigmund Freud-Marcuse thesis rather than through the lens of the poverty-aggression thesis 
and other theoretical perspectives upon which this thesis is premised. This is because, under 
the exigencies of oppression or the violation of fundamental human rights, the death instinct 
may prevail over the life instinct under concrete situations of severe dehumanization, a 
breach of social contract, and the indignity of social life. Such conditions may then produce, 
reproduce and sustain acts of terrorism by the Boko Haram sect.  
Herbert Marcuse (1966) explains that both sets of instinct are to be understood dialectically. 
It is expressed that these instincts are shaped by culture which, in turn, influences individual 
characteristic predispositions (or personalities) as well as social behaviour (Ninalowo, 
2011:150). The dynamics of social structure, whether oppressive or liberative, would shape 
the prevalence of the type of instinctual impulse within the socio-cultural realm (ibid). 
However, this theory has been discredited by biologists who do not believe that such a 
mechanism exists. It has also been argued that neither of these theories lays adequate 
emphasis on unequal hegemonic power exchange as expressed in socio-economic, political, 
ethno-religious and cultural forms, which all form the basis for the experience of a failed 
state which,  in turn, breeds poverty and the exacerbation of poverty across the civil society. 
It is within this context that frustration may arise to ignite a class conflict that will eventually 
engender high levels of violence in society. 
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3.1.4 Understanding Boko Haram terrorism from the perspective of the general 
strain theory  
In their book entitled Criminology theory and terrorism: new applications and approaches 
that was published in 2016, Freilich and LaFree opine that terrorism can be better understood 
from the lens of the general strain theory. This assertion is one of the most recent approaches 
in essays on terrorism across the social and behavioural sciences. Based on the conceptual 
and empirical argument of Freilich and LaFree, Robert Agnew developed his general strain 
theory in the 1980s, which is a theory that builds upon the foundation of Merton’s strain 
theory but encompasses a much larger range of behaviours by focusing on the middle, upper 
and lower classes of society and can also be applied to societies outside the United States of 
America (see also Tibbets & Hemmens, 2015). 
As new focuses on the assumption that frustration is an aspect of the daily life of members 
of all societies, social classes and economic backgrounds, and it is people’s ability, or lack 
thereof, to deal with these frustrations and the manner in which they do so which are of 
major importance to the understanding of terrorism (Freilich & LaFree, 2016). Freilich and 
LaFree’s work supports the argument of the current study which contends that the Nigerian 
youth are living in frustration resulting from poor democratic governance and the long-
lasting aftermath of a combination of years of corruption and mismanagement that have 
characterized the historical development of the Nigerian state. These situations that cause 
frustration seem to have caused a good number of the youth to fall prey to Boko Haram’s 
lure. The strain theory also focuses on individuals’ inability to achieve the positive goals set 
out by society. According to Merton, society teaches its youth to attain these goals by means 
of hard work. Agnew takes this even further by suggesting two additional sources of strain, 
namely “presentation of noxious stimuli and [the] removal of positively valued stimuli” 
(Tibbets & Hemmens, 2015). The reference to noxious stimuli refers to bad events that 
transpire in the lives of individuals. Such events are usually beyond their control, such as an 
abusive parent or an excessively demanding workplace superior (Tibbets & Hemmens, 
2015). Such bad experiences then remove positive stimuli which causes the sudden absence 
of something positive in a person’s life, such as the loss of a job or a loved one, poverty, 
unemployment, material deprivation, and the denial of fundamental human rights. Drawing 
upon the conceptual arguments of Freilich and LaFree (2016), the current study thus argues 
that most youths in north-eastern Nigeria,  including those with good educational attainment, 
have no other option but to respond to the cheap recruitment of terrorist organizations such 
as Boko Haram. Such youths include those who cannot secure a job, who have lost their jobs 
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due to political corruption and the socio-economic instability of the country, who have low 
educational qualifications, who come from poor socio-economic backgrounds, and whose 
lives have been battered by abject poverty. Agnew postulates that both these categories 
contain activities that have the ability to cause undue stress and frustration at any stage of 
an individual’s life (Tibbets & Hemmens, 2015). It is noteworthy that not all individuals 
respond to these sources of strain in the same way (Tibbets & Hemmens, 2015). 
The general strain theory also postulates that these two categories of strain have the potential 
to result in a person feeling a significant amount of frustration which ordinarily leads to high 
levels of anger. Such feelings could subsequently lead to criminality (Freilich & LaFree, 
2016; Tibbets & Hemmens, 2015). However, Agnew also states that this is usually only the 
case when an individual is unable to utilize some form of positive coping mechanism to deal 
with anger and frustration. Those individuals who are able to find and utilize a positive 
coping mechanism – such as exercise – reduce their predisposition to criminal activity while 
those who cannot do so are easily predisposed to criminality. Examples of negative coping 
mechanisms are drug use and increased aggression (Tibbets & Hemmens, 2015). 
The general strain theory is exceptionally useful in evaluating youths’ susceptibility for 
recruitment into terrorist organizations, not only in Nigeria but on a global scale (Freilich & 
LaFree, 2016). Young people in Nigeria, particularly those from an Islamic background, 
experience a great deal of strain and frustration due to either discrimination against or 
sympathy towards those of the Muslim faith who are victimized by both Western powers 
and acts of terrorism. This strain is a major factor which contributes to the inclination of the 
Islamic youth to join a terrorist organization. The general strain theory also accounts for the 
successful recruitment of non-Muslim youths, as these young people face other forms of 
strain and frustration which are fuelled by their desperate need for inclusion and acceptance 
into a group. This need consequently drives them towards the false promises and religious 
teachings of terrorist organizations. 
Furthermore, young people who may not live up to societal standards of success may find 
the promise of glory and honour within a terrorist organization a welcome substitute 
(Gardener, 2016; House of Commons, 2016). This is in line with the strain theory’s 
prediction that those who are unable to achieve in society may seek criminal means as an 
avenue to release their frustration (Tibbets & Hemmens, 2015). According to Gardener 
(2016) and Freilich and LaFree (2016), terrorist organizations utilize expert 
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cinematography, graphics and extreme violence to draw in individuals with psychopathic 
tendencies. It is important to note that Boko Haram not only draws in young people, but also 
those who already have families, as is illustrated in the propaganda video which claims the 
organization provides education and resources to children of recruits (Heavy.com, 2015; 
Winter, 2016). This often results in young children being raised as jihadi fighters and being 
used in propaganda videos to achieve a strong and emotional response from the public 
(Winter, 2016). This phenomenon could be linked to the strain theory as the absence of 
acceptance or sudden maltreatment of an individual in a society (presentation of noxious 
stimuli) would likely lead to significant amounts of frustration, anger and resentment. Boko 
Haram terrorism can be viewed through Agnew’s theory of the removal of positively valued 
stimuli, where social acceptance, socio-economic goals, honour and esteem are removed 
from those who have criminal tendencies, thus making them cheap preys to terrorism.  
 
3.2 Short Essays on the Causes of Terrorism: an Overview 
Essays on the causes of terrorism are always bound to lead to controversial academic 
discourse. Many scholars regard the discourse of the underlying causes, motivating factors, 
and grievances of terrorism as being accompanied by a sort of justification for extremism 
and violence (Brynjar & Katja, 2000). Any study of terrorism and its future potential must 
rely upon causalities and explore impartially all essential factors leading to changes in the 
occurrence and manifestation of terrorism in society. More specifically, issues surrounding 
the post 9/11 era have made things more significant than ever before in the philosophical 
understanding of the driving forces behind terrorism across a wide array of societies. 
Brynjar and Katja (2000) submit that the literature on terrorism research has previously 
suffered from a dearth of concrete findings about the causes of terrorism. They stress that 
over the past years, there has not been significant progress in testing hypotheses about the 
causes of terrorism. Nevertheless, the theories reviewed in this thesis are well grounded in 
theoretical and empirical studies, and they limelight critical factors that account for the 
propagation of terrorism across a wide range of human societies.  
New research on the causes of terrorism has equally demonstrated that causal relationships 
between economic and political conditions and terrorism are in several areas quite similar 
to those previously found in civil war studies (Quan Li a &  Schaub, 2004). Therefore, 
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findings from this field of research will allow scholars to fill gaps in terrorism research 
literature (Brian, 2004). Still, the relationship applicability to terrorism studies is not 
necessarily direct and straightforward, and will have to be discussed at every stage of life 
(Engene, 1998). When analysing the causes of terrorism, people are confronted with 
different levels of explanations (Kegley, 1990) such as at the individual, group, 
psychological, and socio-psychological levels that assist scholars in identifying why 
individuals may join a terrorist group (Brian, 1985). Explanations at the societal or national 
level primarily attempt to identify non-spurious correlations between certain historical, 
cultural, economic and socio-political characteristics of the larger society and the occurrence 
of terrorism. For example, the impact of modernization, democratization, and economic 
inequality on terrorism falls into this category (Brian, 1985). Moreover, explanations at the 
world system or international level seek to establish causal relationships between the 
characteristics of the international state system and relations between states on the one hand, 
and the occurrence of international terrorism on the other (Brian, 1985).   
A myriad of situations is capable of generating terrorism in human societies. On this note, 
terrorists may either be deprived or aggrieved, frustrated or provoked, disenfranchised or 
denied, religiously fanatic or politically desperate, economically unstable or affluent, 
uneducated or well educated people. Although young males are usually highly over-
represented in most terrorist organizations, terrorists are also found among people of both 
sexes and of all ages (Cunningham, 2003). Cunningham argues further that terrorism occurs 
in rich as well as in poor countries; in the modern industrialized world and in less developed 
areas; during a process of transition and development, prior to or after such a process; in 
former colonial states and in independent ones; and in established democracies as well as in 
less democratic regimes. This list could easily be extended, but it suffices as a demonstration 
of the wide diversity of conditions one needs to consider when trying to develop an 
understanding of terrorism. Apparently, this diversity makes it difficult to generalize 
academic argument on terrorism, because there are different forms of terrorism 
(Cunningham, 2003). Different forms of terrorism also have different causes and different 
effects on the populace and on ecological environments. We may distinguish between 
international and domestic terrorism; socio-revolutionary terrorism; separatist terrorism; 
ethno-religious terrorism; state and non-state terrorism, etc. It is also equally important to 
recognize that what gives rise to terrorism may be different from what perpetuates terrorism 
over time and space, and the degree at which this occurs varies from one society to another. 
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In essence, all theoretical debates on terrorism have been dominated by three major schools 
of thought:  
( i )  Psychology: W h i c h  i s  a n  approach that focuses on the personality, psycho-
pathology and psycho-social traits of terrorists;  
(ii) Orthodox: The realism and liberalism approach that focuses on non-state actor 
terrorism; and  
(iii) Critical terrorism studies: Which is an approach that focuses on state terrorism 
(Ogunrotifa, 2013).  
Such theoretical studies seem to adopt a general point of view on terrorism, irrespective of 
the fact that they are strongly marked by socio-cultural, bio-psychosocial, economic and 
institutional contexts that give rise to terrorist acts. Based on their general approach to the 
understanding and explanation of terrorism, this study has found none of these models suitable 
for engendering an in-depth approach towards a socio-economic and class analysis of Boko 
Haram terrorism in Nigeria. Consequently, the theoretical thrust of the study became 
dispassionately eclectic in the sense that it derived its strength from the integration of three 
sociological theories.  
At this juncture, it becomes paramount to note that this chapter particularly explores the 
theoretical framework that underpinned the study. The theories were advanced in an attempt 
to answer the following research questions that this study proposed. These are: 
(i) What are the public perceptions on the root causes of Boko Haram Terrorism in 
Nigeria? 
(ii) What patterns characterize Boko Haram terrorism and how do they maintain this 
form of terrorism in Nigeria? 
(iii) What are the socio-economic consequences of Boko Haram terrorism in 
Nigeria?  
(iii) How can Boko Haram terrorism be resolved in Nigeria?   
On this note, a combination of the social exchange, the social conflict and the rational choice 
theories was advanced to identify the gaps in the literature on the discourse of Boko Haram 
terrorism in Nigeria and to address the research questions that were developed during the 
course of the research inquiry. The integration of the three theoretical models that were 
selected was considered adequate to address the foci of this study, as they complemented 
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rather than contradicted one another in the critical analysis of the factors that produced, 
reproduced and sustained Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. These theories, which are 
discussed in the next sections, were generated by the following scholars: 
(i) The social exchange theory: George C. Homans and Peter Blau 
(ii) The social conflict theory: Karl Marx 
(iii) The rational choice theory: George C. Homans 
 
 
3.2.1   The social exchange theory 
Social exchange theory has been described as a socio-psychological and sociological 
perspective that explains social change, orderliness and stability as a process of negotiated 
exchanges between parties. The social exchange theory posits that human relationships are 
formed by the use of a subjective cost-benefit analysis and the comparison of alternatives 
(Karen, Cook, Erick, & Rice, 2014). The theory has its roots in the works of Levi-Straus 
(Structural Anthropology), B. F. Skinner and  Albert Bandura (Behavioural Psychology), D. 
Ricardo, Adam Smith, J. S. Mill (Utilitarian Economics), Thibaut and Kelly (Social 
Psychology), and  Sociology (George Homans and Peter Blau). The social exchange theory 
features many of the main assumptions found in the rational choice theory and in 
structuralism. It is also used quite frequently in the business world to imply a two-sided, 
mutually contingent and rewarding process involving transactions or simply exchange 
(Lambe, Jay, Wittmann, Michael, Spekman, & Robert, 2001).  
In the sociological parlance, the social exchange theory was first introduced in 1958 by 
George C. Homans with the publication of his work Social behavior as exchange ( Karen, 
Cook, Erick, & Rice, 2014). He defined social exchange as “the exchange of activity, either 
tangible or intangible, and more or less rewarding or costly, between at least two persons” 
(Homans, 1961). After the introduction of the theory by Homans came other prominent 
theorists who continued to write about it, particularly Peter M. Blau and Richard M. 
Emerson who, in addition to Homans, are generally thought of as the major developers of 
the exchange perspective within sociological theorizing. Homans's work emphasizes the 
individual behavior of actors in interaction with one another. Although there are various 
modes of exchange, Homans centres his philosophy on dyadic exchange (Cook, Karen, Rice, 
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& Eric, 2010). John Thibaut and Harold Kelley are recognized for focusing their studies 
within the theory on the psychological concepts, the dyad and small group (Emerson, 1976). 
Lévi-Strauss is recognized for contributing to the emergence of this theoretical perspective 
from his work on anthropology that is focused on systems of generalized exchange, such as 
kinship systems and gift exchange (Emerson, 1976). 
Peter Blau focused his early writings on the social exchange theory more towards the 
economic and utilitarian perspective, whereas Homans focused on reinforcement principles 
which presuppose individuals and base their next social move on past experiences. Blau's 
utilitarian focus encouraged theorist to look forward, as in what they anticipated the reward 
would be with regard to their next social interaction (Cook, Karen, Rice, & Eric, 2010). Blau 
felt that if individuals focused too much on the psychological concepts within the theory, 
they would refrain from learning the developing aspects of social exchange (Emerson, 
1976). Blau emphasized technical economic analysis whereas Homans concentrated more 
on the psychology of instrumental behaviour (Emerson, 1976). Richard Emerson's early 
work on the theory intertwined with both Homans’ and Blau’s ideas. Homans believed that 
the social exchange theory was based on reinforcement principles, but according to 
Emerson, exchange is not a theory but a framework from which other theories can converge 
and be compared to structural functionalism. Emerson's perspective was similar to Blau's 
since they both focused on the relationship power had with the exchange process (Cook, 
Karen, Rice, & Eric, 2010). Emerson argues that the social exchange theory is an approach 
in sociology that is described for simplicity as an economic analysis of non-economic social 
situations. According to Emerson (1976), the exchange theory brings a quasi-economic form 
of analysis into those situations.  
Lambe, Wittmann, Michael, Spekman, and Robert (2001) submit that the basic concept of 
the social exchange theory views exchange as a social behaviour that may result in both 
economic and social outcomes. The social exchange theory, according to Cook; Karen, Rice, 
and Eric (2010) has been generally analyzed by comparing human interactions with the 
marketplace. They stress further that a study of the theory from a microeconomic perspective 
is attributed to Blau. Under his perspective, every individual is trying to maximize his wins. 
Blau states that once this concept is understood, it is possible to observe social exchanges 
everywhere; not only in market relations, but also in other social relations like friendship 
(Burns, 1973). The major difference between social and economic exchange is the nature of 
the exchange between parties. The neo-classic economic theory views the actor as dealing 
96 
 
not with another actor, but with market and environmental parameters such as market price 
(Cook, Karen, & Emerson, 1978a). Unlike economic exchange, the elements of social 
exchange are quite varied and cannot be reduced to a single quantitative exchange rate 
(Encyclopaedia of Public Relations, 2013). According to Stafford (2008), social exchange 
involves a connection with another person; it involves trust and non-legal obligations that 
are more flexible and rarely involve explicit bargaining. However, when putting together 
different scholarly ideas about the social exchange process and what it stands for as a binding 
force that puts human society together, especially when the exchange is equal on both sides, 
one could see that the theory brings satisfaction and peace when people receive fair returns 
for their expenditures, while it generates fundamental conflicts of interest when people 
receive the other side of the exchange (Cook, Karen, & Emerson, 1978b). 
Several sociological theorizings have made it clear that the social exchange theory is a major 
theoretical perspective in the scientific study of human societies. In considering the multi-
dimensional perspective of the social exchange theory, this study chose to advance the 
theoretical underpinning and conceptual arguments of George C. Homans’ and Peter Blau’s 
global unequal power exchange to explain the fundamental basis behind Boko Haram’s 
rational decision to embark on terrorism in Nigeria. 
As first espoused by George C. Homans (1961a) and Peter Blau (1964), the theory 
emphasizes the “norms of reciprocity” (i.e., the principle of something for something and 
nothing for nothing). The idea behind this theory suggests that, for peace and orderliness to 
exist in human society, the norms of reciprocity must always remain intact. This is a vacuum 
that is left unfilled in the Nigerian state and recurrently generates the continuous mayhem 
entrenched between the government and the Boko Haram insurgents. This study thus found 
this theory highly suitable for the explanation of Boko Haram terrorism in the north-eastern 
part of Nigeria. This is because Boko Haram terrorism has been conceived as an attendant 
consequence of an unequal hegemonic power configuration as expressed in political, socio-
economic, ethno-religious and cultural forms that are implicit in the hidden structure of 
oppression against a significant number of Nigerian citizens, particularly in north-eastern 
societies. Consequently, the possibility of resistance and challenge against the sovereign 
authority is exacerbated, which is a condition that sustains Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. 
Such a form of resistance could be deemed by subaltern actors as moments of an 
emancipatory struggle against the shackles of oppression. By the same token, such struggles 
for liberation may well be conceived by others as acts of terrorism (Martin, 2003; Kashima, 
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2003; Mandani, 2004). Therefore, what is depicted as Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria 
today may well be perceived by some as being within the nexus of counter-hegemony; that 
is, an emancipatory struggle or collective action against the shackles of oppression that are 
infringed on citizens by the political state  (Ninalowo, 2004; Gramsci, 1971). 
We can also look at the relevance of this theory to the study through the sociological lens of 
the global historical notion of a ‘symbiotic social contract’ between the Nigerian political 
state and the citizenry, as was first explicated by John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, and Jean 
Jacque Rosseau, among others. In this regard, the political state of Nigeria is expected to 
provide instrumentality towards the sustenance and amelioration of the human condition in 
the north-east, chiefly by providing for the basic needs of the citizens such as formal 
education, political representation, housing, nutrition, health, clothing, a public transport 
system, and internet and communication facilities. By the same token, the citizenry is 
expected to fulfil their own part of the social contract by paying their taxes regularly, 
discharging their communal obligations, and obeying the clarion call to national services. 
These are unequivocally entrenched in the Nigerian Constitution and the Bill of Rights of 
1999. However, numerous citizens of the Nigerian state have been denied many of these 
rights by the political state. Moreover, the non-fulfilment of or deficits in respect of the terms 
of the social contract between the two parties could have culminated in conflicting factors 
that eventually engendered the crisis of increasing levels of insecurity in the affected 
Nigerian communities. The continuous anarchy between the Nigerian government and Boko 
Haram might probably have emanated from the non-fulfilment of the social contract on the 
part of the Nigerian political state (such as failure to provide in the basic needs of the 
citizens, material deprivation, fragmentation and marginalization of political rights, unequal 
power configuration, or failure of the government to ensure uniform distribution of resources 
across the geo-political zones of the nation). But whatever pattern this chaos has taken in 
Nigeria, this theory firmly establishes the fact that it is a legitimation crisis, as members of 
the Boko Haram sect are deemed to be revolting against the ruling class as a way of 
expressing their grievances and a means of correcting the political errors of their rulers. 
3.2.1.1 Critiques of the social exchange theory 
Despite the merits of this theory with regards to its ability to provide a critical analysis of 
people’s rational, conscious and calculated decisions to embark on terrorism as a punishment 
for the non-fulfilment of the social contract between the state and citizens’ need to meet 
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socio-economic, political and religious goals, many scholars critique this theory for 
presuming that people always make rational decisions. Critics also point out that this 
theoretical model fails to capture the power that emotions and frustrations play in our daily 
lives and in our interactions with others. A case in point is the appreciable number of 
aggrieved youths who fall victim to Boko Haram recruitment in the north-east of Nigeria. 
Moreover, this theory also undercuts the power of social structures and forces which 
unconsciously shape our perception of the world and our experiences within it and which 
play a strong role in shaping our interactions with others. According to Miller (2005), the 
theory reduces human interaction to a purely rational process that arises from economic 
theory. Hence the theory is highly criticized on the basis that it primarily addresses conflict 
that arises from economic transactions that emanate from unequal exchange between two or 
more parties. Although it favours openness as it was developed in the 1970s when ideas of 
freedom and openness were preferred, there may be times when openness is not the best 
option in a relationship. It further assumes that the ultimate goal of a relationship is intimacy, 
but this might not always be the case. Also, the theory places relationships in a linear 
structure, when some relationships might skip steps or go backwards in terms of intimacy 
(Miller, 2005). 
However, the fact that this theory critically explains that the mode of exchange in all contexts 
could be productive, negotiated, reciprocal, unequal, or generalized is a milestone 
achievement; and this account thus describes what becomes of human societies in terms of 
stability, orderliness, peacefulness and workability of all its structural components. 
3.2.2 The social conflict theory 
The social conflict theory of Karl Marx is a macro-oriented paradigm in sociology. It views 
society as an arena of inequality that generates conflict and social change within the social 
structure (Marx, 1867). According to Karl Marx, the key elements of this perspective are 
that society is structured in ways to benefit a few at the expense of the majority. This theory 
sees social life as a competition (or class struggle) and focuses on the unequal distribution 
of resources, space, and power within the social structure (Marx, 1867). To a social conflict 
theorist, it is all about dominant versus minority group relations. Marx therefore opined that 
there was a tainted history of class struggle in all pre-existing societies and that these 
conflicts created the impetus and tonic for the transformation of those societies. However, 
the primary theme of this theory that focuses on class conflict arises from the ways human 
societies produce their material goods and fail to distribute these uniformly within the social 
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structure. Consequently, in place of communal ownership of property or material values, 
there is a constant increase in the privatization of property and the means of production, 
thereby leaving active members of the civil society in abject poverty, frustration and misery. 
Based on this theory, it is argued that the conditions of people in northern Nigeria are 
undermined and worsened by a few leaders, thereby leading to the dispossession and social 
dislocation of the poor masses (i.e., the oppressed). This study viewed social conflict as an 
elongation and attendant consequence of the unequal exchange between Nigeria’s political 
leaders and the citizenry. It is in this context that members of the Boko Haram sect emerged 
in their quest to revolting against the oppression of the minority in the form of violence and 
radicalization. Their actions have thus eventually led to the illicit disruption of the political 
state and the brutalized termination of lives and the destruction of property in the north-
eastern part of Nigeria. 
More specifically, the social conflict theory posits that when a group’s shared grievances 
about its oppressive marginalization and unequal distribution of resources are combined 
with a strong sense of group identity, there is a tendency for the outburst of violent responses 
against the source of their marginalization, either real or imagined (Gurr, 1994:347–377). 
This caveat applies to the situation in Nigeria that has been created by the Boko Haram sect. 
The argument here is that frustration among the poor masses, precipitated by factors such as 
severe poverty, unemployment and corruption among the ruling elite, has generated a 
fundamental conflict of interest within the affected masses who constantly feel oppressed, 
alienated, deprived, frustrated, and abandoned. They may thus either find refuge in their 
religious groups, or are manipulated to wage an insurgency war against the political state 
(Adibe, 2012b).  
Another relevant application of the conflict theory in this study is closely knit with the 
frustration-aggression framework which came into being after the reintroduction of Sharia 
law in twelve northern states. As a corollary, there was widespread disillusionment at the 
way it was implemented, and members of the sect simply tapped into that frustration (Adibe, 
2012a). The relevance of the frustration-aggression thesis for this study is underlined by the 
fact that Boko Haram members have embarked on a revenge mission since the clampdown 
on their members and the extrajudicial killing of their leader by security forces in a bloody 
episode in July 2009. Since then, most of the sect members have been harbouring intense 
anger and aggression towards the Nigerian government and its security forces. There also 
appears to be ample evidence that their increased frustration and disillusionment are closely 
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linked with growing religiosity (Uzodike & Whetho, 2011). When faced with a mélange of 
social challenges and severe poverty, citizens of unresponsive state intervention often turn 
to religious institutions as a solution and redress. By the same token, such people may 
become extremists and zealots in their religious practices. In Nigeria, as well as anywhere 
else in the world, such religious extremism is often associated with the failure of the state to 
meet its people’s basic needs. This is evident in the capacity of Boko Haram to recruit and 
convert poor citizens into terrorism (Jackson, 2007:599). It is within the context of the 
conflict, state-failure and frustration-aggression theses that the Boko Haram reign of terror 
in Nigeria is situated in this particular thesis. This study found evidence to argue that the 
democratic dispensation in Africa, particularly in Nigeria, has provided a breeding ground 
for various sectors and social groups to articulate their concerns more forcefully and 
effectively than ever before. Their voices are raised not only through the ballot box, but also 
through protest activities and even forms of violent resistance against the political state. This 
thesis thus acknowledges the potential connection of Boko Haram terrorism to the issues of 
class conflict, state failure, and the frustration-aggression context that currently characterize 
the Nigerian state. 
The theory presents Boko Haram terrorism as “an expression of an unending class struggle 
implicit in the hidden structures of oppression by the political state as well as the structured 
contradictions of a global capitalist system” (Ogunrotifa, 2013:1). The antagonistic class 
relations between the ruling class and the lumpen class translate into state and individual 
terrorism that has manifested prominently as Boko Haram terrorism in recent times in 
Nigeria. Through this perspective, it is argued that the discursive framework of terrorism 
cannot be analyzed in isolation of its class nature and the socio-economic conditions that 
give rise to it. Boko Haram terrorism is a potentially useful model for the case discussed, 
thereby making it possible to develop an analytical construct and explanation for terrorism 
across global societies.  
3.2.2.1 Critiques of the social conflict theory 
The social conflict theory has demonstrated the inclination to argue that human societies 
cannot exist without going through some form of fundamental conflict of interest, which 
forms the fulcrum for the manifestation of various societies. Nevertheless, the theory appears 
to place over-emphasis on economic relationships as the most constant and indispensable 
source of conflict generation in society.  On this premise, the theory is accused of being too 
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economically determinist. This implies that Marxists over-exaggerate the importance of 
economic relationships (i.e., relationships that are seen to determine the shape taken by all 
other relationships such as family, education, friendship, religion, and so forth) as the basis 
of social conflict and the need to transform societies. It is argued that by concentrating on 
economic relationships, this theory tends to either overlook other forms of non-economic 
conflict or that it attempts to explain these conflicts as ultimately having economic roots. 
The theory is thus heavily criticized as it states that conflict arises from economic inequality 
that emanates from an unequal exchange which is implicit in the hidden structure of 
oppression by a capitalist society through its political state. The theory fails to acknowledge 
the impact of “value consensus” upon which the human society is structured, as 
impressionably explicated by Talcott Parsons’s structural functionalism which submits that 
all the components of human society must work together as a whole (i.e., his organismic 
model) in order to achieve stability, solidarity and orderliness within the social system . 
According Marxists, this theory unfolds that human societies are defined by inequality that 
produces conflict rather than order and consensus. However, the relevance of this theory to 
the current study was that it was able to pinpoint Boko Haram terrorism as an attendant 
consequence of the class conflict that stemmed from the non-fulfilment of the socio-
economic goals of members of the Boko Haram sect in the north-eastern part of Nigeria. 
3.2.3 The rational choice theory as it is related to terrorism 
It has for a long time appeared in the academic domain that economics is the most successful 
of the social sciences. It is widely acknowledged that people are motivated by money and 
material things and by the possibility of making a profit from every social relationship, and 
this has allowed it to construct formal, and often predictive, models of human behaviour 
(Becker, 1976). This apparent breakthrough has led many other social scientists to cast 
envious eyes in this direction. They are of the opinion that if social scientists could only 
follow the economic approach, they could as well record similar achievements in their own 
studies. Therefore, sociologists, anthropologists, psychologists, political scientists, 
criminologists and any other social scientists that deal with the study of human behaviour 
have tried to build theories around the idea that all action is fundamentally 'rational' in 
character and that people calculate the likely costs and benefits of any action before deciding 
what to do, when to do it and how actions will be carried out. This approach to theory is 
known as the rational choice theory, and its application to terrorism takes the form of 
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punishment reward. This argument is extensively espoused by the exchange theory, which 
posits that rational and calculated decisions are taken to institute violence in society as a 
response to the non-fulfilment of socio-economic needs. 
The fact that people act rationally has indeed been recognized by many behavioural 
scientists, but they have seen rational actions alongside other forms of action and human 
action as involving both rational and non-rational elements. Such perceptions of action 
recognize traditional or habitual action, emotional or affectual action, and various forms of 
value-oriented action vis-à-vis the purely rational types of action. Max Weber (1920), for 
example, built an influential typology of action around just such concepts. His ideas were 
taken up by Talcott Parsons (1937) and became a part of the sociological mainstream. In the 
same vein, the social anthropologists Bronislaw Malinowski (1922) and Marcel Mauss 
(1925) looked at how social exchange was embedded in structures of reciprocity and social 
obligation. The rational choice theory of terrorism is argued to have emerged from 
economics and applied mathematics. A pioneering figure in establishing this theory in 
sociology is George Homans (1961b), who devised a basic framework of the exchange 
theory which he grounded in assumptions drawn from behaviourist psychology. While these 
psychological assumptions have been rejected by many later writers, Homans' formulation 
of the exchange theory remains the basis of all subsequent discussions. During the 1960s 
and 1970s, Blau (1964), Coleman (1973), and Cook (1978) extended and enlarged his 
framework, and they helped develop more formal, mathematical models of rational action 
(see also Coleman, 1990).  
In terms of terrorism, the rational choice theory assumes that terrorist acts usually emanate 
from rational, calculated and conscious decisions. These decisions represent an optimal 
strategy to fulfil the socio-economic, political and religious goals of such perpetrators 
(Crenshaw 1992; Sandler & Lapan, 1988; Victoroff, 2005; Wilson, 2000). In other words, 
according to this theory, terrorism might represent a pathological or illogical behaviour, but 
could also represent the best means to fulfil personal needs in some circumstances. The 
rational choice theory thus sees terrorism as a deliberate act with the sole intention to destroy 
life and property in order to achieve some form of socio-economic, religious and political 
goals (Wilson, 2000). 
This theory is often applied to predict the utility of various policies. According to this theory, 
individuals are motivated by their personal wants and goals and are driven by personal 
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desires. Because it is not possible for individuals to attain all of the various things that they 
want, they must make choices related to both their goals and the means for attaining those 
goals. Individuals must anticipate the outcomes of alternative courses of action and calculate 
which action will be best for them. In the end, rational individuals choose the course of 
action that is likely to give them the greatest satisfaction. However, one key element of the 
rational choice theory is the belief that all action is fundamentally ‘rational’ in character. 
This distinguishes it from other theories because it denies the existence of any kind of action 
other than the purely rational and calculative. It argues that all social actions can be seen as 
rationally motivated however much of it may appear to be irrational. The current study found 
this theory relevant to the understanding of the Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria because it 
provided a sound platform from which to argue that members of the sect would not abruptly 
turn inimical to the growth and development agenda of the country. Rather, it would be 
observed from their modes of operation that their activities were ‘rationally’ geared towards 
achieving a common goal. The rational choice theory of terrorism thus facilitated the 
gathering of evidence to argue that most of the responses of the Boko Haram terrorists 
seemed to be intended to maximize their common goals.  
Looking further into the rational choice perspective for the explanation of terrorism, Perry 
and Hasisi (2015) made use of criminology’s rational choice theory to analyse the 
motivations of jihadist suicide attackers. They argue that suicide attackers engage in self-
destructive forms of behaviour which are mostly driven not by altruistic motivations, but by 
the anticipation of future self-gratifying benefits. It is in this context that Boko Haram 
terrorists seem to be motivated to continue with their deadly activities in Nigeria, as they 
may hope to achieve their envisaged optimum benefits. Perry and Hasisi are of the opinion 
that there are no fundamental differences between the motivations that drive terrorists and 
those of more ordinary criminals. Persistent with the rational choice perspective, both sets 
of offenders are committed to maximizing self-gratifying, beneficial behaviour (Perry & 
Hasisi, 2015).  
In terms of the rational choice theory, Perry and Hasisi (ibid) also argue that the ‘rational’ 
concept stresses the notion of strategic thinking and presumes a phenomenon whereby 
information is analyzed, situations are defined from a subjective perspective, opportunities 
and alternatives are evaluated, and all actions are directed towards the optimum achievement 
of expected benefits. To them, the concept of ‘choice’ fortifies the position that criminals 
consider and make decisions which suit their situation. They argue further that people 
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commit crimes if they expect that the benefits of the offenses will exceed the benefits they 
may obtain by investing in alternative feasible activities, be they legal or non-legal (Perry & 
Hasisi, 2015:56). 
Some of these instances are quintessential to the response that terrorism does sometimes 
increase the likelihood that perpetrators will accomplish their socio-political goals. For 
example, the bombings perpetrated by Irgun (a paramilitary Zionist group) facilitated the 
independence of Eretz Israel from the British. Terrorist attacks by the IRA also expedited 
the formation of the Irish Free State. Furthermore, suicide bombings by Hezbollah during 
the mid-1980s enabled Shia to control parts of Lebanon and incited the withdrawal of 
American, French and Israeli forces from the territory (Victoroff, 2005). Terrorist acts that 
were committed by the ANC hastened the abolishment of apartheid in South Africa and the 
recent terrorist acts by the Niger-Delta militants in Nigeria gave birth to civil emancipation 
from the shackles of oppression, material deprivation and political marginalization of power 
and wealth in the region. However, terrorist attacks such as the infamous September 11 
attack in New York and Washington DC seem to attract more recruits for terrorism 
(Whittaker, 2001).  
In conclusion, this theory thus firmly entrenches the fact that frustration resulting from the 
non-fulfilment of socio-economic goals may cause members of the Boko Haram sect to 
embark on rational and calculated decisions as a punishment reward to disrupt activities in 
Nigeria as the only optimum strategy to achieve their common goal. 
3.2.3.1 Critiques of the rational choice theory of terrorism 
Some rational choice theorists have viewed rationality as an attendant consequence of a 
psychological state of being. Others have accepted the position that it is simply essential to 
assume that individuals act as if they were completely rational. Nevertheless, one major flaw 
of the rational choice theory is that it denies the existence of any kind of action other than 
the purely rational and calculative action. To buttress this argument, some behaviourist 
terrorists seem to contradict this assumption that such acts represent optimal attempts to 
fulfil socio-political goals. Crenshaw (2000), for example, maintains that the goals of 
terrorists are sometimes implausible. Their acts, therefore, will not fulfil their goals, and thus 
cannot be regarded as a rational attempt to pursue these objectives (see also Brannan, 
Eslerm, & Anders Strindberg, 2001). Nevertheless, the goals of terrorists might not be as 
tangible as overthrowing a government, but might merely correspond to the recruitment of 
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support or assistance to terrorist family members (Azam, 2005; Brooks, 2002; Jain & 
Mukand, 2004). Moreover, the theory does not seem to accommodate the pronounced effects 
of impulsive actions, emotional experiences, or flawed cognitions on the behaviour of 
individuals. Profound feelings of revenge, ambition, and trust in leaders can thus skew 
behaviours from the forces of rational processes (Victoroff, 2005). Only these more transient 
and idiosyncratic forces can explain why few individuals living in similar conditions can 
ever commit these acts. 
Finally, Post (1998) argues that if terrorism were strategic and rational, such groups would 
be more likely to disband after they have achieved their victory. That is, if the benefits have 
been achieved, the incidences of terrorist acts should diminish and or vanish immediately. 
Scholars have also debated the fact that terrorists often sabotage their own success moments 
before a deal can be reached. Moreover, to maintain the group, to meet their sense of purpose 
and to fulfil their need to belong, terrorists often sustain risky ventures regardless of the 
outcomes. To this end, terrorist acts often become mindless as violence is incited not to fulfil 
a strategic goal, but to create a state of disorderliness for human existence. 
3.3 Generalizability of the Tripartite Theoretical Model 
The study adopted a tripartite theoretical model as a useful construct for explaining the 
phenomenon of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. The advancement of the model provided 
a logical account of the interactive schematic pattern of the likely factors that were adjudged 
to have led to the emergence and sustenance of the Boko Haram crisis in north-eastern 
Nigeria. The model explains that every citizen stands an equal chance of achieving the socio-
economic goals of his or her society, but because human goals are always unlimited and the 
chance of accomplishing those goals sometimes appears very slim due to structural 
inequality embedded within the social structure, people are compelled by societal pressures 
to make a choice in order to accomplish some of the stated goals. Consequently, during the 
course of choice making, there must definitely be a rational process of exchange. If, 
however, the exchange is unequal and the fulfilment of socio-economic goals is no longer 
realistic between the parties involved, this would spontaneously engender class conflict that 
will eventually lead to a rational and calculated decision by aggrieved  members of the civil 





The theoretical analysis of the schematic model draws the conclusion that, as long as the 
endemic socio-economic problems caused by global capitalism vis-a-vis unequal hegemonic 
power exchange persist in the Nigerian society, the use of individual terrorism will 
recurrently remain an inevitable enterprise; indeed it will be sustained as a normal social 
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This section describes the methodological strategies that were employed in the execution of 
the study. The research design and methods are described and justified and the study setting 
(or study location) is discussed. The section also underlines the various steps that were 
undertaken in generating and analysing the qualitative data. The discourse entails a detailed 
discussion of the ethical considerations that underpinned the study, with particular reference 
to participant anonymity, confidentiality, privacy and informed consent that were adhered 
to in the processes of selecting the participants, retrieving and analysing the data. The 
chapter presents the strengths and limitations of the study and discusses how the challenges 
that were encountered were overcome in order to achieve the stated objectives of the 
research. More importantly, the section also gives a brief description of research methods as 
an integral part of research inquiry. 
Effective research methods are the tools by which information about the social world is 
gathered (MacDonald & Headlam, 2011:2). The latter authors argue that, without the 
appropriate design and use of research methods, researchers are unlikely to gather quality 
information and, as such, create a shaky foundation to any research inquiry, evaluation, as 
well as future strategy. In any form of research, studies have shown that it is either required 
to count things or events by ways of quantification or measurement and/or talk to people by 
way of interviews through explanation, description or interpretation of ideas. These methods 
can be broadly classified into quantitative and qualitative research methods. This distinction 
provides a yardstick for defining research methods in social research.   
According to MacDonald and Headlam (2011), these two types of research methods and 
their output data are classified as quantitative and qualitative methodologies. As the name 
implies, a quantitative approach is concerned with trying to quantify things: it asks questions 
such as ‘how long?’, ‘how many?’ or ‘the degree to which’? Quantitative methods attempt 
to quantify data and generalize results from a sample of the population of interest. They may 
measure the incidence of various views and opinions in a chosen sample or aggregate results. 
Quantitative methods are research techniques that are used to gather quantitative data, which 
are data that can be sorted, classified, and measured. A qualitative approach, on the other 
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hand, is concerned with the quality of the information that has been gathered. The methods 
are used to gather qualitative data – i.e., information that is required to gain an understanding 
of the underlying reasons and motivations for actions and to establish how people interpret 
their experiences and the world around them (MacDonald & Headlam, 2011). Qualitative 
methods provide insights into the setting of a problem as they generate ideas and/or 
hypotheses. Therefore, in order to give this study a more distinct and thorough research 
approach, the qualitative research method was preferred and employed to gather high-quality 
data from which appropriate findings could be generated. 
In any research project, the researcher is accountable for his or her "starting point, methods, 
applications and findings" (Van der Walt et al., 1977:159). The ultimate value of a research 
is dependent upon the methods, procedures and techniques that are utilized. This chapter 
presents an elucidation of the procedural steps undertaken to achieve the aim and objectives 
of this study. Due consideration was therefore given to the research procedures, with 
particular emphasis on the sampling procedures to acquire appropriate participants for the 
interviews. The primary data gathering tool was in-depth, semi-structured interviews that 
were prompted by an interview guide. Data analysis and interpretation followed the data 
collection phase. The study closely adhered to all ethical considerations and took cognisance 
of the limitations that impacted the data collection and evaluation procedures. 
4.2 Research Design 
A research design is a blueprint or plan to guide data collection and data analysis; in other 
words, to answer a study’s research questions (Steyn, 2016:9). It comprises the exact 
techniques that will be employed in a research, including the type of sampling procedure, 
and the data collection and analysis methods. The research design of a study depends on the 
following four criteria: 
(a) The purpose of the research (e.g., is it descriptive or explanatory?); 
(b) The chosen paradigm;  
(c) The context in which the research will be conducted; and 
(d) The research techniques that will be used to collect and analyze the data.  
The research design of a study is the investigator’s plan of action for answering the most 
suitable research questions in order to achieve the stated objectives of the research (Oyefara, 
2011:88-89). The objective of selecting a research design for this study was to minimize 
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possible errors by maximizing the credibility and dependability of the data. The adoption of 
the research design provided an opportunity to formulate strategies that examined the topic 
under investigation and specified the most appropriate procedures employed for gathering 
the richest possible data for the research. The study employed a qualitative methodological 
approach comprising one key method of investigation, namely in-depth semi-structured one-
on-one interviews to interrogate the phenomenon of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. In 
executing this methodological approach, participants for the interviews were selected as key 
informants. This was necessary to facilitate the collection of rich data as the participants 
could be probed beyond the capacity of questionnaires. This minimized possible errors of 
interpretation and enhanced the trustworthiness of the research as high-quality data could be 
collected to the point of saturation. The comprehensive and explicit research design that was 
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4.3 Study Location and Description of the Study Setting 
The study was conducted in Abuja, the Federal Capital Territory of Nigeria. The territory 
currently comprises six local government councils, namely: Abuja Municipal, Abaji, 
Gwagwalada, Kuje, Bwari and Kwali. The research did not span all these local council areas 
but was strictly confined to Abuja Municipal Area Council for the following reasons: (i) The 
enormous size of the territory which would have been too cumbersome to cover in its entirety 
for the study; (ii) Abuja city is the core area of the territory where some of the most notable 
activities of the Boko Haram sect have taken place since its inception; (iii) Abuja is in the 
northern sector of Nigeria where it is home to many government officials, students, religious 
leaders, business men and women, as well as coercive security members of the state who 
have long been at the forefront of the Boko Haram warfare. This scope facilitated the best 
possible access to obtain relevant information from the two categories of stakeholders who 
were recruited for the interviews. More importantly, a significant justification for choosing 
Abuja as the study location was to ensure the safety of the researcher and his assistants given 
the fact that the growing intensity of Boko Haram activities had been reduced in Abuja in 
recent times, while other zones in northern Nigeria were still at very high risk of Boko Haram 
insurgency. It was therefore not feasible for any researchers to embark upon fieldwork in 
these regions at the time of the study. This consideration of the safety of all stakeholders 
became mandatory in order to adhere to the ethical considerations that guided the fieldwork 
phase of the research as stipulated by the School of Higher Degree of the University of 
KwaZulu-Natal. On a more critical note, the fact that study seeks public perceptions on the 
emerging socio-economic context of Boko Haram terrorism has concretely justified the 
researcher’s choice of Abuja as the study location. 
Abuja is also the capital city of Nigeria. It is located at the centre of Nigeria and is situated 
within the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). Abuja is a planned city which was built mainly 
in the 1980s. It officially became Nigeria's capital on 12 December 1991, replacing Lagos, 
although the latter remains the country's most populous city. Abuja's geography is defined 
by Aso Rock, a 400 metre (1 300 ft) monolith left by water erosion. It also contains 
the presidential complex, the National Assembly, the Supreme Court and  the Zuma Rock 
(a 792 metre [2 598 ft] monolith), all of which lie  north of the city on the road to Kaduna 
state. 
The 2006 census revealed that the city of Abuja had a population of 776 298, making it one 
of the ten most populous cities in Nigeria. According to the United Nations, Abuja grew at 
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the rate of 139.7% between 2000 and 2010, making it the fastest-growing city in the world 
(Euromonitor International, 2015). As of 2015, the city has been experiencing an annual 
growth of at least 35%, still retaining its position as the fastest-growing city on the African 
continent and one of the fastest-growing in the world (Euromonitor International, 2015). 
Abuja has witnessed a huge influx of people into the city. This influx has led to the 
emergence of satellite towns such as the Karu urban area, Suleja, Gwagwalada, 
Lugbe, Kuje and smaller settlements towards which the planned city is sprawling. The 
unofficial metropolitan area of Abuja has a population of well over three million, making it 
the fourth largest metropolitan area in Nigeria, surpassed only by Lagos, Kano and Ibadan. 
In 2015, the metropolitan area of Abuja was estimated at 6 million persons (Euromonitor 
International, 2015). Major religious sites include the Nigerian National Mosque and 
the Nigerian National Christian Centre. The city is served by the Nnamdi Azikiwe 
International Airport. Abuja is known for being one of the few purpose-built capital cities 
in Africa, as well as being one of the wealthiest.  
The indigenous inhabitants of Abuja are the Gbagyi (Gwari) whose language is the major 
language of the region, and the Bassa, Gwandara, Gade, Ganagana, and Koro. In light of the 
ethnic and religious divisions of Nigeria, plans have been devised since Nigeria's 
independence to have its capital in a place deemed neutral to all major ethnic parties, and 
also in close proximity to all the regions of Nigeria. The location was eventually designated 
at the centre of the country in the early 1970s, as it signified neutrality and national unity. 
Another impetus for Abuja came because the Lagos population boomed which made that 
city overcrowded and conditions squalid. As Lagos was already undergoing rapid economic 
development, the Nigerian regime felt the need to expand the economy towards the inner 
part of the country, and hence decided to move its capital to Abuja. The logic was similar to 
the way Brazil planned its capital, Brasília. Construction broke ground and was dedicated in 
the late 1970s but, due to economic and political instability, the initial stages of the city were 
not complete until the late 1980s. 
The master plan for Abuja and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) was developed by 
international planning associates comprising a consortium of three American firms: 
Planning Research Corporation; Wallace, McHarg, Roberts and Todd; and Archisystems, a 
division of the Hughes Organization. The master plan for Abuja defined the general structure 
and major design elements of the city that are visible in its current form. More detailed 
design of the central areas of the capital, particularly its monumental core, was accomplished 
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by Kenzo Tange, a renowned Japanese architect, with his team of city planners of the Kenzo 
Tange and Urtec company. 
Looking at the rapid development and beautiful scenery of the city, most countries relocated 
their embassies to Abuja and many maintain their former embassies as consulates in Lagos, 
the commercial capital of Nigeria. Abuja is the headquarters of the Economic Community 
of West African States (ECOWAS) and the regional headquarters of OPEC. Abuja and the 
FCT have experienced huge population growth; it has been reported that some areas around 
Abuja have been growing at 20% to 30% per year (World Bank Conference, 2007). Squatter 
settlements and towns have spread rapidly in and outside the city limits, and tens of 
thousands of people have been evicted since former FCT minister, Nasir Ahmad el-
Rufai, started a demolition campaign in 2003 (Polgreen, 2006). 
Abuja Municipal Area Council (AMAC) is made up of six district areas within which the 
research was conducted. These include the Central Business District, Garki District, Wuse 
District, Maitama District, Asokoro District,  Gwarinpa District, with  Durumi District 
seemingly situated near the districts but located southwest of Abuja. In addition to the 
district areas, there are five sub-urban districts: Nyanya, Karu, Gwagwalada, Kubwa, 
and Jukwoyi. The latter is the zone that is most traumatized by Boko Haram in Abuja. Along 
the airport road are clusters of satellite settlements, namely: 
Lugbe, Chika, Kuchigworo and Pyakassa. Other satellite settlements are Idu (the 
main industrial zone), Mpape, Karimu, Gwagwa, and Dei-Dei (which houses the 
International Livestock market and also the International Building Materials market). 
4.3.1 Central Business District 
Abuja  Central District, also called Central Area, spans from the foot of Aso Rock across 
the Three Arms Zone to the southern base of the inner ring road. It is like the city's spinal 
cord, dividing it into the northern sector with Maitama and Wuse, and the southern sector 
with Garki and Asokoro. While each district has its own clearly demarcated commercial and 
residential sectors, the Central District is the city's principal business zone where practically 
all parastatal and multinational corporations have their offices. An attractive area in the 
Central District is the region known as the ‘Three Arms Zone’. It is so called because it 
houses the administrative offices of the executive, legislative and judicial arms of the federal 
government. A few of the other sites worth seeing in the area are the federal secretariats 
alongside Shehu Shagari Way, Aso Hill, the Abuja Plant Nursery, Eagle Square (which is 
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of important historic significance as it was on this ground that the present democratic 
dispensation had its origin on 29 May 1999) and the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier across 
the road facing it. The National Mosque and the National Church of Nigeria are opposite 
each other on either side of Independence Avenue.  A well-known government office in this 
area is the Ministry of Defence, colloquially nicknamed "Ship House". 
4.3.2 Garki District 
The Garki District is the area in the southwest corner of the city, with the Central District to 
the north and the Asokoro District to the east. The district is subdivided into units called 
‘Areas’. Garki uses a distinctive naming convention of "Area" to refer to parts of Garki. 
These are designated as Areas 1 to 11. Garki II is used to differentiate the area from Garki 
Area 2. Visitors may find this system confusing. Garki is presently the principal business 
district of Abuja. Numerous buildings of interest are in this area. Some of them include the 
General Post Office, Abuja International Conference Centre along the busy Herbert Maculay 
Way, Nicon Luxury Hotel (formally known as Abuja Sofitel Hotel and Le Meridian), Agura 
Hotel and Old Federal Secretariat Complex Buildings (Area 1). A new five-star hotel, 
Hawthorn Suites Abuja, is in Garki. Area 2 is mainly used for residential purposes, although 
a zoological garden as well as Garki Shopping Centre are in Area 2. Several banks and other 
commercial offices are located along Moshood Abiola Way in Area 7. The headquarters of 
the Nigerian Armed Forces – the Army, Airforce and Navy – are all in the Garki District. 
The tallest building in this district is the Radio House, which houses the Federal Ministry of 
Information and Communications and the Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria (FRCN). 
The Nigerian Television Authority (NTA) station and corporate headquarters are based in 
Garki. The Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA), which oversees and runs the 
Administration of the Federal Capital Territory, has its offices in Garki. 
The Office of the Minister of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja is in Area 10. Other places 
of note include the Arts and Culture Centre and the Nigerian Police Mobile Force 
headquarters in Area 10. The Abuja Municipal Area Council, which is the local government 
administration, has its headquarters in Area 10. The new United States Embassy is in the 
Garki District. 
4.3.3 Wuse District 
Wuse District is the north-western part of the city, with the Maitama District to its north and 
the Central District to its south. The District is numbered Zones 1–8. The Wuse Market is 
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Abuja's principal market (Zone 5). The second most important post office in the city is here. 
This district houses the Sheraton Hotel and Towers (Zone 4), Ibro International Hotel, the 
Foreign Affairs Ministry Headquarters (Zone 3) and Nigerian Customs Services 
Headquarters, Federal Civil Service Commission (Zone 3), Federal Road Safety 
Commission (FRSC), National Agency for Food and Drugs Administration (NAFDAC) 
(Zone 7), Wuse General Hospital, and the Nigerian Tourism Development Corporation. Just 
as Garki District has Garki II, Wuse has Wuse II. This is distinct from Wuse Zone 2. 
 
4.3.4 Maitama District 
Maitama District is to the north of the city, with the Wuse and Central Districts lying to its 
southwest and southeast respectively. This area is home to the top bracket sections of society 
and businesses, and has the reputation of being very exclusive and very expensive. 
Interesting buildings include the Transcorp Hilton Hotel, Nigerian Communications 
Commission Headquarters (NCC), National Universities Commission (NUC), Soil 
Conservation Complex, and Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). The 
British High Commission is located along Aguiyi Ironsi Way, in Maitama. Also, the 
Maitama District Hospital is another notable building in Maitama. Maitama District is home 
to many of the European and Asian embassies. 
4.3.5 Asokoro District 
Asokoro District, commonly referred to as the ‘doyen’ of all the other districts, houses all of 
the state's lodges/guest houses. The ECOWAS secretariat is a focal point of interest. 
Asokoro is to the east of Garki District and south of Central District. It is one of the most 
exclusive districts of Abuja and houses virtually all of the federal cabinet ministers; in 
addition, the Presidential Palace (commonly referred to as the Aso Rock) is in Asokoro 
District. By virtue of this fact, Asokoro is the most secure area of the city. 
4.3.6  Gwarinpa District 
Gwarinpa is the last district in the Abuja Municipal Area Council. It is a 20-kilometre 
(12 miles) drive from the central district and contains the largest single housing estate in 
Nigeria, the Gwarinpa Housing Estate. The estate was built by the administration of 
General Sani Abacha and is the largest of its kind in Africa. It provides residence for the 
majority of the civil servants in federal ministries and government parastatals. The 
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ECOWAS Court has official quarters for the President and members of the court in 
Gwarinpa. 
4.3.7 Durumi District 
Durumi District is not located within the local council but situated southwest of Abuja and 
is bordered by Garki Districts I and II to the northeast. Its borders are the Oladipo Dia Road 
to the southwest, the Nnamdi Azikiwe Express Way to the northeast, and Ahmadu Bello 
Way to the southeast. The American International School of Abuja is located in the Durumi 
District.  
According to the World Meteorological Organization (2012), the Abuja climate 
under Köppen climate classification features a tropical wet and dry climate . The FCT 
experiences three weather conditions annually. This includes a warm, humid rainy 
season and a blistering dry season. In between the two, there is a brief interlude 
of harmattan occasioned by the northeast trade wind, with the main feature of dust haze and 
dryness. The rainy season begins from April and ends in October, when daytime 
temperatures reach 28°C (82.4°F) to 30°C (86.0°F) and night-time lows hover around 22°C 
(71.6°F) to 23°C (73.4°F). In the dry season, daytime temperatures can soar as high as 40°C 
(104.0°F) and night-time temperatures can dip to 12 °C (53.6 °F). Even the chilliest nights 
can be followed by daytime temperatures well above 30°C (86.0°F). The high altitudes and 
undulating terrain of the FCT act as a moderating influence on the weather of the territory. 
Rainfall in the FCT reflects the territory's location on the windward side of the Jos 
Plateau and the zone of rising air masses with the city receiving frequent rainfall during the 
rainy season from March to November every year (WMO, 2012). The Abuja vegetation falls 
within the Guinean forest-savannah mosaic zone of the West African sub-region. Patches 
of rain forest, however, occur on the Gwagwa plains, especially in the rugged terrain to the 
south south-eastern parts of the territory, where a landscape of gullies and rough terrain is 
found. These areas of the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) form one of the few surviving 
occurrences of the mature forest vegetation in Nigeria. 
The Abuja skyline and landmark are made up of mostly mid-range and a few tall buildings. 
Only recently have tall buildings begun to appear. Most of the buildings are modern, 
reflecting that it is a new city. Plans were made to build skyscrapers such as the Millennium 
Tower which was completed in 2015. This structure looms 170 metres (560 ft) above the 
city. The tower is part of a huge cultural development complex called the Nigeria National 
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Complex that includes the Nigeria Cultural Centre, a 120 000 m2 (1 300 000 sq ft) structure 
dedicated to the art and culture of Nigeria. The Cultural Centre and the Millennium Tower 
were designed by the Italian architect, Manfredi Nicolette. 
Landmarks include the Millennium Tower, the Central Bank of Nigeria headquarters, 
the Nigerian Presidential Complex, the Ship House, the National Stadium, National 
Mosque, the National Church, Aso Rock and Zuma Rock. Below is the map of Abuja 
Municipal Area Council (AMAC) showing the study location.   
 
Figure 4.3a: Map of Abuja Municipal Area Council Showing the Study Location 







Figure 4.3b: Map Showing the Location of Abuja (FCT) in Nigeria 







                           
Notation 
North-central Zone   
North-western Zone          
North-eastern Zone           
South-eastern Zone      
South-south Zone      
South-western Zone   
Boko Haram Affected Zone  
Boko Haram Unaffected Zone 
Boko Haram Mostly Affected Zone  




4.4 Study Population and Sample Size 
The study population covered two different categories of stakeholders with their age bracket 
ranging from the penal age of 18 and above. The age criterion was based on the participants’ 
perceived maturity and their ability to articulate their experiences of the Boko Haram crisis 
in Nigeria. These were:  
(1) Government Officials:  
(a)  Security Operatives (specifically officers in the Police Force, the Nigerian Army, 
State Security Service (SSS), Prison, and Customs);  
(b)  Political office holders.  
(2) Civil Society Organizations:  
(a)  Business men and women;  
(b)  Students from tertiary institutions;  
(c)  Religious leaders (both Christianity and Islam); and  
(d)  Abuja Metro Police Community Relation Committee members from within the 
area council.  
Gender equality was also considered within the study population to avoid confining the 
entire study to a particular sex. Although this study was not a comparative gender study of 
participants, the study deemed it important to establish an approximate gender balance in 
the sample. On this account, 40 participants comprising 12 female and 28 male individuals 
were sampled for the study.  
Of the total of 40 participants, 5 informants were selected as representatives of each 
stakeholder group in order to allow for a more comparative research study. The technique 
for determining the sample size for the study was based on a tentative judgement considering 
the pragmatic and redundancy criteria which could, to a large extent, influence the choice of 
the qualitative sample. As a general rule of thumb, qualitative samples for a single study 
involving individual interviews often lie under 50 (Ritchie & Lewis, 2014). On this basis, 
40 participants were sampled for the study. This selection technique was observed to 
moderate the interviews against becoming too difficult and complex to manage in terms of 





4.5  Sampling Techniques 
Sampling as it relates to social research is the selection of individuals, categories, specimens, 
units, and/or settings to be studied (Hagan, 2006). In any research study, the sample is a 
small part of the whole or population from which information, facts or ideas about the whole 
are generated. Therefore, a small population of the participants was selected from the larger 
population of Abuja residents. A purposive sampling technique was utilized to select 
participants for the interviews. This selection method was based on motive, the key criterion 
and relevance of the respondents to the theme of the study.  In the purposive sampling 
approach, the selection of participants, settings or other sampling units is criterion-based or 
purposive (Mason, 2002; Patton, 2002). It is stressed that “the sample units are chosen 
because they have particular features or characteristics which will enable a detailed 
exploration and understanding of the central themes and questions which the researcher 
wishes to study” (Bryman, 2012). Sometimes these characteristics may be socio-
demographic or they may relate to specific experiences, behaviours or roles. Some even 
label this approach as “judgement sampling” (Hagan, 2006). 
The recruitment of participants for the research took place from a pool of government 
officials and civil society organizations, thus forming two categories of stakeholders for the 
study. Five representatives of various designations were purposively selected as key 
informants from a pool of security operatives and political office holders in Nigeria. Five 
leader representatives from the Islamic and five from the Christian religions were also 
selected for the study by purposive sampling. Five representatives were purposively selected 
from businesses comprising both male and female, five representatives from students of 
tertiary institutions, and five members of the Abuja Metro Police Community Relation 
Committee in the area council were also selected. Table 4.5 presents a tabular presentation 








Table 4.5: Tabular Presentation of Participants Sampled for the Study 
Stakeholders Number Sampled for  
an Interview 
Security Operatives (Police Officer, Army 
Officer, SSS, Prison Officer, Customs Officer) 
5 
Political office holders 5 
Islamic leaders 5 
Christian leaders 5 
Business representatives (male) 5 
Business representatives (female) 5 
Students 5 
Abuja Metro Police Community Relation 
Committee representatives 
5 
Total Number of Participants Sampled 40 
 
4.6  Selection of Key Informants for the Interviews 
Key informants are those individuals whose social positions in a research setting give them 
specialist knowledge about other people, processes or happenings that are more extensive, 
secretive, sensitive, detailed or privileged than those of other people. Such participants are 
therefore particularly valuable sources of information to a researcher (Payne & Payne, 2004; 
Rossi et al., 2004). Simply stated, key informant interviews involve the interviewing of a 
selected group of individuals who are likely to provide the needed information, ideas, and 




Payne and Payne (2004:12) argue that “the quality of key informant interviews rests largely 
on choosing the right informants”. Undoubtedly, one of the most important considerations 
of this research was that the selected informants should possess intimate knowledge of the 
subject on which they would be interviewed. Such knowledge was based on the informants’ 
special socio-political and religious positions, careers, experiences, participation in a 
previous related project or program, and/or professional expertise, to mention a few. A 
typical key informant is very different from any other potential respondent, particularly in 
sample surveys because of the depth of his or her knowledge and experience. It is paramount 
to point out that the prominent members of the target population that were selected, as 
highlighted in Table 4.5, were appropriate key informants for this research inquiry. 
Three characteristics underpinned the key informant interviews in the study. First, a 
relatively small number of informants was sampled and interviewed. These informants were 
selected because they possessed information or ideas that could be solicited by the 
investigator and that would address the key research questions. With reference to the nature 
and scope of this inquiry, the researcher identified appropriate groups from which the key 
informants were drawn, and then selected five individuals from each group. The literature 
suggests that the number of key informants for a study of this nature should range from 15 
to 45 for one complete qualitative study (Payne & Payne, 2004). For this study, 40 
individuals were selected and successfully recruited as key informants. It should be noted at 
this point that key informant interviews should not be confused with formal or informal 
surveys in which a relatively large number of people are interviewed. 
The second characteristic was that the interviews were conducted on a one-on-one basis as 
recommended by (Ritchie & Lewis, 2014). In this process the researcher could probe for in-
depth data on a personal level, while the data that were inter- and intra-group specific could 
be compared for credibility and dependability.  
The third characteristic required that the key informant interviews be essentially qualitative 
in nature. They were thus conducted with reference to an interview guide that listed the 
topics and issues to be covered during each interview session. Referring to the interview 
guide, the researcher framed the actual questions in the course of the research interviews. 
The atmosphere during these interviews was usually informal, resembling a conversation 
among acquaintances. It is also imperative to note that participants for the in-depth 
interviews were drawn from all six of the district areas of the local council. 
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After the successful recruitment of the informants, the researcher scheduled an appointment 
with each participant. During the interviews, the informants were subtly probed for adequate 
information. Extensive notes were taken in corroboration of the tape recorded conversations. 
Sometimes all the relevant information was not covered in an interview session. This 
compelled the researcher to reschedule another interview with some participants in order to 
probe for more detailed data. 
4.7 Semi-structured Interviews and the Interview Guide    
A semi-structured interview is a commonly used interview technique that follows a 
framework in order to address key themes rather than specific questions (Ritchie et al., 
2003). At the same time, it allows a certain degree of flexibility for the researcher to respond 
to the answers of the interviewee and therefore to develop themes and issues as they arise 
during the course of the interview (MacDonald & Headlam, 2011). By definition, a semi-
structured interview needs to have some structure, although that structure should be flexible, 
and for this reason open-ended questions are posed to each participant. This flexible 
structure is normally provided by an interview guide that lists the key questions for the 
interview. The interviewer is normally free to add questions or change the order if necessary 
(Ritchie & Lewis, 2014).  
The most useful interview format for conducting qualitative research, according to Ritchie 
et al. (2003), is often semi-structured, moderately scheduled. This means the interview is 
not highly structured, as is the case of a structured interview that consists of closed-ended 
questions, nor is it unstructured, such that the interviewee is simply given license to talk 
freely about whatever comes to mind. Semi-structured interviews offer topics and questions 
to the interviewee, but are carefully designed to elicit the interviewee’s ideas and opinions 
on the topic of interest, as opposed to leading the interviewee towards preconceived choices. 
In such an interview the interviewer follows up with probes to elicit further in-depth 
information on the topics of interest (Ritchie et al., 2003). 
As stated earlier, semi-structured interviews utilizing lead questions were conducted to 
collect data for the study. This process employed the use of an audio recorder and field notes to 
validate the  data that were obtained and processed. The interview guide was structured in such 
a way that adequate information was elicited to address the research questions and objectives 




This section contained the date of the interview, the starting time, the time the interview was 
concluded, the name of the interviewer and interviewee, and the language in which the 
interview was conducted. 
Section B 
The section contained questions on the personal socio-demographic characteristics of each 
participant. These included questions on age, gender, profession, religious affiliation, ethnic 
background, educational attainment, marital status, and state of origin or nationality. The 
total number of questions in section B was six. 
Section C 
This section contained questions on the participants’ perceptions on and experiences of the 
root causes of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. The questions probed people’s awareness 
and experiences of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, their source/s of information about 
the terrorist sect, their religious orientation (e.g., Muslim, Christian, or Traditionalist), 
perception whether the insurgency had a cause or not, as well as their opinion about the 
Islamic religion as a cause of the crisis. The section also contained a total number of six 
questions. 
Section D 
Questions on the patterns that served to maintain Boko Haram terrorism were asked in this 
section. The enquiry elicited responses about the survival potential of the sect since 
2009/2010. Information on whether the terrorist group had government and community 
support or was affiliated with international organizations was confined to this section. This 
section had a total number of four questions. 
Section E 
This section addressed the socio-economic consequences of Boko Haram terrorism in 
Nigeria. Questions that probed the adverse effects of the menace on the socio-economic 
development of the country were tackled. Effects such as poor standards of living, health 
hazards, political instability, religious misconceptions, youth degeneration and brain-
washing, ethnic segregation, cultural discrimination, a declining economy, unemployment, 
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poverty, the conditions of internally displaced citizens, and low educational standards were 
examined. Six broad questions were posed and thoroughly discussed in this section.   
Section F 
This section contained questions on possible techniques to address the menace of Boko 
Haram terrorism and how this could enhance sustainable development in Nigeria. For 
example, the questions pertained to the effects of a military approach and whether peaceful 
negotiations or partnerships with international organizations could best resolve the problem 
of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. The questions also probed the participants’ opinion of 
community policing as a remedy for Boko Haram insurgency. The open-ended questions 
invited views on possible solutions other than those highlighted in the interview guide. The 
section contained a total number of eight questions. 
The interview guide contained a total number of thirty open-ended questions that were 
centred on the research questions and the objectives of the study. 
4.8 In-Depth Interviews 
Several research inquiries have persistently demonstrated that qualitative research can be 
conducted by utilizing a variety of data collection techniques or by employing one technique 
in particular. Marshall and Rossman (1999) submit that data collection methods in 
qualitative research could be classified  into four types: (a) participant observation, or 
otherwise regarded as participating in the setting; (b) direct observation or non-participant 
observation; (c) in-depth interviews; and (d) document analysis. For the purpose of this 
research, an in-depth interview technique was adopted as the primary method of qualitative 
data collection. Coffey and Atkinson (1996) suggest that data collection and analysis are 
best conducted simultaneously in qualitative research to allow for the necessary flexibility. 
Therefore, data collection and analysis occurred in a cyclical process until concepts and 
themes became detailed and saturated and new information ceased to emerge (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994; Strauss & Corbin, 1998).  
In-depth interviews are described as a powerful method for generating descriptions and 
interpretations of people’s social worlds, and as such are a core qualitative research method 
(Ritchie & Lewis, 2014). To this end, classic ethnographers such as Malinowski stress the 
importance of talking to people in order to understand their viewpoint (Burgess, 1982). The 
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power of in-depth interviews to illuminate research topics is emphasized by Rubin and 
Rubin (2012:3) as follows: “When using in-depth qualitative interviewing, researchers talk 
to those who have knowledge of or experience with the problem of interest. Through such 
interviews, researchers explore in detail the experiences, motives, and opinions of others and 
learn to see the world from perspectives other than their own”. 
The in-depth interview is often described as a form of conversation (Kvale & Brinkman, 
2009; Lofland et al., 2006), while Sidney and Beatrice Webb, in their classic text on 
interviewing, describe this interview method as “a conversation with a purpose” (Webb & 
Webb, 1932:130). They stress that there are some obvious differences between a normal 
conversation and an in-depth interview, particularly in terms of the objectives and the roles 
of the researcher and the participant (Berg & Lune, 2012; Miller & Glassner, 2011; Rubin 
& Rubin, 2012; Silverman, 2010). Therefore, a good in-depth interview may appear like a 
conversation but will not seem like an ordinary conversation between the researcher and the 
participant, as both are serious and meticulous about eliciting the required information from 
the participant’s honest and authentic viewpoint. 
In-depth interviews also express the exploratory or micro-approach utilized to generate 
qualitative data on the theme of the study. According to Caldwell et al. (2000:13), the micro-
approach (which is a long discursive semi-structured conversation which may go on for 
hours) is a good and major instrument for studying change in behavioural research. It is 
flexible and pursues what the respondent takes to be important, with occasional 
conversational nudges from the researcher so as to maintain the general direction. Shariff 
(1984) also refers to the advantages of the micro-approach in behavioural enquiries. 
According to this scholar, many aspects of human life are very complex, and therefore the 
best way to study such complex relations is the use of a micro-approach. Shariff argues that 
having an in-depth understanding and knowledge of a society is possible only from a 
prolonged conversation during innumerable contacts, connected and interconnected 
questioning, probing and observations. He also asserts that the personal, cordial and relaxed 
atmosphere of the micro-approach enhances credibility as well as authenticity of information 
and interpretation. Clearly, the micro-approach can draw attention to important areas that 
may otherwise not be investigated at all. This is in addition to producing an adequate and 
largely correct picture instead of thin partial, often erroneous one. Because the current study 
did not utilize a cross-sectional survey method, a series of interviews was conducted in the 
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study location with key informants in order to balance the large body of empirical data that 
might have been obtained from a questionnaire survey approach.  
The study sample comprised 40 participants who had been recruited for interviewing using 
a purposive sampling technique. The respondents were representative of a range of 
stakeholders with knowledge of the Boko Haram insurgency as was illustrated in Table 4.5 
above.  
This selection technique and the compilation of the sample facilitated a comparative research 
approach as each representative sample group offered their opinions on the subject under 
investigation from a particular vantage point. This selection technique was highly 
appropriate as it was able to subside the redundancy effects associated with qualitative data 
collection of a larger scope. The process of data collection reached saturation point when 
sufficient credible and dependable data had been collected and when no further new insights 
could be provided by the participants. It is also reiterated that participants for the in-depth 
interviews were drawn from all six the district areas of the local council. This process 
ensured that the data that were generated from the interviews represented a comprehensive 
picture that addressed the research questions and the findings thus supported the objectives 
of the study. 
4.9 Justification for a Qualitative Research Approach  
The qualitative methodological approach that was adopted for generating data for this study 
aimed at examining the socio-economic context of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. Thus, 
the selection of a qualitative approach was the most suitable option for this study as it aimed 
to producing what Mason (2002:3) connotes as “a rounded and contextual understanding on 
the basis of rich, nuanced and detailed data”. More significantly, it has been argued that 
qualitative research is best suited for an enquiry that seeks rich descriptions of individual 
experiences (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003:16). Similarly, qualitative methods of generating data 
have often been recommended for studies that intend to elicit the contextualized nature of 
experience and action and that attempt to generate analyses that are “detailed, thick and 
integrative” (Liamputtong & Ezzy, 2005:2).  
A significant justification for selecting a qualitative research design was that, because of the 
sensitive and potentially dangerous nature of the enquiry, this study was motivated by a 
desire to move beyond the inadequacy of questionnaires (a closed-ended approach) and to 
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avoid any possible errors that are usually generated by a dominant quantitative approach 
based on a positivist paradigm. Moreover, most research inquiries into Boko Haram 
insurgency have engaged in a review of related literatures and a cross-sectional survey 
approach according to which most of the findings may either have been manipulated, over-
emphasized, undermined or altered in some way, or the data may not have been adequately 
corroborated by empirical data due to the nature of the research instruments used. The 
findings of such methods may have provided limited explanations for understanding the 
socio-economic context of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. Therefore, the adoption of a 
qualitative approach in this study was highly suitable for in-depth probing into the research 
problem by generating high quality data that would throw more light on the conflicting 
factors behind the phenomenon of Boko Haram terrorism in this part of sub-Saharan Africa.  
With reference to Creswell’s (1998) assertions on qualitative research, eight factors (or 
rationales) were considered before the selection of this method. The first was whether the 
research questions started with ‘how?’ or ‘what?’ in the attempt to explore the research 
phenomenon in comparison to quantitative approaches. The second was whether the 
research topic was exploratory in nature rather than descriptive. The third was whether a 
study sought to present a detailed view of the topic. The fourth was the requirement to study 
people in their natural settings. The fifth was whether the study would recognize the author’s 
presence in the inquiry process. The sixth was whether there were sufficient time and 
resources to generate/collect and analyze the data. The seventh condition was whether there 
was an audience (for instance, the study supervisor and other wider disciplines) that would 
be receptive to the qualitative research method and the findings. The eighth rationale for 
selecting a qualitative research approach was the researcher’s need to position himself as 
“an active learner rather than expert”. In as much as the present study met all the 
aforementioned criteria, justification for and validation of the study were attained. 
4.10 Negotiating Access for the Recruitment of Participants 
Negotiating access for the recruitment of participants was a crucial step in the research 
design of this study. Blaxter and Tight (1997) note that one of the factors that determine a 
successful research study is the researcher’s consideration of how to obtain approval from 
the institutions or individuals that govern (or are the gatekeepers of) a research setting. The 
consent of the institutions concerned with this research study was sought and formal 
approval was obtained in writing (i.e., a gatekeeper letter) to conduct the research (Appendix 
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B: Gatekeeper Letter). The starting point for the preparation of the fieldwork commenced 
with the approval of this research by authorities of the selected institutions. The next step 
was to obtain ethical clearance approval from the higher degree committee of the School of 
Applied Human Sciences at the University of KwaZulu-Natal (Appendix A: Ethical 
Clearance Certificate).   
Thereafter, the researcher proceeded to undertake the fieldwork. This enabled the researcher 
to proceed to the different sites where the research participants were located. Thus accessing 
and recruiting participants on arrival in the field where the primary data collection phase of 
the research would be conducted were enabled. 
4.11 Method of Primary Data Collection    
The fieldwork for the study was conducted between January and July in 2017 in Abuja 
(Federal Capital Territory and the North-Central region of Nigeria). A pilot survey of the 
study location was conducted in January of the same year in Nigeria. This stage presented a 
pre-fieldwork training session of research assistants for the study. Two graduate students of 
the social sciences were recruited as research assistants for the interview, and they were 
rigorously trained for three days on how to collect qualitative data through the use of an 
ethnographic method during in-depth interviews. During the three days of their training, they 
were also adequately instructed and briefed by the principal researcher on the ethical matters 
that guiding research of this nature. Moreover, their skills were pre-tested before the 
commencement of the major interviews. The fieldwork was carried out by a team and the 
researcher consistently supervised and monitored the activities of the other two interviewers 
in each of the six sampled districts of Abuja Municipal Area Council (AMAC). Qualitative 
data were collected by in-depth interview method during semi-structured interviews. All the 
information was recorded on audio tape with the approval of the participants. This process 
was also supplemented with the use of field diaries in which various salient points were 
recorded during the interviews. The latter process was deemed vital and useful for validating 
the outcomes of the research inquiry. 
At the end of each day of interviews, the principal researcher reviewed and edited the 
recorded interviews and field diaries to check for voice frequency, internal consistency, 
accurate recording, completeness, screening and other related issues. Because the principal 
researcher was always available in the study location throughout the period of data 
collection, all the problems encountered by the two interviewers were quickly reported to 
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him and the necessary steps were taken in order to get both credible and dependable data 
from the research participants. More importantly, consent for the use of a tape recorder was 
solicited from all participants in the interviewing process. The researcher also reminded 
them of the confidentiality of their conversations. They were pertinently informed that the 
study was for academic purposes only and that their identities would be protected. All the 
interviews were conducted in English, while the participants were allowed to express certain 
points in the language of their choice. The interviews were recorded and transcribed and 
those statements that had been expressed in local languages were translated into English by 
a competent translator. Each interview session lasted about one hour.  
4.12 Method of Data Analysis: Qualitative Analytical Method 
In carrying out a successful research inquiry, the collected data need to be analyzed 
efficiently to elicit valid and trustworthy findings. Because the data that were generated in 
the study were solely qualitative, a process referred to as ‘thematic content analysis’ was 
utilized to analyze and explain the data that had been compacted into manageable chunks. 
Content analysis is a qualitative methodological approach that is defined as “a systemic, 
replicable technique of compressing many words of text into fewer content categories based 
on explicit rules of coding (Krippendorff, 1980:l-84; Weber, 1990). “This is a technique for 
making inferences by systematically and objectively identifying specified characteristics of 
messages” (Holsti, 1969:14, cited in Oyefara, 2011:105). In this process, the recordings and 
notes of the in-depth interviews were transcribed from English or a local language (i.e., 
Yoruba, Hausa, Nupe, Gwari, Igbo or Pidgin) to English text. The responses to each question 
were summarized and important quotations were reported verbatim for the sake of 
authenticity and to validate the findings of the study. It should be noted that content analysis 
was done manually in order to enhance the explanatory clarity of the findings. It is also 
paramount to note that the data analysis followed a set of five stages to ensure adequate and 
comprehensive analyses. With reference to Ritchie and Spencer (1994), these steps were as 
follows: 
(a) Familiarization: This entails the reading and re-reading of the transcripts, research 
notes and their translation to ensure data reduction. The audio recordings of the 
interviews were transcribed verbatim. Thereafter, the transcripts were reviewed and 
typed to provide raw data for analysis. This process enabled the researcher to identify 
key words that formed key themes and ideas as they began to emerge from the initial 
readings of the transcripts. 
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(b) Identification of themes: This process concerned the notification and identification of 
major themes. The themes were identified from key words or ideas in the data and 
were in turn used to examine the data. As new themes emerged during the interviews, 
they were added and examined in relation to the research questions. This process was 
followed by an open coding procedure which was utilized for the identification of all 
emerging themes that were deemed relevant to address the research questions.   
(c) Coding and Indexing: During this stage, the researcher applied data that emerged from 
the thematic framework elicited from the data. Each section of the text garnered form 
the interviews was marked with appropriate themes and coded with particular numbers 
or short phrases. This stage dealt with the identification of all emerging themes that 
were deemed relevant for an in-depth understanding of the data. 
(d) Charting: The data were re-arranged under main headings and sub-headings according 
to the themes that had been identified. All the statements belonging to a specific theme 
were arranged into a single file using Microsoft Word Excel. This was used to 
distinguish or note the similarities that existed in the opinions of the different 
stakeholders selected for the interviews.  
(e) Mapping and Interpretation: This was the final stage of the data analysis process. The 
range of responses, central themes and shared perceptions as well as dissenting 
viewpoints were condensed and interpreted. Significant quotes expressing the 
emerging themes were noted and highlighted. 
4.13 Trustworthiness of the Research Findings  
Lincoln and Guba (1985) argue that, “while quantitative research relies on measures of 
reliability and validity to evaluate the utility of a study, qualitative research can be evaluated 
by its ‘trustworthiness’.” The latter term is was embraced to represent several constructs that 
were adhered to in this study, namely: (a) credibility; (b) transferability; (c) dependability; 
and (d) confirmability. A description of each of these concepts is briefly presented below. 
Credibility 
The truth-value, or credibility of conclusions, in a qualitative study is comparable to the 
concept of internal validity in quantitative research. As suggested by Lincoln and Guba 
(1985) and Miles and Huberman (1994), research results should be scrutinized according to 
three fundamental questions: (i) Do the conclusions make sense?; (ii) Do the conclusions 
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adequately describe research participants’ perspectives?; and (iii) Do the conclusions 
authentically represent the phenomena under study? This study relied on participants’ in-
depth data information and a comparative analysis of the findings with previous research 
inquiries that had been conducted by other researchers in related studies to enhance the 
credibility of the research. In this study, the credibility of the results was enhanced by 
providing thick and rich descriptions of the contexts, perspectives, and findings that were 
drawn from the participants’ experiences of the Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria.  
Transferability 
Corresponding to the concept of external validity in quantitative studies, transferability seeks 
to determine if the results relate to and can be transferred to other contexts (Lincoln & Guba, 
1985; Miles & Huberman, 1994). Lincoln and Guba (1985) add that comparison and 
triangulation of research findings constitute the corroboration of results with alternative 
sources of data. Additionally, a review of relevant literature and media reports was utilized 
as an alternative data source to enhance the transferability of the findings of this study. 
Dependability 
Dependability is deemed similar to the concept of reliability in quantitative research. 
Dependability refers to whether or not the results of the study are consistent over time and 
across researchers (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Miles & Huberman, 1994). To address 
dependability in this study, a consultation with a peer debriefer was conducted. The peer 
debriefer was asked to comment on all aspects of the study, particularly the data collection 
and analysis processes, and to assess the results in order to determine if the conclusions 
generated the same results as those stated by the researcher. The peer debriefer was also 
asked to comment on the clarity of the research design and its potential for consistency over 
time and across research studies. The peer debriefer who had been employed agreed to 
review all aspects of this research project and thus worked very closely with the researcher. 
Weekly meetings, starting from the proposal and pilot stages of this research, were 
scheduled. At the commencement of the pilot study, the research procedures for the study 
were discussed and, as the study entered the data collection and analysis phases, the frequent 
meetings were gradually reduced to consultations that were scheduled to review the general 
progress of the study. This process also served as a tool to establish the trustworthiness and 




Confirmability implies that the findings are reflective of the participants’ perspectives as 
evidenced in the data, rather than being a reflection of the researcher’s own perceptions or 
bias. The confirmability of this study was kept intact by explicitly expressing only the views 
and opinions of the participants as recorded and transcribed verbatim from the audio tapes. 
It is also noteworthy that the research study was not at any level influenced by the 
researcher’s own perceptions of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. 
4.14 Ethical Considerations  
The guidelines for research ethics have been compiled to help researchers and the research 
community be cognizant of their ethical responsibilities, the relevant code of conduct, and 
their attitudes when conducting a research study. Ethical considerations guide researchers’ 
awareness of conflicting standards, promote good judgement, and enhance their ability to 
make well-founded decisions in the face of conflicting considerations (NESH, 2003). The 
guidelines presented by NESH cover what are often known as cultural and social studies 
(i.e., the social sciences, the humanities, and law and theology). Research ethics in general 
embrace both personal and institutional morality. Accordingly, the guidelines contain 
standards that apply not only to individual researchers and research managers, but also to 
other bodies that exert an influence on research and the consequences of research. The 
obligation to respect research ethics is part of the responsibility for research in general. 
Individual researchers, project managers, research institutions and the appropriating 
authorities all share this responsibility. NESH’s role in following up on the guidelines is to 
furnish advice and, upon request, to hand down opinions on questions of principle involving 
research ethics. The committee has no judicial function in respect of accusations of breaches 
of the guidelines for research ethics, nor does it have any authority to impose sanctions. The 
ethical responsibilities inherent in research are partly associated with standards related to the 
research process, including relationships between researchers, and partly with respect for 
the individuals and institutions being studied, including taking responsibility for the use and 
dissemination of the research findings. These standards as highlighted in the guidelines can 
broadly be divided into three main categories: 
 Standards for freedom of research, good research practice associated with a 




 Standards that regulate relationships among individuals and groups that are 
directly affected by the research.  
 Standards regarding social relevance and users’ interests and regard for cultural 
reproduction and rationality in the public debate (NESH, 2003). 
Ethics can therefore be conceptualized as “the practical study of the moral principles that 
govern a person’s behaviour or the way an activity is conducted” (Lochner & Zinn, 2015:3). 
As a concept, ‘research ethics’ refers to a complex set of values, principles, and standards 
and institutional schemes that help constitute and regulate scientific activity. Ultimately, the 
term ‘research ethics’ is a codification of ethics of science in practice. In other words, it is 
based on general ethics of science, just as general ethics is based on common sense morality. 
Conducting ethical research implies the application of fundamental ethical principles to 
scientific research (European Commission on Ethical Review, 2009:7). All possible 
domains of scientific research can raise ethical issues. Ethical adherence is thus not just 
about the theories and complex philosophical reasoning. Ethics is everywhere. In everything 
we do there can be an ethical component. When conducting research, there is a clear need 
to make a thorough ethical evaluation. Ethics is often misunderstood by researchers as 
hindering the scientific progress. While it is true that research ethics intends to put 
boundaries to what is and is not possible (under a certain perspective), it does not intend to 
regulate research or go against research freedom. The way research ethics is interpreted by 
the European Commission, it aims to be collaborative and constructive. Also, by considering 
ethics at the conceptual stage of the research proposal, the quality of the research is enhanced 
(European Commission, 2010).  
It has been contested by various scholars and institutions that an interview can affect the 
people being interviewed and therefore moral and ethical considerations need to be observed 
before, during or after the interview (Kvale, 1996, cited in Uprety, 2014). Ethical 
considerations were therefore taken into account while gathering data during the interviews. 
Prior to the commencement of the interviews, the Abuja Municipal Area Council was 
contacted in writing to obtain permission to conduct the interview with the members of the 
Council. The organization endorsed the request and made arrangements for the researcher 
in the form of a written document. The ethical considerations that were taken into account 
while conducting the interviews were: informed consent, data protection and privacy, 
confidentiality and anonymity. 
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(a) Informed Consent 
A critical component of respecting human participants is the informed consent process 
(Belmont Report, 2014:2). The consent document is a written summary of the information 
that should be provided to the participants. Many investigators use it as a guide for the verbal 
explanation of the study. The participant's signature on the form shows agreement to 
participate in a study, but that is only one part of the consent process. The entire informed 
consent process according to the Belmont report involves the following: 
 Giving a participant adequate information about the study; 
 Providing adequate opportunity for the participant to consider all options in 
responding to the interviewer’s questions; 
 Ensuring that the participant has comprehended this information; 
 Obtaining the participant's voluntary agreement to participate (i.e, each 
participant is capable of making an independent and voluntary decision to 
participate based upon the given information and the individual’s own 
preferences and values); 
 Ensuring that the participant is capable of voluntarily communicating the 
decision to participate; 
 Continuing to provide information as the participant or situation requires; and 
 Making sure that a participant is competent and understands the project’s 
purpose and the consequences of participation. 
Informed consent is declared as one of the most pivotal principles in research ethics in many 
international conventions and guidelines (International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, 1966). Informed consent is meant to guarantee the voluntary participation in research 
and is probably the most important procedure to address privacy issues in research. Informed 
consent consists of three components: adequate information, voluntariness and competence. 
This implies that, prior to consenting to participation, participants should be clearly informed 
of the research goals, possible adverse events or consequences, and leeway to refuse 
participation or withdraw from the research at any time and without consequences. Research 
participants must also be competent to understand the information and should be fully aware 
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of the consequences of their consent. Although informed consent is often seen in the context 
of clinical research, this principle is important for all types of research, including the social 
sciences. Informed consent is required when the research involves the participation of 
human beings, when the research uses human genetic material or biological samples, and 
when the research involves personal data collection. In some cases, the 'traditional' informed 
consent procedure might not be sufficient to ensure that the rights and interests of the 
research subjects are fully respected. It is very important to take into account people's 
autonomy and vulnerability when deciding on how to organize the consent procedure. It 
must also be noted that some categories of people require special attention (European 
Commission, 2010:129-142).  The way participants are informed is a critical part of the 
informed consent process. When participants are informed, it is crucial that they fully realize 
the impact of the research for themselves and for society. Numerous anthropological studies 
have pointed out that participants rarely recall what they agreed upon when signing an 
informed consent form (European Commission, 2010:129-142). A more interactive 
approach can address this issue. Good examples are making a presentation of the research 
project or conducting interviews with the participants to ensure that they understand all the 
issues at stake. Researchers might forget to explain what will happen with the research data 
and/or samples at the end of the research. If the data or samples are retained for further 
research, this needs to be included in the consent procedure. In the same vein, when research 
involves humans as the object of research, the researcher must follow the rules of informed 
consent. Advice should be sought from a regional or national committee on research ethics 
in cases where there are doubts about the need or formulation of informed consent (Ruyter 
2003:15). In light of the foregoing, every participant of this study was briefed in a 
comprehensive manner on everything that pertained to his or her participation in this 
research project.  
(b) Data protection  
Data protection is meant to guarantee every person’s right to privacy and refers to the 
technical framework and security measures designed to guarantee that all personal data are 
safe from unforeseen, unintended or malevolent use. Data protection therefore includes both 
the measures taken with regards to access to the data and the conservation of the data. Also, 
measures to assure the accuracy of the data can be included in a data protection strategy 
(World Medical Association, 2008).  
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(c) Privacy  
Privacy can mean many different things in different contexts. Not all people have the same 
notion of the right to privacy, but most people want to maintain control over personal 
information and personal communications. If personal information is disclosed, we expect 
this information to be treated confidentially. In the context of research, privacy issues arise 
whenever data relating to persons are collected and stored, in digital form or otherwise. The 
main challenge for research is to use and share the data, and at the same time to protect all 
identifiable information to guarantee personal privacy. The personal data needed to keep 
confidential in research can include health information, genetic information, information on 
behaviour such as criminal records, financial information, travel records, information on 
religious beliefs and sexual orientation or ethnic identification records. Privacy and data 
protection are fundamental human rights which need to be protected at all times (World 
Medical Association, 2008). In the context of this study, the data that were collected were 
stored securely in a location that was accessible only to the researcher and his delegates. 
Moreover, the data tapes and transcripts will be securely stored for a period of five years, 
after which they will be destroyed.   
(d) Confidentiality and anonymity 
Any information about the research subjects must be handled with caution. The researcher 
must state how the information will be protected and stored and the confidentiality and 
anonymity of those who agree to participate in the research must be protected (World 
Medical Association, 2008). Confidentiality entails that information and materials are de-
identified; i.e., no outside parties should know who provided the information to the 
researcher. This also implies preventing the possibility of linking information to any 
person(s). In terms of anonymity, not even the researcher knows which individual provided 
any given information and materials. This entails that the researcher respects their privacy 
in the form of the de-identification or anonymization of the research data. In other words, 
any interviewee will be rendered anonymous. Every effort was therefore made by the 
researcher to preserve the participants’ confidentiality and anonymity by doing the 
following:  




 At the conclusion of the research study, the interview data will be kept in a 
securely locked cabinet that is the personal possession of the researcher. In other 
words, participant data will be kept confidential. 
 In referring to particular comments or where quoting a participant’s words 
verbatim, the participants are referred to be their designation or the organization 
they represented. This will also be adhered to when the findings are published 
in academic journals or otherwise distributed for review and consideration.   
4.15  Code of Conduct and Ethical Considerations Observed During the 
Course of the Study 
The researcher was aware of the ethical issues involved in this work and adhered to the 
following basic principles: 
(a) Responsibility for all procedures and ethical issues related to the project rested with 
the principal investigator (the researcher) throughout the research process.  
(b) The research was conducted in such a way that the integrity of the research enterprise 
was maintained, and negative after-effects which might diminish the potential for 
future research were avoided.  
(c) The choice of research issues was based on the best scientific judgement and on an 
assessment of the potential benefits to the participants and society in relation to the 
risk to be borne by the participants. The study was related to an important intellectual 
issue and avoided inanity.  
(d) The researcher considered the effects of his work, including the consequences or 
misuse, both for the individuals and groups with whom the fieldwork was conducted, 
as well as for his colleagues and the wider society.  
(e) The researcher was always cognizant of any potential harmful effects of the research. 
In this regard, the methods required by the academic institution’s ethical clearance 
application form were adhered to and no alternative methods during consultation with 
colleagues and other experts were employed contrary to the ones stated in the research 
proposal. Full justification for the selected research method was given.  
(f) The research was conducted in a competent fashion, as an objective scientific project 
and without bias. All the research assistants and personnel were trained and qualified 
to apply the procedures for which they had been employed. 
140 
 
(g)  The research was carried out in full compliance with, and awareness of, local customs, 
standards, laws and regulations guiding the establishment of the study location.  
(h) The principal researcher and his assistants were familiar with, and respected, the host 
culture. The fact that the researcher and his assistants undertook research on the 
cultures, in geo-political zones and among ethnic groups other than their own made 
the research objectives was given cognizance, and all were particularly sensitive to 
remaining aware of the concerns and welfare of the individuals,  communities and 
organizations under study.  
(i) The principal investigator’s own ethical principles were made clear to all those were 
involved in the research to allow informed collaboration with the participants. 
Potential conflicts were also resolved before the research began.  
(j) The researcher avoided undue intrusion into the lives of the individuals and 
communities under study. The welfare of the informants was given the highest 
priority, and their dignity, privacy and interests were protected at all times during the 
course of the research.  
(k) Freely given informed consent was obtained from all the human subjects. Potential 
participants were informed, in a manner and in language they could understand, of the 
context, purpose, nature, methods, procedures, and sponsors of the research. The 
research team was made identifiable and contactable during and after the research 
activity.  
(l) There was no coercion of any participants during the continuance of the research. 
Participants were fully informed of their right to refuse and to withdraw at any time 
during the research.  
(m) The participants were protected against any potentially harmful effects and were 
informed of any potential consequences of their participation.  
(n) Full confidentiality of all information and the anonymity of participants were 
maintained. Participants were informed of any potential limitations to their 
confidentiality of any information supplied. Procedures were put in place to protect 
the confidentiality of the information and the anonymity of the participants in all the 
research materials.  
(o) The participants were promised access to the research results and recommendations in 
a manner and language they could understand.  
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(p) The research findings that were and will be reported widely were and will be reported 
with objectivity and integrity.  
(q) The researcher made arrangements to provide adequate information about the research 
in all publications and to permit the methods and findings of the research to be properly 
assessed by his peers, colleagues and the public. The limits pertaining to reliability, 
accessibility and applicability were made clear.  
(r) The researcher took responsibility for properly acknowledging the unpublished as well 
as published works of other scholars cited in the study.  
(s) All the research materials were preserved in a manner that respected the agreements 
made with the participants.  
(t) In the process of interpreting and presenting the data, it was ensured that the identity 
of any respondents would not be revealed. All data generated were kept confidential 
and used strictly for academic purposes. Both the tapes and the transcribed texts were 
stored in a location which is only accessible to the researcher and the supervisor for at 
least a period of five years, which is in line with the University of KwaZulu-Natal’s 
ethical guidelines. 
(u) The data were stored on a disc, flash drive/memory stick in two copies each. These 
will be disposed of by shredding and incineration, which are methods that guarantee 
an appropriate security level for destroying papers, CD/DVD or any memory sticks 
used in the research.  
On the whole, ethics might seem a very abstract concept in social research, but when 
confronted with reality, ethics becomes the challenge to do what ought to be done. Although 
many of the rules and principles outlined above may seem evident, they were held sacrosanct 
in this research. Several recent examples of ethical breaches indicates that we need to remain 
alert and cautious when it comes to research ethics. Quite often and unintended, important 
ethical principle is inadvertently violated during the course of a research endeavour, and 
such incidences have been reported to have adversely affected the success of these research 
inquiries (UNESCO, 2005). 
4.16   Strengths and Limitations of the Study 
The University of Southern California (2016:n.p.) defines the limitations of a study as “the 
characteristics of design or methodology that impact or influence the interpretation of the 
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findings from a research carried out by the researcher. The limitations refer to constraints 
regarding generalizability, applications to practice, and usability of findings that result from 
the ways in which the researcher initially chose the design of the study and the methods used 
to establish internal and external trustworthiness.” A number of limitations were 
encountered during the course of the research. However, the strength of this research lies in 
the fact that it was based on one of the most challenging contemporary global issues 
emanating from Nigeria. These limitations are presented below: 
(a)   Reluctance by relevant stakeholders to participate in the study 
Due to the sensitivity of the topic and hesitations by the participants to talk freely on Boko 
Haram-related matters, the researcher had a hard time collecting information for the study. 
This problem was mostly encountered with the security operatives and some of the religious 
leaders selected for the research. Despite the fact appointments were made with them on 
several occasions, they often cancelled the appointment for reasons unknown to the 
researcher. Some were reluctant to provide information regarding the subject under 
investigation. Even the selected business representatives, the selected students, the political 
office holders, and members of Abuja Metro Police felt insecure and uncomfortable to 
participate in research connected with the Boko Haram insurgency. Nevertheless, the 
participants opened up eventually and much of the information was based on their real-life 
and case study experiences of the activities of Boko Haram terrorists in northern Nigeria. 
The exploratory methods (in-depth, semi-structured and key informant interviews) used in 
this study rendered the findings authentic and the findings presented in this report are wholly 
based on the descriptions obtained from participants with first-hand information and 
adequate knowledge of Boko Haram terrorism. More importantly, the findings were not 
manipulated or altered in any way. There is thus high quality assurance that the information 
can be used for a much broader future research in this field of study, particularly if a larger 
pool of the population is sampled.  
(b)  Financial constraints and stress due to travelling distances   
A significant limitation of this research was a lack of funding as the research was self-
sponsored by the researcher without having access to grants. This almost affected the success 
of the research because of the limited time-frame allotted for the research. However, 
regardless of this constraint, the study was not adversely affected, nor was the standard 
lowered in any way.  
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The study participants were selected from six district areas of Abuja Municipal Area 
Council, which required extensive travelling on the researcher’s and research assistants’ 
part. In certain instances, only two participants were interviewed per day after the researcher 
had travelled a long distance (e.g., from Asokoro to Gwarinpa or from the Central Business 
District to Gwarinpa). This quite often resulted in travelling to the same district on the 
following day, depending on the availability of the selected participants. The College of 
Humanities allocated funds in 2016 to aid this research, but it hardly covered to cost of 
travelling from Durban (South Africa) to Abuja (Nigeria) where the fieldwork was 
conducted.  
(c) Refusal to audio-record interviews  
A major problem that arose during the course of the interviews was that an appreciable 
number of respondents did not consent to have the interview recorded. They usually frowned 
at having their voices recorded on the tape for security reasons. This posed some threat to 
the research inquiry as there was no method other than a hastily written record of the 
interview, which was then impossible to verify with a back-up audio recording. However, 
after several persistent visits and persuasion by the researcher pieces of information needed 
for the qualitative study were released. The fact that the research assistants had been well 
trained also contributed to efficient written records of the data. 
(d) Limited previous empirical research on the research topic 
A review of the literature revealed a paucity of empirical studies on the research topic. Most 
of the previous research studies that had been conducted on Boko Haram terrorism were 
produced from a review of secondary data sources such as newspaper reports, the social 
media, archival materials, documentary analysis, and Google resources. Consequently, there 
was not enough empirical information for comparative analysis of the research findings, 
particularly in terms of primary data interpretation and a discussion of the research findings. 
Despite the availability of some local and international literature that could be accessed to 
validate the research findings, the study was still left with limited primary references to work 
with in terms of comparison and juxtaposition of findings. 
(e) Restrictions in terms of the study location 
Another prominent limitation of the study was that the research was strictly streamlined 
within the north-central senatorial district of Abuja, leaving the other two senatorial districts 
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(the north-east and the north-west where the most dire activities of the Boko sect had been 
recorded over time) uncovered. This restriction occurred as a result of the security and safety 
threats to the researcher, his assistants and potential participants in Boko Haram’s deadliest 
and hottest contested zones which many participants labelled as ‘Boko Haram no-go areas’. 
Nonetheless, data that needed to answer the research questions were obtainable from the 
participating army and police officers who had, on several occasions, been deployed to those 
deadly zones on special duty to defend and protect the citizens against Boko Haram attacks. 
(f)   Limitation in terms of the research methods that were employed 
Despite the appropriate nature of the research methods that were adopted for the study, the 
research could be considered limited in the area of quantitative research data. It is believed 
that such data could have supplemented the findings of the qualitative research by covering 
a larger population to elicit data through the use of questionnaires. Consequent upon the 
nature of the research questions and methods chosen for the study (i.e., it was solely 
qualitative), questionnaires were not administered, and thus the study could not involve the 
testing of any hypotheses. However, the choice of an in-depth interview method elicited 
sufficient credible and dependable case study and incisively perceptive data, which a survey 
method might not have been able to accomplish. The study also had access to published and 
unpublished studies, journal and newspaper reports, as well as the electronic media, the print 
media, an audio recorder, oral and institutional data, and data collected directly from the 
field as complementary sources of information relevant to the study. 
(g) Defining the generalizability of the findings 
Defining the generalizability of the findings was also enlisted as a limitation to this study. 
Actually, the fact that the study was relatively limited in scope in terms of the participants, 
locations and techniques employed for data collection makes this impossible to define.  Also, 
two crucial participant groups (survival victims and Boko Haram insurgents themselves) 
were excluded from the study. Obviously, these groups could not be included due to the 
sensitive and dangerous nature of the investigation , but this fact should perhaps be briefly 
mentioned as a limitation that impacted a more complete and balanced picture of Boko 
Haram insurgency. There was also a recognition to the fact that the research was biased in 
the sense that the study participants were generally opposed to Boko Haram as a jihadist 
movement, and that the data in the quest to determine the root causes of Boko Haram 
insurgency might not have been skewed if the views and perceptions of Boko Haram 
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members were compared to the views of obviously biased participants. Irrespective of this 
array of limitations, this research can still be used as a baseline informative research for 
much broader future research inquiries on Boko Haram or related issues. 
4.17 Conclusion 
In conclusion, this chapter has outlined the methodological and research design for this 
study. The qualitative approach adopted for the study was considered the most suitable 
methodological framework for meeting the purpose and aim of the research. The qualitative 
approach from a constructivist and positivist viewpoints, focuses on the in-depth account of 
the participants’ perceptions on the socio-economic context of Boko Haram terrorism, as it 
relates to the various factors that precipitated and sustain the insurgency in the Nigerian 
affected communities. The choice of the purposive sampling technique was rigorous enough 
to obtain balanced information from the stakeholders that are knowledgeable about the 
socio-economic context of Boko Haram terrorism; and this helped greatly in answering the 
objectives of the study. This chapter also emphasized the ethical considerations of the study 
in ensuring that the principles of confidentiality, anonymity and informed consent were 
upheld throughout the study. Furthermore, this chapter considered the issue of reflexivity 
for enhancing credibility and trustworthiness of the findings. In sum, this chapter has dealt 
with the discussion and justifications of the methodological issues raised by the literatures 
reviewed in Chapter Two of this thesis. The chapter has also been employed to establish the 
link between the methodological approaches adopted and the broad social constructionist 
theoretical positions that guided the study and set out methodological strategies deployed in 
carrying out this research. In the next chapters, the researcher discussed and described in 





DATA ANALYSIS, INTERPRETATION, PRESENTATION 
AND DISCUSSION OF THE RESEARCH FINDINGS 
5.1 Introduction  
This section of the study is two-fold. First, it is centred on the analysis, interpretation and 
presentation of the raw data that were collected from the study location using a qualitative 
methodological approach that employed in-depth, semi-structured interviews as the research 
instruments. This section also presents thematic content analysis in the analysis of the data. 
This section is logically structured with a view to shedding rational understanding on the 
research inquiry. Thus, the thrust of employing thematic content analysis in the research 
inquiry is to strengthen the trustworthiness of the research by way of enhancing the 
credibility and dependability of the data and minimizing possible errors which may have 
affected the research process or the procedures that were employed. This procedure is crucial 
in shedding rational meaning on the subjective understanding and interpretation of the 
collected data so as to contribute widely to the existing body of knowledge.  
The second part focuses on a discussion of the research findings using relevant themes that 
emerged from the data. This aspect provided the research with a sound conceptual 
framework that buttressed some of the arguments comparative to the findings of earlier 
studies as well as the theoretical framework within which the study was located.  In this 
process the data and findings were given credibility and dependability through triangulation, 
as proposed by (Lincoln &Guba,1985) 
5.2 Analyses, Interpretation and Presentation of the Data 
The purpose of the study was to examine people’s perceptions and experiences of the 
phenomenon of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. The study was premised upon the socio-
economic context of the insurgency and addressed four main research questions, which were 
thoroughly examined and answered with reference to the theoretical lens of the social 
exchange theory, the social conflict theory and the rational choice theory of terrorism. The 
research questions were:  (a) What  are the public perceptions on the root causes of Boko 
Haram terrorism in Nigeria?; (b)What patterns characterize Boko Haram terrorism and how 
do they maintain this form of terrorism in Nigeria?; (c) What are the socio-economic 
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consequences of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria?; and  (d) How can Boko Haram terrorism 
be resolved in Nigeria? 
During the in-depth interviews, the study participants described their perceptions and 
experiences of the Boko Haram impasse. The interviews involved in-depth probing of the 
factors that propagated the emergence and maintenance of the terrorist group in Nigeria. The 
participants were also given an opportunity to offer critical analyses of the influential factors 
that, in their view, strengthened and sustained the insurgency since its emergence in Nigeria. 
They offered profuse discussions on the socio-economic impact of this scourge, giving 
examples from a wide variety of circumstances associated with Boko Haram terrorism that 
they had experienced and witnessed. They also emphasized various possible measures that 
could be taken to resolve the on-going problem in the affected societies in Nigeria.  
The reader should note that the research findings that are reported in this chapter are based 
on a thematic analysis of the data that were obtained from the semi-structured interviews 
using selected key informants as the major source of primary information. 
5.3 Thematic Analysis 
After the interviews, the data analysis procedures commenced. The interview data were 
converted from the audio-taped recordings and field notes to transcribed text. Data reduction 
began with the reading and re-reading of the transcribed data. Themes began to emerge with 
the initial reading of each transcript. This process was followed by an open coding procedure 
which was utilized for the identification of all emerging themes that were deemed most 
relevant to understanding the research phenomenon. The four main emerging themes that 
emerged were the following: (1) Public perceptions regarding the root causes of Boko 
Haram Terrorism in Nigeria; (2) Patterns that maintain Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria; 
(3) Socio-economic consequences of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria; and (4) Possible 
techniques that can be adopted to resolve the problem of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. 
The development of themes as described by the voices of the participants provided thick 
descriptions of their experiences of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. In the analysis of the 
findings, the discourse also considers the social exchange, the social conflict and the rational 
choice theoretical and conceptual arguments in explaining the socio-economic context of 
Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. The tripartite theoretical model clarifies the 
understanding of those intriguing factors that produced, reproduced and sustained the Boko 
Haram violence and unrest in Nigeria. In particular, the data information provides an 
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understanding of different ways in which people perceive the incidence of Boko Haram 
terrorism in this sub-Saharan African country. 
The section that follows presents the socio-demographic background of the participants as 
well as a full discussion of their experiences as expressed in the words of the participants. It 
is from these transcriptions that the major findings emerged and were evaluated in 
accordance with each theme that was identified. The transcribed words of the participants 
are presented verbatim and, to some extent, in everyday vernacular. Their perceptions are 
presented in this style to reflect the authenticity of the data and to enhance the reader’s 
submersion into the reflections and thoughts of the participants. 
5.4 Socio-demographic background of the research participants 
During the interviews, the participants’ biographic data were recorded. Their profiles 
emerged as a consequence and are presented in the table as follows.  





Age Gender Nationality/ 









47 Male Kaduna Christianity Tertiary Married 
2 Army 
Officer 
49 Male Niger Islam Tertiary Married 
3 SSS Officer 50 Male Akwa Ibom Christianity Tertiary Widower 
4 Customs 
Officer 
48 Male Kano Islam Tertiary Married 
5 Prisons 
Officer 






















45 Female Kogi Islam Tertiary Married 
11 Business rep 
(man) 
56 Male Lebanon Islam Tertiary Separate 
12 Business rep 
(man) 
52 Male Enugu Christianity Secondary Married 
13 Business rep 
(man) 
54 Male Anambra Christianity Tertiary Married 
14 Business rep 
(man) 
44 Male Gombe Islam Secondary Married 
15 Business rep 
(man) 
54 Male Cameroon Christianity Tertiary Married 
16 Business rep 
(woman) 
53 Female Adamawa Islam Secondary Separated 
17 Business rep 
(woman) 
51 Female Bauchi Islam Tertiary Divorced 
18 Business rep 
(woman) 
50 Female Benue Islam Tertiary Divorced 
19 Business rep 
(woman) 
50 Female Sokoto Islam Secondary Married 
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20 Business rep 
(woman) 
48 Female Plateau Christianity Secondary Separated 
21 Student 31 Male Gogi Islam Tertiary Single 
22 Student 25 Male Kwara Islam Tertiary Single 
23 Student 20 Female Kastina Islam Tertiary Single 
24 Student 22 Female FCT Islam Tertiary Single 
25 Student 24 Female FCT Christianity Tertiary Single 
26 Islamic 
Leader 
61 Male Kastina Islam Tertiary Married 
27 Islamic 
Leader 
59 Male FCT Islam Tertiary Married 
28 Islamic 
Leader 
60 Male FCT Islam Tertiary Married 
29 Islamic 
Leader 
70 Male FCT Islam Tertiary Married 
30 Islamic 
Leader 
72 Male Osun Islam Tertiary Married 
31 Christian 
Leader 
67 Male Kaduna Christianity Tertiary Married 
32 Christian 
Leader 
65 Male Ogun Christianity Tertiary Married 
33 Christian 
Leader 
71 Male Kwara Christianity Tertiary Married 
34 Christian 
Leader 
72 Male Edo Christianity Tertiary Married 
35 Christian 
Leader 





40 Male Borno Islam Tertiary Married 
37 Community 
Police 
44 Male Taraba Islam Tertiary Married 
38 Community 
Police 
37 Male FCT Islam Secondary Married 
39 Community 
Police 
46 Male FCT Christianity Tertiary Married 
40 Community 
Police 
31 Male FCT Islam Secondary Widower 
The above table presents the socio-demographic profile of the participants who were 
selected for and agreed to participate in the study. The table illustrates that the research 
interviews cut across a wide variety of stakeholders to allow for comparative research 
findings in terms of the socio-economic context of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. As 
reflected in the table, the youngest age limit of the participants was 18 years, which means 
that only individuals of 18 or above were considered for the study. The age criterion was 
based on the participants’ perceived maturity and their ability to articulate their experiences 
of the Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria. Gender equality was also considered as a means of 
lending credibility to the study. Thus the perceptions of both genders were sought rather 
than restricting all sources of information to a particular gender. Forty (40) participants 
comprising 12 female and 28 male individuals were involved in the interview process. It is 
noteworthy that interviews were conducted with individuals of different educational 
backgrounds, although participants were not selected on the basis of a specific level of 
education. The relatively high educational attainment of the participants may be ascribed to 
the nature of the study and the relevance of the participants for the study. Apart from the 
students who were pursuing their tertiary education at the time of the study, the majority of 
the participants had achieved a tertiary level of education while only seven were held a 
secondary school education only. None of the participants recorded only a primary school 
education. In terms of religious affiliation, the interviews were not restricted to a particular 
religious group and interviews were thus conducted with members of both the Islamic and 
the Christian faiths. This was deemed necessary to avoid an exclusive religious slant which 
would have impacted the credibility and dependability of the findings through limited 
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comparative data. In terms of the participants’ marital status, 25 were married, 4 were 
divorced, 3 were separated, 3 were widows/widowers while 5 were single. Those with a 
single marital status comprised the sample of students from tertiary institutions. The data on 
the ethnic background of the participants revealed that they hailed from various socio-ethnic 
groups and nationalities, although all resided in Abuja, Nigeria. 
5.5 Data Presentation and Discussion of the Findings     
5.5.1 Public Perceptions Regarding the Root Causes of Boko Haram 
Terrorism in Nigeria 
There have been widespread assumptions across the globe that the root cause of Boko Haram 
terrorism in Nigeria is religious rather than socio-economic. However, the data obtained in 
this study did not scientifically debunk this submission but comprehensively added that the 
evolution of the crisis was unabatedly accompanied and exacerbated by socio-economic 
phlebotomy, political and moral putrescence as well as dehumanization born from a 
combination of decades of mismanagement and pervasive corruption by the various Nigerian 
leaders. The study found evidence to argue that the socio-economic inclination of Boko 
Haram terrorism evolved from the non-fulfilment of socio-economic goals emanating from 
the violation of fundamental human rights, corruption, poverty, poor and unconstitutional 
democratic practices in the northern part of the Nigerian state. This argument is seemingly 
aligned with Njoku’s (2011) postulation that the root causes of terrorism in the third world 
cannot be divorced from poverty, which is an end-product of the evil effects of globalization 
facilitated by the Bretton Woods industrialized capitalist states, leading to the expression of 
hatred through violent attacks on government institutions, both foreign and local. In support 
of the above argument, a prisons officer stated the following: 
“To me, Boko Haram has its origin from economic crises in north-eastern Nigeria. In 
an interview with a Boko Haram commander in Kuje prison, he saw himself as a 
transformed man, which he ascribed to an Islamic team that came to preach the true 
Islam to them. When asked during the interview where does Qur’an justify killing of 
people and civilians, the commander repeatedly said he could not remember. It is like 
he doesn’t want to explore that old frame of mind of their ideology of false Islam. He 
said and I quote: ‘I’ve changed. I don’t want to talk about justification now. But I have 
come to realize now that we have been manipulated and the centrality of our fight and 
ideology is baseless”.  
153 
 
When questioned on what he perceived the root cause of their violence against Nigeria 
was, he said: “I don’t know but I just joined the group because of my poor condition. 
I don’t know when they started their crisis but because of my keen activeness on the 
battlefield, I was made a commander. As for the cause of the crisis, we used to hear 
Shekau say when addressing the camp, ‘Our people are suffering under the rulership 
of political hypocrites…We must not relent! No retreat, no surrender. Our people must 
be freed from poverty and hardships. If our weapons fail us, we will fight with our 
souls’.”  
To buttress the above information, an Army officer, a businessman and a Christian religious 
leader contributed the following: 
The Army officer stated: 
“As earlier said, Boko Haram crisis has many facets associated with socio-economic 
conditions of people…Severe corruption in the Borno state government could be seen 
as the root cause of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria.” 
The business man declared: 
“Corruption of the northern political chiefs is a factor. They want to divert the 
attention of the masses from their inability to run the economy of the country efficiently 
and effectively, thereby enabling them to embezzle more money….It is not a religious 
issue at all. Islam! Hawusubillai!” 
A Christian religious leader offered the following insight: 
“No! to be honest, I don’t think the Islamic religion has anything to do with Boko 
Haram terrorism…but it is only unfortunate that the group originated from a Muslim 
youth movement organization….That is why so many people believe they are Muslims 
and that they are fighting to Islamize the country….To me it is a socio-economic and 
political crisis caused by bad leadership in north-eastern Nigeria.” 
To complement the above argument, a businesswomen stressed the following: 
“Boko Haram terrorism is caused by the way our leaders are squandering our 
resources and it does not cut across all the citizens. People are suffering and Boko 
Haram members believe that education made them to be self-centred and corrupt.” 
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On the contrary, the religious inclination of the root causes of Boko Haram terrorism cannot 
easily be wished away considering the narratives and conceptual arguments of a number of 
the participants that were recruited for the study. Evidence in support of these assertions is 
captured in the statements of the following participants: 
 
A 52- year-old business man offered this statement: 
 
“Negative and misinterpretation of the Holy Quaran to some Muslims led to the 
emergence of Boko Haram”. 
 
A 54-year- old business woman added that: 
 
“They want everybody to change to Muslim…which is difficult…no country practices 
entirely one religion…even if there is, Nigeria’s own will be difficult”. 
 
A Christian leader declared that: 
 
“They are Muslims but those with violent spirit for war and terrorism. You know Islam is 
highly associated with terrorism than Christianity….They are protesting because their 
Muslim brother was defeated at the poll for presidency and their level of education is about 
20% compared to south east, south south, and south west”. 
 
A custom officer expressed that: 
 
“The major factors surrounding the BH insurgency in Nigeria revolve around socio-
economic and political issues in the north-eastern Nigeria. There is also viable connection 
with ethno-religious aspect of it. In fact, you cannot push religion away If you know the 
origin of Boko Haram, you will understand me better”. 
Taking a comparative look at the above data, one may conclude that socio-economic factors 
are critically viable for understanding the root causes of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. 
However, the fact that a number of participants interviewed during the course of the study 
attributed the sect’s affiliation to Islamic religion has justified an appreciable number of the 
scientifically proven assertions that centred the root causes of the insurgency on Islamic 
religion. More specifically, a wide margin between the religious and socio-economic 
contexts of the argument is still created. Nevertheless, based on the examination of people’s 
perceptions, this study premises its findings on the socio-economic factors as an additional 
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insight to the understanding of Boko Haram terrorism rather than debunks out rightly the 
several findings that blamed the root cause of Boko Haram terrorism on Islamic injunctions. 
This finding seems to balance the intricacies behind the notion that religion, and specifically 
the Islamic faith, is the root cause of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria rather than socio-
economic. An examination of the empirical data suggests that the Islamic religion is 
relatively not left out among the factors that pioneered and sustain the Boko Haram crisis in 
Nigeria. Carefully unfolding this finding, it appears that the sect actually portrays a 
particular kind of background affiliation to the Islamic religion – as probably expressed by 
speaking the language of Islam and making references to the Qur’an in the course of 
executing their activities − one thing that is clear is that Islam is actively harnessed by this 
terrorist sect as a platform from which its members vent their anger and grievances to the 
global community. Evidence of this assertion is supported by the statement of a prisons 
officer: 
“They are not Muslims, but frustrated northerners. Interviews with some of the BH 
inmates in Kuje prison confirmed that these people are not Muslims because the 
majority of them are illiterate and can’t even cite the Qur’an, yet they say they are 
doing ‘jihad’. Few of them are learned… they have read the Qur’an and the Hadith, 
but they don’t really understand Islam.  I guess they are controlled by the devil. 
Interviews with them also show that Boko Haram terrorists are mostly men with little 
formal education, with hand-to-mouth jobs on the urban margins…they are people 
commonly looked down upon even by Muslims in their own community as ‘riff-raff”. 
They are angry because of their miserable lives and religion is the platform to express 




A statement by an officer in the State Security Service corroborated this: 
“Based on the information given to the State Security Service in line with our 
investigation, as you know we live on information. The cause of Boko Haram has much 
to do with economic crises in north-eastern Nigeria, aided by corrupt political leaders. 
We guess the political leaders initiated this insurgency by making use of the group for 
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selfish political interests, after which they are now trying to curb it. Unfortunately, it 
is no more within their control. It is completely a political crisis, not a religious issue. 
They may be using Islam to reach out their grievances to the world. But if these people 
were truly Muslims, they would not be attacking fellow Muslims and Islamic 
communities”.  
On being probed further, this participant stated: 
“Do you know the cause of the split of Boko Haram in 2016 during which Al-barnawi 
was appointed over Shekau as the new leader by the Islamic States? It is because 
Shekau  attacked fellow Muslims in Chad-Niger regions and in Nigeria. Even ISIS 
terrorist organization frowns at Boko Haram attacking Muslim fellows. This is strong 
evidence to prove that Boko Haram terrorists are not Muslims…or they may be 
backslided Muslims. Take that from me!”  
According to some scholars and researchers such as Adesoji (2010), Soyinka (2011), Cook 
(2011), Pham (2012), Olagunju (2012), Agbiboa (2013e) and Idahosa (2015), Boko Haram 
terrorism in Nigeria is a product of an attempt by some northern states’ leaders to rule and 
Islamize the entire country. To Idahosa (2015), the primary motive behind Boko Haram’s 
deadly insurgency in the north-east of Nigeria for the last six years has been to enshrine 
Sharia laws as state laws.  According to Olagunju (2012:10), it seems that the Boko Haram 
fundamentalists frown on Western education and, for this reason, many thought they were 
really illiterates. It has indeed come to light that although some are poorly educated, not all 
Boko Haram members are illiterate, but that they are embarking on an ideological war to 
accomplish a set of stated goals. However, the finding of this study has not discarded the 
viewpoints of Adesoji (2010), Soyinka (2011), Cook (2011),Pham (2012), Olagunju (2012), 
Agbiboa (2013e), and Idahosa (2015) by demonstrating that the targets of Boko Haram are 
Christians, Muslims and innocent Nigerian citizens regardless of their religious 
denomination. This assertion did not in any way render the position of the listed authors in 
adequate in their respective attempts to fully explain the Islamic fundamentalism of Boko 
Haram terrorism within the Nigerian context. Understanding the root causes of Boko Haram 
terrorism from another perspective other than the religious lens from which the previous 
scholars and individuals have looked at this debate, the findings of the study, based on the 
narratives of the various participants, have unfolded the role of socio-economic constraints 
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as another significant and contributory factors that pioneered and sustained the emergence 
and escalation of the Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. 
Addressing the root cause of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria, an officer in the Nigerian 
Army offered the following opinion: 
“Walahi, the cause is more  socio-economic and political issues in north-eastern 
Nigeria, not Islam. Because if we look at the beginning of the crisis, it all started from 
north-eastern Nigeria where many people are living in abject poverty. The truth is that 
the northern political leaders are not doing fine; they are too corrupt and they deprive 
most of their citizens of their fundamental rights to socio-economic opportunities such 
as jobs, sound education, good health facilities, food availability and anything that 
humans need to make a life. Any opinion that Islam is the cause is far from reasonable 
thoughts.”  
On being probed, he also stated: 
“However, we all know that Boko Haram was formally an Islamic organization 
originating from this region – Borno − by Yusuf. We all heard of the good will of the 
organization in the early 2000s when they were making provisions for the needs of the 
citizens, helping government to perform their responsibility before they eventually 
accused government of severe acts of corruption and maltreatment of eligible Borno 
citizens. Now, their acts of killing Muslims and bombing mosques have proved them 
not to be Muslims any more. We have to realize this!” 
A 72-year-old Islamic cleric, a business woman, and an undergraduate student of a tertiary 
institution offered the following insights in answer to the same question. The cleric stated: 
“Hmmm! What I think is that some political hoodlums have hijacked the group name 
as a tool of extorting and disrupting the government under the disguise of Boko 
Haram. The cause is not religious but I can say it is from corruption of the political 
leaders. They deny so many people, especially in that north-eastern Nigeria of their 
rights to live in good standard as against the Islamic teachings of Prophet Mohammed. 
Maybe the frustrations and agony of poverty in the region led to this crisis today. But 
I know the group has been influenced by some wicked and powerful leaders. My son, 
with my deeper understanding of Islam and time-long reading of the Holy Book, I want 
158 
 
you to know that there is nowhere in the Qur’an that says you should have to kill for 
God.”  
A successful business woman was of the following opinion regarding the root cause of Boko 
Haram terrorism in Nigeria: 
“Initially they were being used as political thugs and sponsored by politicians and 
when their leader failed election, they vowed to disorganize the country and the tenure 
of the new government. In my own opinion, there is nothing tangible they are fighting 
for other than to make trouble and meet ends needs through terrorism….Well, if I will 
be sincere with you, Boko Haram is caused by a political problem, not Islamic as many 
people think…It is just unfortunate that these people have a background history with 
Islam.” 
An undergraduate student stated: 
“Boko Haram resulted from the socio-economic crisis in north-eastern Nigeria due to 
the corrupt governance of the political leaders. It is a socio-political problem now 
extended to all parts of the northern region.” 
In order to maintain further equilibrium between the socio-economic and religious contexts 
of the crisis, the following excerpts were offered: 
An Islamic cleric stated that: 
“They just want to cause trouble in the country by their request for the sharia law. They said 
they are against the way our government is putting the educated ones in political positions 
and they know they are corrupt and not good Muslims. The truth is that this crisis is 
heightened by the misinterpretation of Islamic doctrines”. 
 
A political office holder was of this opinion: 
 
“I just know many factors are attached to the insurgency….Religion, politics and economic 
crises cannot be left out”. 
An officer in the State Security Service also added that: 
“Numerous factors that have much to do with economic and political crises other than 




An analysis of the data strongly propels the notion that the widespread assumption that the 
root cause and rising insurgency of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria occur as the religious 
injunctions of Islam is not totally misleading and erroneous based on these findings.  
However, in the view of a cleric, true Muslim believers will never harm their fellow 
believers, yet members of the sect had been witnessed killing fellow Muslims as well as 
attacking religious institutions such as mosques and other Islamic centres. The study found 
that this assertion is not sufficient to render the attribution of the root causes of Boko Haram 
terrorism to religious injunctions of Islam erroneous. Moreover, Adebayo Ninalowo 
(2011:152) argues along the same direction, stating that no religious tenet anywhere in the 
world condones violence or termination of human life or destruction of life and property. He 
argues further that the best explanation for terrorism must be attributed to the existential 
factors of the human condition. Ninalowo’s assertion is adequate to corroborate the findings 
of this study on the socio-economic propensity as a more viable cause of Boko Haram crisis 
in Nigeria.  On this note, this study suggests that the unequal hegemonic power configuration 
between the northern political state and civil society vis-a-vis the non-fulfilment of socio-
economic needs as expressed in socio-political, ethno-religious and cultural forms may be 
more viable in promoting a lucid understanding of the root cause of  Boko Haram terrorism 
in Nigeria. 
From the vantage of the social exchange theory, this study conceived Boko Haram terrorism 
as an attendant consequence of unequal exchange resorting to possibilities of resistance and 
challenge against the northern sovereign authority. When putting together different scholarly 
ideas about the social exchange process and what it stands for as a binding force that draws 
human society together, chiefly when the exchange is equal on both sides, one can see that 
the theory argues that satisfaction and peace will exist when people receive fair returns for 
their expenditures, but that fundamental conflicts of interest are generated when people 
receive the bad side of the exchange. This theory is reflected in the situation between the 
northern political state and its citizens, where Boko Haram terrorists wage a war for a fairer 
deal. As an interjection, it may be argued that although their motives may find sympathy in 
many quarters, their tactics are deemed repulsive by observers and victims alike. Secondary 
data that were reviewed revealed that the living conditions in north-eastern Nigeria have 
been worsened by a minority of leaders in the region who cause a sizeable number of 
northern citizens to live in abject poverty, unemployment, hopelessness, backwardness, 
diverse recession, frustration, social dislocation, misery and underdevelopment. Therefore, 
160 
 
the accrued non-fulfilment of socio-economic goals resulting from unequal exchange 
between the northern political state and the frustrated citizens is conceived to have led not 
only to the emergence of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria, but to its sustainability. This 
argument was validated during the interview with a 65-year-old Christian leader: 
“ The origin was more socio-economic and political in northern Nigeria where severe 
corruption and slavery of the poor masses exists. It is a legitimacy crisis…Boko 
Haram is just revolting against the government of the northern states, but the fight has 
gone out of hand now.” 
Looking critically into the above data, the social conflict perspective supports the 
understanding that the Boko Haram insurgency is an elongation and attendant consequence 
of an unequal exchange between Nigeria’s political state and the poor masses. It is in this 
context that members of the Boko Haram sect seem to have emerged with a view to revolting 
against northern leaders through forms of violence and radicalism that have escalated to 
illicit disruptions of the existing political states and the brutalization and termination of lives 
and property in the northern part of Nigeria. This study found credible evidence to buttress 
the findings submitted by Adibe (2012b) who asserts that the frustration of the poor masses, 
precipitated by factors such as severe poverty, unemployment, and elite corruption, 
generates fundamental conflicts of interest within the affected masses who constantly feel 
oppressed, alienated, deprived, frustrated, and abandoned. The study also radiates a great 
deal of symmetry with those of Kwaja (2011:1), Omede (2011:93) and Schwartz et al. 
(2009:540), who similarly argue that “the religious dimension of the Boko Haram conflict 
has been misconstrued as the primary driver of the violence when, in effect, 
disenfranchisement, ineffective governance and structural inequality are assumed to be the 
root causes of the phenomenon”. For Mustapha (2012), Boko Haram could be best described 
as the symptom of the failure of nation-building and democratic politics in Nigeria. His 
argument that “the misguided cry of the disgruntled youth, crushed by the socio-economic 
system, is more viable than religion in any attempt to establish the root cause of Boko Haram 
terrorism in Nigeria” has thus been corroborated by the current study.  
The current research inquiry also found evidence not to absolutely debunk Wole Soyinka’s 
(2011) submission that Boko Haram is the handiwork of “disgruntled northern Muslim 
politicians who desire to make life unbearable for a southern Christian president (cited in 
Agbiboa, 2013e). However, the study agrees with Bintube (2015), who argues that socio-
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economic factors are the major influences responsible for the Boko Haram insurgency in 
Nigeria. Bintube’s assertion, coupled with the assertions in this section, validates the 
findings of this study in terms of the socio-economic causes of Boko Haram terrorism. 
In conclusion, based on the comparative research approach adopted for the analysis and 
discussions of findings of this research and sharp comparisons with previous research 
inquiries, the study concludes that socio-economic factors vis-a-vis religious grievances are 
the key variables accountable for the emergence and maintenance of Boko Haram 
insurgency in Nigeria. In support it presents a broad range of factors such as poverty, 
joblessness, illiteracy, false religious doctrines, economic deprivation, state-actor terrorism, 
bad governance occasioned with leadership deficits and failures, non-fulfilment of the social 
contract with regards to the provision of basic amenities to the citizenry by the political state, 
corruption, greed, political deceit and injustice as the springboard for Boko Haram terrorism 
in Nigeria. 
5.6  Patterns that Maintain Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria 
Over the last seven years of Boko Haram re-emergence in Nigeria, the group has taken pre-
eminence to present itself as the most intractable malaise ever known to ravage the peace 
and social fabric of the Nigerian society, particularly the northern geo-political zone of the 
country. The undue supremacy of the sect has not only earned it global notoriety, but has 
also generated a continuum of controversial academic debates on the patterns that maintain 
the sect as a terrorist stronghold in Nigeria. At this point it must be reiterated that the interest 
of this research shifted completely from the questions of who Boko Haram terrorists are or 
what the nature of their modus operandi and the number of casualties of their activities in 
Nigeria have been. Instead, the study focused on determining the influential factors that have 
fuelled the burning flame of the insurgency in Nigeria since their re-emergence in 2010 to 
date. 
The research findings illuminated a high incidence of pervasive elite and political corruption 
within the Nigerian democratic system as the leading factor fanning the flame of Boko 
Haram insurgency in Nigeria. When the participants were asked to share their views on how 
the Boko Haram sect has been surviving in Nigeria without being suppressed or curbed 




“Boko Haram terrorists survive in Nigeria because they have support from the 
community and international organizations. They have an adequate information 
system, more sophisticated and digitalized weapons to fight unlike us, as the Army is 
issued with old dilapidated and weak arms. So there is no way we can defeat them. 
The Boko Haram are parts of our society… they are here and there. We even hear that 
they are in the government and in politics. I must tell you, they have sponsorships and 
support from elite and political leaders. They are better trained and armed than the 
Nigerian Army and that is the truth of the whole matter. Our government would 
earmark some funds to train the army or to buy ammunition, but before you know the 
money is diverted by some political cabals to satisfy their own selfish interests. In fact, 
excessive corruption within the Nigerian system has made the fight against Boko 
Haram difficult. They have high-class people sponsoring their activities both in 
Nigeria and abroad. I pray that Allah will reveal those that are sponsoring the sect 
any moment from now.” 
Corroborating the points made by the Army Officer above, a detective from the Department 
of State Security stated: 
“Corruption is a factor that helps the growth of BH terrorism. They keep winning the 
war against the military. It is not that our military force is weak, but even the 
Multinational Joint Task Force is still defeated. The reason is that the group has a 
good financial support − from where nobody knows. They use sophisticated and 
digitalized weapons to fight.  In 2014, despite Goodluck Jonathan’s determination to 
submerge the group through pumping of huge funds into the Army and other security 
agencies, those funds were siphoned by unknown people, including Army chiefs, so 
they say. The Army chiefs are even part of the corruption mess by collaborating with 
corrupt politicians to embezzle public funds meant for securing ammunition.” 
On being probed, he further stated: 
“The worst of it all is that they presented to the public that they have bought new arms 
and weapons to fight Boko Haram [and bring them] down. Sometimes, funds approved 
by the government to train officers by international security bodies were diverted into 
private accounts. They will show old pictures of previous training to prove to the 
public that the training has been conducted.  At the end of the day, [they] deployed 
them to BH zones to fight with only one AK-47 rifles, where they met with BH using 
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armoured tanks and bombs and various kinds of sophisticated weapons to fight. With 
this, now tell me…how do you want the military to win the war?”  
An interview with a high-ranking community police officer revealed the following:     
 “Corruption within the Nigerian government is a factor that makes it difficult to curb 
Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. We know that the Boko Haram’s leader in the forest 
there − Shekau, or what does he call himself? − is just a figurehead leader. The 
original leader is here, living with us in the community. They have representatives in 
all government sectors, giving financial strength and first-hand information to the 
sect. This is why it is difficult to submerge them. We have this information with us but 
because the police and even the community do not recognize us, we keep quiet and 
watch where things are going. The BH group has adequate support from the 
community and the government − even their affiliations to other world-rated terrorist 
groups like Al-Qaeda, Ansaaru, Al-Shabaab, Taliban strengthen the war force of the 
group from time to time…They make use of adequate information, intelligence plans 
to execute their objectives, where and the time to attack. This is what our military 
troops lack and the reason why they have failed in their pledge to rid BH out of 
Nigeria.  I am sure the politicians who hide under their canopy are still there to 
frustrate the efforts of the government, and they are the ones financing Boko Haram 
activities and make them comfortable and surviving since 2010”. 
Comparing the responses of various stakeholders, the following was revealed by the 
excerpts:  
A successful businessman stated: 
“Some powerful people in the government are rejoicing, making money and 





A 61-year-old Islamic scholar declared: 
“Democracy nursed a good platform for them to survive. Our politicians cannot be 
vouched for. Many people believed they knew about this Boko Haram issue to cover 
their corruption mess and so if you follow the trend of their operations, you would 
believe they have support of some important people and that gave them the power of 
surviving in the continent.” 
A postgraduate student of the University of Abuja had this to say: 
“They have some people who give them money…they sponsor all their activities…they 
have a more adequate information system than the military. Corruption in the 
government causes all the money earmarked to fight Boko Haram to be diverted.”  
A comparison of the responses affirmed the view that pervasive elitist and political 
corruption take the lead among the factors that create an enabling environment for the 
sustainability of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. Support the findings of Agbiboa (2013a), 
Zenn et al. (2013), Onuoha (2012),Suleiman (2007), the study found evidence to argue that 
excessive corruption within the Nigerian system has made the fight against Boko Haram 
difficult to win. The study unfolded that high levels of corruption persist within the Nigerian 
government and among prominent individuals and political saboteurs who benefit from the 
existence of the insurgency by inappropriately diverting and sharing public funds earmarked 
for procuring weapons and ammunition to fight Boko Haram terrorists and bring their reign 
to an end in Nigeria. Based on the findings of this research, the corollary of these corrupt 
practices has given birth to security deficiencies and a weak security network within the 
military, specifically in terms of the availability of modern digitalized and sophisticated 
weapons to attack the Boko Haram war force. Moreover, there is a sad lack of electronic 
investigative devices to intercept and monitor the activities of the sect and its connectivity 
to sponsors and subversive elements in the broader society. Contrary to strengthening the 
armed forces against Boko Haram, the study found that corrupt individuals, both within the 
government and in the private sector, engaged in reinforcing the military-like force of Boko 
Haram terrorists through adequate funding, the provision of a powerful information network, 
and a technologically advanced infrastructure in the form of vehicles, clothes, food, shelter, 
digitalized electronic devices (such as remote sensing satellite imagery, a border movement 
control system, information linkage devices, video cameras, CCTV, and cell-phones). The 
insurgents were also said to be furbished with sophisticated weapons and arms with which 
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the terrorists recorded infamous victories against the country’s ineffective armed forces over 
time. These findings resonate with Abubakah Shekau’s statement on 7 March 2015 that 
“even as the onslaught by the multinational armed forces against Boko Haram intensifies 
every day with the influx of new weapons and African Union support, the multinational 
force is much less equipped to combat Boko Haram’s war force” (Braun, 2015). This 
statement supports the finding that the victories of the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria are 
sustained by an adequate security framework and fighting equipment that are obtained 
through the staunch support of corrupt individuals. Similar equipment is not made available 
to the multinational armed forces, who have to win the war with outdated rifles and a lack 
of sophisticated support weaponry. 
A second leading factor that launches the boat of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria is 
community support and its affiliations with supportive international organizations. Based on 
the information received from the participants, it became crystal clear that the Boko Haram 
terrorists have strong support from covert members of the civil society through whom they 
obtain adequate information and financial and economic resources which are pivotal to the 
sect’s continued insurgency activities. Regardless of publicised claims to the contrary, 
attempts by the government to repress the group and rid the Nigerian system of this scourge 
have, on different occasions, proved futile. It was also suggested that the sect has 
connections within local communities where they operate. In support of Adesoji’s findings 
(2011), individuals who participated in this research argued that Boko Haram terrorists had 
very strong affiliations with international organizations, particularly with global jihadist 
movements from whom they received physical, motivational and ideological support. The 
research inquiry also illuminated the complexities associated with the failure of the Nigerian 
system to subdue the sect and to sever it form its affiliations with world-class terrorist 
organizations like Al-Qaeda, Ansaaru, Al-Shabaab, the Taliban and ISIS, all of which are 
believed to strengthen the war force of the organization from time to time. Empirical 
evidence in support of the above submission is captured in the statements of a political office 
holder and a detective who were interviewed: 
The political office holder stated: 
“Yes, they have support from some saboteurs in the government and from some 
community leaders who do not know their relatives are among Boko Haram members. 
They keep siding their relatives anytime police want to get them arrested.” 
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The detective expressed his views as follows: 
“Yes, they are affiliated to other terrorist organizations of the world. I know of their 
affiliation to Islamic States and Al-Qaeda, because their leader, Shekau, used to hold 
forth his loyalty to ISIS on the video tapes that they usually send to government.” 
To buttress the statement of the political office holder and that of the detective on the 
question of whether the Boko Haram terrorists have community support, a successful 
business woman stated: 
 “Yes! They must have the support of some citizens because military caught some 
citizens who supplied food items and drugs to Boko Haram.” 
It was also suggested that Boko Haram’s affiliation to international communities was a 
prominent factor that aided the transnationalism of Boko Haram terrorism in neighbouring 
countries. An excerpt in support of this finding is presented in the words of a community 
police member: 
“Yes! There is no doubt that they have support from some neighbouring countries 
because that is where they usually run to whenever the military attacks them heavily 
and they used to harbour them. Take note of this. They have support from those 
neighbouring countries they usually run to in order to avoid attacks from the Nigerian 
Army. This gives us more reasons why the Multinational Task Force also failed to 
resolve the problem. 
A statement by a university academic was similar to that of an Islamic scholar, who said: 
“Allahakubar inna satani robihin! Some wicked communities are in support of Boko 
Haram but I know Allah would expose them one day. They also have the support of 
other neighbouring countries like Chad, Cameroon and Niger Republic, not only 
Nigeria…that is why they can penetrate those countries so easily.” 
The study also identified that a powerful information network served as a lifeline of Boko 
Haram terrorism in Nigeria. Moreover, the adequate information system utilized by the sect 
was found to be an attendant consequence of their secret relationships with international 
organizations, secretive and probably affluent community members, and prominent figures 
in government and politics to whom it has always promised allegiance. The findings thus 
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suggest that Boko Haram terrorists owe their success and existence in Nigeria to an adequate 
information network through which they obtain vital information as to when to strike, how 
to strike and where to strike, and this phenomenon accounts for their frequent victories 
against the armed forces. This statement was validated by a police officer and a 65-year-old 
Christian leader: 
The police officer’s opinion was expressed as follows: 
“More so, they have support from government and the community as we know that 
some of them are even in the force…they are in politics…they are in government…they 
have representatives among students and lecturers. They have informants everywhere 
who provide them with an adequate information system. With corruption keep 
flourishing in the Nigerian system, it may be difficult to fight the war.” 
The Christian religious leader said: 
“Boko Haram has been surviving in Nigeria since 2010 because they have the support 
of powerful politicians and they live on powerful information sources which the 
military is seriously lacking.” 
Furthermore, on the question of community support and an information network as a factor 
sustaining the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, a Customs officer added: 
“I know they have community support. That is why they always have first-hand 
information about every step taken by the government to attack them. They are not 
spirits, they live on information from their supporters. That is why they are difficult to 
submerge in Nigeria.” 
The study successfully linked the potential survival of Boko Harm terrorism to the soft, weak 
and porous administration of the former president, Goodluck Jonathan, whose governance 
was open to pathological corruption and irrational embezzlement of public funds that was 
much heavier and rigorous than any democratic government that had ever ruled in Nigeria. 
This anomaly in his government bore out a wide range of constraints that hindered every 
strategic plan put in place to submerge the terrorist group in Nigeria. Other pathological 
circumstances associated with the former administration which impeded the collective 
efforts of his government and those of the coercive security apparatuses of the state include 
a porous border security network which allowed free and unchecked migration of people in 
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and out of the country, excessive money laundering, inexperienced and corrupt cabinet 
members, inadequate and deceptive reporting by the security chiefs, and a decrepit and 
underdeveloped infrastructure, to mention a few. This finding was corroborated during the 
interview with a high-profile political leader: 
“When Boko Haram first started in Nigeria, the then president of Nigeria did not know 
what to do to the extent that Boko Haram took over a whole local government. 
Collecting tax and revenue from the residents, blocking roads, and taking women 
captive from their husbands’ houses and government did not do anything running to 
one year before they now broke into a government secondary school in Chibok, Borno 
state, and packed over two hundred  final year students writing the West African 
Examination to Sambisa forest. That was when concerned Nigerians formed a human 
rights group called #bring back our girls#. Then the president and his cabinet did not 
find any solution, maybe because he did not have a military experience as a military. 
But when the present president assumed office, they switched into action and Boko 
Haram is reducing now because some of them have surrendered while some were 
killed. I think Boko Haram took the advantage of the former inexperienced and weak 
president to survive from 2010 to the time this present administration took over.” 
The comments of a student substantiated the above data: 
“As I told you, the former president had no knowledge of ruling this complex country. 
He kept sending money like Father Christmas to Boko Haram and so they found 
delight in it and kept throwing bombs, taking thousands captive, and our dear weak 
and inexperienced president kept paying for killing his people, thinking he was trying 
to settle the crisis with Boko Haram. He and his corrupt cabinet made Boko Haram 
comfortable instead of giving them a deadly attack. They were comfortable, that is 
why they could survive throughout his porous and weak government.” 
A business man added that : 
“Some powerful people in the government are rejoicing, making money  and prospering in 
the unstable situation of the country and thereby financing boko haram members. This is 




A customs officer expressed that: 
“Their sustainability in Nigeria could be attributed to political influence in the North, 
corruption, community support and adequate information system available to the sect from 
people of the underground(that is, people whose identities and locations  are not known). 
Weak  security network of the military troops, Porous border  security network, sponsorships 
by members of the government parastatals and ex-political fiqures also aid the sustenance 
of the insurgency. I believe the weakness of the former president Goodluck worsened this 
situation”. 
The credibility of this finding is further confirmed by the statement of an Islamic cleric: 
 
“They have been surviving because the government is slow in action all because some 
government officials are in support indirectly…Especially during Jonathan’s government, 
his reaction to the terrorist activities was slow, weak and nonchalant. This aided their 
success in the region”. 
The unabated expansion of Boko Haram’s war force by the frequent recruitment of able-
bodied youths in northern Nigeria gives momentum to the insurgency in Nigeria. Because 
young people’s socio-economic needs remain unfulfilled as a result of the unequal social 
exchange between the political state and civil society (Homans, 1961; Blau,1964), a 
condition of anomie has been created in which they are compelled by frustration and 
aggression to violate the rules and norms of their land. In this context, they institute violence 
and conflict against the sovereign authority and are driven to join the Boko Haram sect as a 
means of compensating for their conditions of poverty, dehumanization, violation of 
fundamental human rights, unemployment, and societal neglect. The above argument finds 
support in the work of Freilich and LaFree (2016), by stating that Nigerian youths are living 
in frustration resulting from poor democratic governance and the long-lasting aftermath of 
years of corruption and mismanagement that characterized previous Nigerian regimes. Thus 
frustration and anger seem to motivate a good number of the northern youth to fall prey to 
Boko Haram’s lure. 
With reference to the arguments of Martin (2003), Kashima (2003) and Mandani (2004), 
this study also found that Boko Haram’s persistent struggle for survival is a means of seeking 
freedom from the shackles of oppressions that are inflicted on them by the Nigerian system. 
A theoretical reflection on this submission conceives Boko Haram terrorists as ‘freedom 
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fighters’, particularly from the historical  perspective of their frequent prison breaks and the 
granting of freedom to inmates. This view upholds the work of Wicker (1975), who observes 
that injustice, inequality and dehumanization bred the crisis of Yusuffiya Boko Haram 
insurgency which Nigeria is facing today. In his analysis of the Attica prison revolt, Wicker 
(1975) points out that “the inmates of Attica prison revolted because the system evolved into 
one of the most massive violations of human rights”. The revolters took hostages and 
compelled the authorities into four days of desperate negotiations, which Wicker describes 
as “the grim sign of our dark times” (Bintube, 2015).  
Taking a critical look at the previous findings as well as the narratives of participants in the 
present study, the disturbing trend of Boko Haram terrorism may be attributed to the youth’s 
irrational behaviour that erupts from poor democratic practices, dehumanization, poverty and 
unemployment, socio-economic crises, frustration, aggression, disenfranchisement, political 
dissatisfaction, and  human rights violations, which have prompted many youths to join the 
terrorist group, thereby inflating its numbers and exacerbating the magnitude and the war force 
of the Boko Haram sect which fights in large numbers and records continual triumphs against 
the official military force of Nigeria. The credibility of this statement is affirmed by a 
statement of a community police member: 
“This democratic government is even the life wire and wheels pushing the crisis 
forward in Nigeria. As I said before, it provides a breeding ground for all kinds of 
socio-economic problems in Nigeria. Corruption, joblessness, absolute poverty, 
frustration, material deprivations, violation of human rights, police brutality are all 
attendant consequences of the democratic era in Nigeria. This accounts for more 
reasons why the youth are joining the BH sect in the north to ease the conditions of 
unemployment. Some also see it as an avenue to retaliate for all the sufferings they 
have experienced because of the government.” 
He also added: 
“There are so many factors associated with this. That is why it has been so difficult 
to stop them and because they are many in numbers and they receive support from 
some people in society, they have an adequate information system with which they 
operate. They also have funding and training connections with international terrorist 
organizations. Political corruption is another big factor to be considered.” 
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The in-depth interview with a Customs officer revealed the following: 
“Boko Haram’s sustainability in Nigeria could be attributed to political influence in 
the north, religious brainwashing of the youth, corruption, community support and 
adequate information system available to the sect from people of the underground − 
that is, people whose identities and locations are not known. The weak security 
network of the military troops, a porous border security network, sponsorships by 
members of the government, parastatals and ex-political figures also aid the 
sustainability of the insurgency. We also know of their affiliation to other terrorist 
groups of the world such as ISIS and al-Qaeda, which are highly connected with the 
financial power of the sect. So many things are connected with their surviving trends 
in Nigeria.” 
Moreover, religious brainwashing, abuse of power by northern political leaders, state-actor 
terrorism, perceived societal neglect, unemployment and pervasive poverty among the youth 
of the northern states cannot be left out of those variables that predispose them to Boko 
Haram terrorism in Nigeria.  The preceding statement is supported by the perspective of the 
rational choice theory of terrorism which assumes that terrorist behaviour usually emanates 
from a rational, calculated and conscious decision to achieve socio-economic and political 
goals due to depravation. On the other hand, these youths’ behaviour might reflect 
pathological or illogical behaviour as a means to fulfil their personal needs. On this premise, 
the study radiates a high sense of similarity with Akhain’s findings (2012), contending that 
several scholars have attributed insecurity to the desire of man to satisfy his inordinate and 
immoral ambition and lust for materials, power and authority; this accounts for the irrational 
use of violence by the Boko Haram terrorists against the northern states, private 
organizations and the general public with the ultimate objective of achieving some particular 
selfish goals. With the war force of Boko Haram increasing on a daily basis, it has become 
difficult for the military to overwhelm such a large number of warriors. Hence the 
insurgency continues to evolve and re-evolve from year to year. Put differently, based on 
the theoretical and conceptual argument of Peter Blau’s global unequal power exchange, this 
study is able to describe Boko Haram terrorism as a collective, social action or emancipatory 
struggle against the shackles of oppression and dehumanization. Therefore, the group may 
find it difficult and irrational to stop the fight because their motive for going into rebellion 
with the sovereign authority has not been addressed or removed. This may be another 
dimension of the sustainability of the insurgency in Nigeria. 
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5.7 Socio-economic Consequences of Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria 
After more than half a decade of Boko Haram catastrophic enterprises in Nigeria, this 
phenomenon may be described as an anathema to sustainable development as well as the 
nation’s most protracted standoff of recent times. The seven-year-old impasse is hitherto not 
close to being resolved, but continues unabated. Boko Haram insurgents continue to plaque 
the progress and peace of the most populous African country through its virulent activities. 
Its members ruthlessly destroy lives and property by means of bombings, killing, and attacks 
on innocent citizens.  The height of the insecurity experienced on a daily basis due to the 
nefarious activities of the sect has bestowed upon the nation a host of setbacks that may 
linger and impact the progress of the nation forever if urgent action is not taken to arrest the 
awkward situation. The aftermath of these terrible attacks is fraught with a great deal of 
adverse effects that impact the socio-economic, political, religious, educational, agricultural, 
and health advancement of the country. Consequently, there is currently a gradual 
breakdown in the country’s fiscal policy and national development because most resources 
have been channelled towards resolving the insurgency problem. In turn, the ineffectiveness 
of the state to curb and eradicate terrorism has bounced back to affect other important sectors 




5.7.1 Effects of Boko Haram terrorism on socio-economic development 
When people experience feelings of insecurity, their zeal to invest, purchase or lease from 
the product of investment is reduced and that is why, all over the world today, any country 
that radiates an environment of insecurity naturally repels investment initiatives from both 
the international community and its own local investors. Every society across the globe has 
its peculiar problems and challenges, and Nigeria is no exception (Ifijeh, 2011). 
Today, the insecurity that Boko Haram inflicts of the country is one of the greatest problems 
that bedevils the Nigerian society to varying degrees. For example, it has affected 
government policies, economic growth and also retarded development in all spheres. The 
study shares Ifijeh’s (2011) submission that the Boko Haram insurgency is not only a threat 
to the economic, political and social security of Nigeria, but it is also a significant factor 
affiliated with the gradual underdevelopment of the country and even the African continent, 
because the insecurity situation discourages both local and foreign investments. This has the 
effect of waning down the socio-economic development of the Nigerian state and, as a 
consequence, of the continent, because Nigeria (like South Africa) holds a pivotal position 
in the economic development of Africa. More specifically, the continued lack of security in 
the country has reduced the quality of life and standard of living of its citizens and 
exacerbated the conditions of poverty, wretchedness, unemployment, and health risks across 
the populace. Moreover, educational disruptions across different levels of academic pursuits, 
religious misconceptions and the loss of trust of one another have promoted kidnappings, 
unwanted pregnancies and teenage motherhood, day-to-day panic, loss of property, the 
deaths of numerous people, and incidents of internally displaced persons. The list goes on, 
as human and social capital has been destroyed and agricultural productivity in affected 
areas has been devastated. Political instability truncates the relationship between citizens 
and political states, undermines democracy and the rule of law, and stymies the capacity of 
the country to promote growth and development. The findings of this study thus support 
similar studies in illuminating the adverse effects of Boko Haram terrorism that have 
hampered the socio-economic development of the Nigerian state by truncating all prominent 
sectors of the economy which could have influenced the positive growth and development 
of the state. In addressing questions on the socio-economic consequences of Boko Haram 





The officer stated: 
“It has produced a lot of adverse effects on the country. Especially in the economic 
and agricultural sectors. So many times, the affected areas would lack some 
particular types of food or the other. It has greatly discouraged foreign investors 
and reduced fiscal policy in the Nigerian government, causing educational 
disruptions due to everyday closure of institutions, health problems, loss of loved 
ones, food scarcity, cultural discrimination, incidents of internally displaced 
persons, political instability, religious misconceptions,  causing increased numbers 
of refugees to neighbouring countries, deaths of many innocent people, destruction 
of government and private, property, joblessness due to many people leaving the 
Boko Haram areas for  a safer part of the country, unnecessary fear and national 
threat, to mention but a few.” 
The business woman stated: 
“It also affects the educational system as it is difficult for students in the north to go 
to school, and it affects business generally as citizens can no longer go out to 
purchase goods for their needs, thereby turning the economy of the north to 0%.” 
More information about the socio-economic consequences of Boko Haram terrorism was 
captured in the statement of a political office holder: 
“Boko Haram has caused Nigeria all setbacks including poverty, unemployment, 
food scarcity, kidnapping of VIPs [Very Important Persons or dignitaries] and 
political instability.” 
An evaluation of the above data suggests that the effects of Boko Haram terrorism on the 
economy and on society in Nigeria is multifaceted, as it has devastated all areas of the 
country’s development and endeavours, and it has hindered its people from achieving the 
objectives of the national development plan for economic growth. 
5.7.2 Political instability 
The data also suggest that political instability is acknowledged as the most serious adverse 
effect of Boko Harm terrorism in Nigeria. This is because politics is the backbone of all 
nations as the political stability of a country determines progress, development, and the faith 
the people have in its leaders. It is a well-known fact that when the political situation of a 
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country is in a state of collapse and chaos, all other areas of the nation’s economy are on the 
verge of collapsed. Therefore, the day-to-day disruptive activities of the Boko Haram sect 
destabilize democracy in all the Boko Haram-affected zones in Nigeria. The northern 
situation is so bad that people now hardly come forward to showcase their political 
enfranchisement during national and state elections because of the fear of being killed and 
bombed by the Boko Haram sect. Since Boko Haram stepped up its operations in 2010, the 
northern region has never been the same. It appears desolate and dry, and reports show that 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in the Nigerian economy has crashed owing to the political 
instability that the country has experienced due to terrorism. According to the World 
Investment Report (WIR) (2013), FDI that flows into Nigeria dropped by 21.3% within a 
year — from $8.9 billion in 2011 to $7 billion in 2012. This has dealt a great blow to the 
development of Nigeria as the giant of Africa as a country upon which so many neighbouring 
countries’ economies depend. 
Furthermore, the political insecurity in northern Nigeria has already impaired the service 
industries and foreign organizations, particularly those that have the bulk of their operations 
located in the region. The financial services sector is the most adversely affected as banks 
and other financial organizations such as telecommunication companies and big factories 
are closing down their branches because of the fear of Boko Haram attacks (WIR, 2013) 
Political instability in the north has also resulted in the mass emigration of foreign investors 
and Nigerian citizens, particularly from the south-west, south-east and south-south areas. 
The participants suggested that a good number of people had left their jobs and closed their 
businesses in fear of falling prey to an untimely demise by the hands of dangerous Boko 
Haram terrorists   Moreover, the exodus of people from the northern region not only seemed 
to them to constitute the depletion of economic affairs, in the north, such that was 
experienced in the Basque country of Spain but seemed to them to throw those who remained 
behind into financial and psychological trauma. A 67-year-old Christian leader spoke 
emotionally about the adverse effects of Boko Haram terrorism on socio-economic 
development: 
“Very well. Boko Haram has had a lot of negative effects in Nigeria in terms of a 
poor economy, political instability, unemployment, unplanned departure of people 
from the region, infrastructural stagnation, poor health services, family breakdown, 
loss of jobs, closure of private and government institutions, destruction of Nigeria’s 
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and foreign property, deaths of innocent people, incidences of Nigerian refugees 
fleeing to neighbouring countries, health challenges, trauma among those who lost 
their jobs, businesses and loved ones [destroyed] by Boko Haram, kidnappings here 
and there, abuse of girls and street rape, a phobia of insecurity, affecting foreign 
investment and so on. Talk of any sector in Nigeria today, and Boko Haram has in 
one way or another affected it.” 
To buttress this point, a political office holder had this to say: 
“Of course, Boko Haram has cost us a lot in this country. Millions of our children 
that [should have been] leaders of tomorrow have been killed and those involved 
were frustrated to leave the region for safety of their other children and their own 
lives; the psychological stress it has caused cannot be measured. More so, the 
country is suffering the hardship that Boko Haram inflicted on them because most 
big organizations in the affected areas have folded up tail! [i.e., they have left].” 
5.7.3 Health problems 
The advent of Boko Haram terrorism has worsened the health status of the northern region 
as both private and government hospitals have not been functioning properly because of the 
threat of Boko Haram operations on the streets of the northern states. Health practitioners 
live in fear, because  Boko Haram will kidnap anybody suspected of being a nurse or a 
medical practitioners to take care of some of their captives, including the sick abducted girls, 
pregnant women, and warriors who were injured during a battle with security forces. It was 
in this context that the US Embassy in Nigeria alerted the State Chairman of the National 
Association of Nigerian Nurses and Midwives (NANNM) and the Nigerian Medical 
Associations (NMA) headquarters in Abuja to caution all health care workers to remain 
vigilant of possible kidnappings (NANNM, 2014). This information created a great deal of 
fear in the hearts of nurses and medical doctors in the region, which caused an appreciable 
number of medical practitioners to resign their jobs and run for their lives. As a consequence, 
there are high mortality and morbidity rates in the northern region and an unabated increase 
in maternal and infant deaths at various hospitals. There is also day-to-day news on 
television and radio about the uncontrollable spread of communicable diseases across the 
region, because many primary health centres that should have been in charge of this 
phenomena have long closed down due to invasion and the Boko Haram menace. The streets 
of the north-eastern region are full of motherless children whose mothers died during labour 
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as a result of the unavailability of nurses and doctors on call to attend to their agony during 
childbirth. Another tragic aspect of the health hazards created by Boko Haram is that many 
people have died of minor health problems that could have been prevented if doctors and 
nurses were on call. Second to this is the high rate of victims of accidents (fire, auto crash, 
drowning, poisoning, etc.) who have lost their lives in the region because of a lack of 
competent health workers to give them immediate medical intervention. The health hazards 
that Boko Haram terrorism has created have also produced a negative impact on the socio-
economic development of the region as many foreign investors are afraid of coming to the 
region because of a fear of health security. This occasion has also contributed to the 
migration of people in large numbers out of the northern region to areas where the health of 
their dependants, particularly children and elderly parents, can be guaranteed. The study 
established that, as people are forced to move out of the region, their employment statuses 
are also at stake, which creates some psychological and emotional pressures on the affected 
individuals who have suddenly left their jobs and property to relocate in an unplanned 
manner. The negative effect of people’s migration from the north is overpopulation in the 
receiving regions of Nigeria where the Boko Haram insurgency has not reached.  
This current health situation in northern Nigeria has dealt a great blow to international 
organizations whose primary mission statement is to ensure an acceptable level of health for 
all the people of the world in order to fulfil the World Health Organization’s objectives of 
the Alma Ata Declaration of 1978. Nigeria has a bad reputation in this regard among its 
contemporaries in the global village. When questions were addressed on the health 
challenges that Boko Haram terrorism poses, the responses reflected the statements above. 
A 24-year-old student of the University of Abuja narrated the following: 
 “The negative effects of Boko Haram in Nigeria are many. No good medical 
services….people in the region are dying on a daily basis from diseases and 
accidents because no doctors and nurses are there to attend to them.  
Interviewer: Why?   
Respondent: Some of those hospitals are no more stable and some of their staff have 
resigned because of Boko Haram attacks and road blocks, no health development. 




A successful business man offered this opinion:  
“If we started analyzing the negative effects of Boko Haram in Nigeria, two days 
cannot be enough but I will just mention the most serious ones. It has caused health 
hazards because there is a high incidence of health workers resigning. Road blocks 
and hospital attacks by Boko Haram…nurses being kidnapped…the absence of 
drugs and medical facilities to take care of sick people…salaries of health 
practitioners are not paid regularly which in turn causes regular strikes and deaths 
of many patients. Many people lost their shelter and all their properties including 
their precious ones. A lot of children in school that are supposed to be the leaders of 
tomorrow were killed and some may not be able to think straight again in their lives 
because of scary incidents they have witnessed.”   
The above data suggest havoc in the health services in northern Nigeria at the highest level. 
People in this region have reportedly been exposed to inhumane health experiences since 
the intervention of Boko Haram terrorists in the socio-economic and health affairs of 
Nigeria. 
5.7.4 Disruptions in education   
As stated by Nelson Mandela, education is the bedrock of all nations and the most powerful 
weapon that can be used to change the world (See Masuku, 2002) and is one of the most 
important indices to measure the development of any nation. However, since the evolution 
of Boko Haram terrorists in Nigeria, the educational system has remained epileptic with day 
the by day closure of educational institutions, from primary school level to the tertiary level. 
The situation became worse with the abduction of about 276 secondary school girls from 
Chibok, Borno in the north-eastern part of Nigeria. This was an event that generated global 
concern and a movement tagged “Bring back our girls”. The event advanced Boko Haram’s 
status as one of the deadliest terrorist organizations in the world (Global Terrorism Index, 
2015). This miserable incident served to change the perceptions of most parents in northern 
Nigeria towards education, and caused a good number of parents to withdraw their children 
from school because of the fear of the return of Boko Haram terrorists to the region. The 
attendant consequence of this situation has created a high rate of school drops-out in the 
region. Moreover, the teaching and research productivity of most tertiary institutions around 
the northern region has been greatly affected due to incessant bombing of university 
campuses, maiming and killing of students and academics, and blocking of roads by the sect. 
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These and other activities of intimidation have tragically resulted in the closing down of 
academic institutions in the north. This study established that the effect of the disruption of 
education in the region has lowered the standard of education and the level of the academic 
development of northern societies.  
Another formidable effect of Boko Haram terrorism on the education status of northern 
Nigeria has been felt by the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC). Since Boko Haram 
stepped up its aggression on northern communities, the NYSC scheme has been 
experiencing problems with the deployment of new graduates to the region because so many 
university graduates lost their lives in Boko Haram crises during their postings. Young 
graduates in particular are required to serve their country as an integral part of their 
educational requirements and as enshrined in the Bill of Rights and the Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999). Because new graduates have started refusing to be 
deployed to the northern communities to fulfil their one year mandatory primary assignment 
of serving their country, northern communities have experienced a distressful setback in 
primary and secondary school education. Northern societies have long relied on the annual 
deployment of youth corps graduates to put their children through a sound education, but 
this system has now collapsed due to Boko Haram intervention. Equally important, tertiary 
institutions in the region have lost their funding relationships with international 
organizations that no longer offer loans and grants for the advancement of education as was 
done previously to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) for education. When 
the participants addressed the questions related to the educational challenges posed by Boko 
Haram terrorism, the following responses were offered: 
A clergyman stated: 
“It has caused setback for youths in their education due to frequent closing down of 
their universities due to Boko Haram crisis. It also affects the Nigerian NYSC scheme. 
A Customs officer stated: 
“It caused setbacks in the standard of education especially in the northern part 
because students from the north were moved to the south-west and south-east and it 
really affects them. It has also caused many people to be internally displaced and some 




A 22-year-old student of a private university expressed the following: 
“Honestly, this Boko Haram terrorism is a very bad thing that ever happened in 
Nigeria because it really affects everything. Students are not graduating in some 
places, they get transferred and some students have to waste one year because of Boko 
Haram. Youth Corps members are no more posted to those regions as before. Our 
parents in business can no longer get textiles and jewellery that they usually bought 
from Kano and Kaduna because of the insurgency. No one is willing to travel to the 
north.” 
 A political office bearer stated: 
“The negative effects are many. Children are no longer safe going to school while 
some have abandoned school totally. Government and international organizations 
have stopped granting financial aids to the northern institutions because of 
educational instability of the region.  
Interviewer: Why?  
Respondent: Because the region is under crisis now, so pumping funds to them would just 
be like a waste of resources. The targets of government and those international 
organizations are to resolve their crisis with Boko Haram first before they can think of 
anything in education now.” 
A member of Abuja Metro Police Community Relation Committee declared:  
  “…low standard of education. Some parents have even withdrawn their children 
from boarding schools because of the incident of Chibok girls held in Boko Haram’s 
captivity.” 
By comparatively analysing and interpreting the above data, the findings suggest that Boko 
Haram’s existence in Nigeria has dealt the northern education system a great blow. The 
effects of this destructive situation and the sect’s continued threats to the region are keenly 




5.7.5 Low agricultural productivity 
The adverse impact that Boko Haram terrorism has on society is reportedly also keenly felt 
in the agricultural sphere. Most of the land that was formally used for farming and grazing 
has been claimed by Boko Haram terrorists and converted to war zones where official armed 
forces and Boko Haram insurgents clash. Reports state that many local and professional 
farmers abandoned their farmland to ensure the security and safety of their lives. 
Consequently, agricultural productivity has been adversely affected with farmland lying 
barren as a result of the loss of fertility due to soil destruction and erosion by the militants 
and the nation’s armed forces. Much of the farmland has also been affected by the chemicals 
released by weapons and animals, particularly cattle, are wasted in large numbers during 
operational cross-fire. Some innocent farmers tragically lost their lives when they were 
caught on their land during battle. Consequently, there has been a radical decrease in farm 
produce in the region, which has extended to other regions such as the south-west and the 
south-east of the Nigerian state. Northern Nigeria is an agrarian society where most people’s 
livelihoods depend on farming activities. These farmers supply (or used to supply) food and 
dairy products across the entire country. However, all the regions of Nigeria have now been 
affected by the low agricultural productivity of the north, as food is no longer exported to 
other regions in former quantities. In light of this, it is not an overstatement to suggest that 
hunger and anguish, which impact entire communities in northern Nigeria, have begun to 
extend their tentacle to other parts of the country as well. The effect is so bad that Nigeria 
now has to depend on imported supplies of some food products at considerable cost, whereas 
Nigeria used to produce sufficient food before the emergence of Boko Haram terrorism. It 
is also noteworthy that agricultural schemes funded by the World Bank and the African 
Development Bank to help farmers through adequate loan facilities have been averted since 
Boko Haram commenced its supremacy and destruction in north-eastern Nigeria. When 
questions were asked about the effects of Boko Haram terrorism on the agricultural 
development of the affected region, the participants’ responses reflected the dire situation in 
the north of the country. 
A member of the Abuja Metro Police Community Relation Committee opined as follows: 
 “The negative effects are so many that some families can no longer feed their 
children, not to talk of paying their school fees because of the bad level of the Nigerian 
economy and the depreciation of the Naira.” 
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A political office holder stressed the following: 
“Government has started importing fresh garri [cassava powder]  from India because 
of the shortage of food, and those schemes put in place by the World Bank and the 
African Development Bank  to help farmers through adequate loan facilities have been 
stopped since Boko Haram’s arrival in Nigeria.” 
It is important to note that the data suggest that the Boko Haram menace on agricultural 
productivity is not only restricted to the northern region, but has also spread to and is felt 
across all the geo-political zones of Nigeria where shortages and the scarcity of food 
products are experienced by the entire populace. In this context, it must be argued that Boko 
Haram insurgents do not only impact the areas where they operate in a military capacity, but 
that they impact the country as a whole where it hurts most: i.e., the ability of the state to 
feed its citizens. 
5.7.6 Religious misconceptions  
The Islamic fundamentalism of Boko Haram terrorists has made an appreciable number of 
people across the globe believe that the terrorists are fundamentally Muslims. It is this 
researcher’s contention that one of the most important findings of this study is that this 
perception was balanced by the data. Scholars, politicians, economists and ordinary citizens 
reportedly believe that religious fervour is the cause of Boko Haram terrorism and that Boko 
Haram terrorists are Muslims whose activities are in accordance with the will of God as 
stated in the holy Qur’an. However, an empirical finding of this study, supported by a 
statement by Ninalowo (2011), states unequivocally that there is no religious tenet anywhere 
in the world that condones the illicit and wanton termination of lives and destruction of 
property. The fact that Boko Haram terrorists were seen on the streets of northern 
communities where they killed fellow Muslims and set mosques and other Islamic centres 
ablaze is not a sufficient evidence to argue that these militants are not Muslims in the true 
sense of the word, and that they could therefore not be waging a ‘holy’ war based on Muslim 
teachings. The study discovered that these people have a kind of background affiliation to 
the Islamic religion rather than to any other religious denomination, because on most 
occasions they speak the language of Islam and accord their atrocities to the will of Allah in 
statements and video clips. The leadership thus seems to deliberately create the highest level 
of confusion about Islam as a religion that upholds violence, radicalization, termination of 
human life and the destruction of property. Their volatile situation has also given birth to a 
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religious segregation and, in some instances, ill-will between Christian and Muslim 
associations in Nigeria, whereas the Constitution is clear on the nation’s right to freedom of 
religious association. In light of this finding, the researcher contends that until the Nigerian 
society is able to re-examine its religious conceptions based on this particular finding of this 
study, relationships among the Nigerian population will continue to exude suspicion and 
people will experience daily threats due to religious misconceptions. Sadly, until such a time, 
many religious believers, both Christian and Muslim, will wallow in the doldrums of 
ignorance caused by false religious teachings. Empirical evidence that generated this finding 
was expressed in the statements of many of the participants. Some are highlighted below. 
A community police member stated: 
“Another more prominent effect includes religious segregation and racial 
discrimination as people now see anybody coming from the north or Muslim 
population as Boko Haram.” 
Being further probed, he continued: 
“Whatever cause/reason they may be fighting for should not warrant killing fellow 
human beings. Besides, they are political instruments who advanced to become Boko 
Haram. Never think they are Muslims, they are not according to Islamic doctrines. 
That is why I said the other time that by the time they turned terrorists, they are no 
more Muslims. But the fact that they speak the language of Islam has confused a lot of 
people making them believe they are Muslims. I must tell you the pioneers and 
founding fathers of Boko Haram cannot control them any longer because they have 
turned to a mad dog in their hands.” 
A  67-year-old Christian offered the following insight: 
“We [originally] thought their intention was to reduce the Christian population by 
their Islamic state declaration, but when they now started to attack their fellow 
Muslims and Islamic centres, we got confused, and with this we began to doubt if they 
are truly Muslims. As for the cause of the problem, I don’t really think it is an Islamic 




A 72-year-old Islamic leader contributed the following: 
“If I won’t be biased, Boko Haram are Muslims, but they are not good Muslims! 
Because I don’t think any religion in the world could condone the killing of fellow 
human beings.” 
An officer in the Nigeria Police Force opined as follows: 
“I don’t know who they are except that they showcase their ideology to be of the 
Muslim faith. They preach Islam and demonstrate Islamism each time I listen to their 
leader, Shekau, on video tapes. But I don’t believe they are Muslims. Initially I thought 
they were Muslims but with their mode of operations and activities, it shows clearly 
that they are not Islamic faithfuls. We have seen them kill Muslims, destroy Islamic 
centres and kill people regardless of their religious denomination. In fact, nobody can 
say actually anything about their religion. But it is unfortunate that they hide under 
Islam to do evil. Nobody can say they are Christians as they have nothing to do with 
Christianity since they began their evils in Nigeria. To me, they are neither Christians 
nor Muslims. They have their own ideology which has nothing to do with Islam that 
they claim they are.” 
An officer in the Nigerian prison service shared the following: 
“They are not Muslims but frustrated northerners. Interviews with some of the the 
Boko Haram  inmates in Kuje prison confirmed that these people are not Muslims 
because the majority of them are illiterate and can’t even cite the Qur’an, yet they say 
they are doing ‘jihad’. Few of them are learned. They have read the Qur’an and the 
Hadith, but they don’t really understand Islam.  I guess they are controlled by the 
devil. Interviews with them also show that Boko Haram terrorists are mostly men with 
little formal education, with hand-to-mouth jobs on the urban margins. They are 
people commonly looked down upon even by Muslims in their own community as ‘riff-
raff’. They are angry because of their miserable lives and religion is the platform to 
express that anger. I can describe them as frustrated beings hiding under religion to 
perpetrate evil deeds.” 
When the data were compared and analysed, it was revealed that Boko Haram terrorists have 
a specific ethno-religious link with Islamism but that this does not suggest that these 
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terrorists adhere to the Muslims faith and that the spate of their terrorist activities in Nigeria 
has its root in Islamic doctrines as laid down by Prophet Mohammed. 
To sum it up, a comparative evaluation of the findings of Adesoji (2010), Ifijeh (2011), 
Nkewede et al. (2011), Aro (2013), and Peterside (2014) and the narratives of the 
participants of the present study leads to the conclusion that Boko Haram has instigated an 
unprecedented number of adverse effects that have enormously hampered the economic 
growth of the Nigerian state. Other most prominent effects include the destruction of viable 
institutions such police headquarters, recreational  and sports centres, schools and 
universities, mosques and churches, private and public organizations, and so on. Their 
continued existence in the northern region has given the country the nomenclature of a bad 
reputation as one of the world’s deadliest terrorist insurgencies in any country. The bombing 
of the UN building in Abuja and the abduction of foreign expatriates and foreign ambassadors to 
Nigeria are prominent symbols of the bad nomenclature that Boko Haram has caused Nigeria. 
These terrorists have destabilized economic development, lowered educational standards, 
caused food scarcity in affected areas, created health hazards, caused the untimely death of 
many innocent souls, raped and caused unwanted pregnancies, adolescent motherhood and 
parentless children, increased the number of Nigerian refugees in neighbouring countries, 
created ethno-religious segregation, caused cultural discrimination, instigated unity 
dissolution, religious misconception, loss of confidence and a threat to national security. It 
has obviously hindered foreign investment, truncated economic development and facilitated 
the recent economic recession that Nigeria is currently facing. On the whole, the 
agglomeration of socio-economic consequences of Boko Harm terrorism is seen to have 
propagated an ecosystem of gradual underdevelopment across a wide range of the Nigerian 
society. From the perspective of the rational choice theory, this study considers the 
socioeconomic consequences of Boko Haram terrorism as a deliberate and sustained 
punishment meted out to political leaders and the government (national and local) for their 
failure to fulfil their social contract with civil society in respect of making provision for the 
needs of all the citizens of the country. 
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                                                            CHAPTER SIX 
         The Nigerian Democracy and the Terroristic Menace of Boko Haram  
6.1 Introduction 
Evidence procured by this study showed that the rebirth of democracy in Nigeria may have 
motivated a wide range of terrorist activities in the country in recent times. Since Nigeria’s 
return to democracy in May 1999, political gladiators have abused the democratic 
government by significantly undermining the country’s internal security environment and 
employing young men as foot soldiers to fulfil a host of their selfish goals (Onuoha, 2014). 
Among these groups, Boko Haram has evidently grown to become the most serious national, 
transnational, regional, and international organization of concern, because estimates of the 
death toll from Boko Haram attacks since 2010 are in the thousands (Global Terrorism 
Index, 2015).  
6.2. Conceptualizing Democracy as a Breeding Ground for Predisposing 
Factors that Lure the Youth into Boko Haram Terrorism     
With Boko Haram rapidly gaining strength in Nigeria, a question that was addressed by this 
research was: What are the predisposing factors for youth recruitment into the sect and what 
can government do to mitigate or arrest the situation? Salient comments from some 
participants are presented below: 
The following was the opinion of a political office holder: 
“If I may say the truth, the human welfare during the military government was better 
than this. The economy was better, and truly corruption was lessened as compared to 
this democratic government we are into now. Government then was controlled by a 
‘decree’ rather than today’s constitution. Consequently, there was some level of 
discipline in the government and people enjoyed some degree of moral justification in 
the state of affairs, which expressed some concern on the welfare of the citizens. I 
personally believed that we don’t practise our democracy the way it is instituted. That 
is why you see most of we politicians abusing our positions, particularly by deceiving 
and employing some of our young ones who are jobless as political thugs. I must tell 
you, this was not the situation during the military era. I want you to understand 
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something: We political office holders cannot be there forever. So, some of us are also 
worried about the situation of things in the country, particularly the ways the youth 
are trooping out to be political thugs. We are praying that all this must stop so that 
our young ones must think of what they want to do with their youthful lives. To answer 
your question, I can agree that democracy created a pathway for youth recruitment 
into all sorts of terrorist activities, including Boko Haram. The only way out of this 
problem is for governments at all levels to revisit their agenda for the citizens.” 
An Army officer stated: 
“The present democratic government in Nigeria favours their existence. The point is 
that democracy helps the recruitment strategies of the BH terrorists which rapidly 
increases the magnitude of the Boko Haram war force. The ugly situations of 
corruption created by the democratic government do not favour the youth because the 
majority of them are living in poverty, unemployment and frustration, which make 
them consider joining Boko Haram as an option out of their conditions of penury.” 
A member of Abuja Municipal Community Police Relation Committee had this to say: 
“The military regime was far better this government. Democracy is a setback for 
Nigeria. It gives room to all sorts of problems we are experiencing today. It generates 
severe corruption that affects people’s conditions of living. This is why we have many 
youths who are jobless and are now joining the Boko Haram group to have their daily 
food.” 
A successful business woman commented aggressively towards the question whether 
democracy influenced the youth to join Boko Haram terrorism. She stated the following: 
“Democracy is not working in the country. In fact, it is an avenue for wrong people to 
rule the affairs of the country, hijack our economy and bring recession to every nook 
and cranny of the country. Democracy is indeed a ghastly mistake in Nigeria. Our 
political leaders don’t have the technical know-how to practise democracy. Since they 
began their democracy, patterns of our businesses have changed totally due to 
corruption as we have to settle people in high positions in order to have a successful 
business enterprise. For instance, I engaged in importation of goods. My brother, if 
you see the tariff placed on my goods by customs, you would pity me; and all these 
started since democracy began in 1999. Things are no longer functioning in Nigeria. 
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Universities are closing down every day due to ASUU strikes, graduates of universities 
are no longer getting jobs after graduation, police brutality is pervasive, poverty and 
youth unemployment here and there. This is why some of them have become evil tools 
in the hands of wicked politicians so that they can also have their daily bread. I must 
tell you! It is not only the youth that suffer the bad influence of democracy, we business 
people also have our business enterprises affected by the trend. Until we can change 
our perception of politics in Nigeria, corruption will continue to bring down the 
country and the youth will continue to degenerate and join all sorts of terrorist groups 
to compensate for their conditions of unemployment and poverty.”  
To buttress the above statements, a 22-year-old undergraduate student added the following: 
“Some people in the government are in support of Boko Haram and that is why it has 
been difficult to get rid of them. Truly, democracy is a contributory factor for Nigeria’s 
experience of increased Boko Haram violence and crisis. Our democracy is not 
helping the matter as human conditions are getting worse on a daily basis. I am certain 
Boko Haram cannot survive under a military government.” 
Based on the above expressions, it was obvious that human conditions during the military 
regime were not as miserable and austere as the picture portrayed shortly after Nigeria’s 
transition to democracy in 1999. The study thus found evidence to argue that the advent of 
democracy lay a dark foundation for youth unemployment, frustration, abject poverty, high 
rates of illiteracy, corruption, political deceit, brainwashing, and the inculcation of false 
doctrines into the youth so that they can be used as thugs for political parties and state 
terrorism. Democracy seems to have introduced the denial of fundamental human rights, 
unequal distribution of power, privilege and the unequal distribution of resources, all of 
which are contrary to the Bill of Rights and the Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria. Awojobi and Onuoha (2014) do not essentially emphasize the role of a democratic 
government as a breeding ground for factors that predispose the youth to crime and terrorism 
(i.e., factors such as frustration, unemployment, poverty, and illiteracy). However, having 
probed this possibility into more depth, the current study found justification to agree with 
them that “frustration, lack of income, poverty and unemployment must have prompted the 
youth in northern Nigeria to become foot soldiers of Boko Haram terrorists”. According to 
the findings of this study, some destructive elements in the aftermath of democracy are 
undue autonomy and the unchecked power that is vested in common civilians through the 
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political offices they occupy within their domain. This has created a wide avenue for law 
enforcement agencies, particularly the police who happen to be an instrument in the hands 
of politicians, to unleash their brutality on innocent citizens. With the transition to a 
democratic government, discipline has disintegrated within the socio-political system and 
has been replaced by corruption, exacerbation of human conditions, as well as the radical 
enthronement of severe poverty that has led to an outpouring of frustration, the replication 
of anarchy, and the encouragement of normlessness among the youth in Nigerian societies. 
Consequently, armed groups such as the Boko Haram terrorists, the Niger-Delta militants, 
the Fulani Herdsmen and the Niger-Delta Avengers (NDA) have the leverage to recruit 
formerly law-abiding citizens into terrorism. These findings buttress Walker’s (2012) 
submission that terrorist organizations take advantage of poor human conditions to recruit 
and train the youth for activities ranging from errand running to illicit killings and suicide 
bombings. The study findings seem to suggest that, rather than curb such atrocities, the 
current democratic system in Nigeria inadvertently fuels and sustains them.  
6.3. Democratic Leadership and Youth Recruitment into Boko Haram 
Terrorism 
The findings of the study suggest that poor democratic leadership may be highlighted as a 
leading and foundational factor for youth recruitment into Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. 
The data suggest that some young men and even women in Nigeria are used as political foot 
soldiers on the promise of incentives such as contracts, jobs, political positions and huge 
amounts of money that may liberate them from poverty. These promises are made by 
revolutionary forces in exchange for their reactionary services in destabilizing the country. 
The politicians, secure in their positions in office, seemed to have turned away from their 
pledge to serve the country and all its people within the mandate of ‘social exchange’. It is 
in this context that the social exchange theory finds application, as it posits that, for society 
to experience stability and orderliness, the exchange process must be equal on both sides. 
However, when the exchange is unequal as experienced in terms of the position of politicians 
and the Nigerian youth, the situation of necessity engenders a fundamental conflict of 
interest which eventually perpetrates disorderliness in society, as has been witnessed by the 
large numbers of youth who have willingly joined terrorist groups in reaction to the 
perceived denial of their rights. According to the rational choice theory of terrorism, these 
aggrieved youths have adopted violence as their tool of protest in a process of rational 
choice-making. This implies that their retaliatory actions are fundamentally rational as they 
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seemingly decided to join the Boko Haram group in order to embark on a vendetta as a 
punishment reward for the political leaders who betrayed their trust. The participants were 
almost unanimous in their opinion that democracy was a predisposing factor for youth 
recruitment into terrorism. Salient comments to illustrate their assertive views in this regard 
are offered below. 
An Army officer commented as follows: 
“Yes! I agree that democracy was the origin of all these crises we are experiencing 
with Boko Haram terrorism. As an officer of the Federal Republic during the 
2010/2011 elections, I was always on the campaign fields with some of these 
politicians when they deceived these young men to work for them as political thugs to 
support their elections, promising them all sorts of things which they could never fulfil. 
Some of these boys were not even well educated yet they would promise them jobs and 
huge contracts meant for people with high educational qualifications. At the end of 
the day, when they won the elections, they failed miserably to fulfil their promises to 
the boys. I told one of my friends then that what these politicians were doing would 
backfire on them, not knowing that Nigeria was gradually coming up to experience 
terrorism from Boko Haram. I am of the opinion that the unfaithful attitudes of the 
politicians could have pushed some of the boys to join the Boko Haram terrorists, 
particularly those highly frustrated ones among them. Before I conclude my position 
on this matter, I must let you realize that the strength and magnitude of Boko Haram 
terrorism is an attendant consequence of bad democratic practices in Nigeria.” 
A Nigerian Customs official expressed similar sentiments: 
“I must tell you that democracy was the root of all the problems that the youth of 
Nigeria today confront. It gave birth to corruption, political deceptions, 
assassinations, unemployment, joblessness, state terrorism, widespread poverty, 
economic deprivations, incidences of school drops-out and other factors that anyone 
can think of as a predisposing factor for youths to join terrorist groups. Frustrated 
youths with all these aforementioned characteristics indeed have no option but to join 
any group that can fend for their needs.”  
Upon further consideration, he continued: 
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“I am now 48 years of age and successful in my career as a Customs officer. I was 
employed in the Nigerian Customs services the very year I graduated from Ahmadu 
Bello University without knowing anybody. Today, without a political ‘godfather’, you 
cannot enter into the job. There was no job crisis like we experience today during the 
military political era. No democracy and the country was better than this. Corruption 
of the military regime was not as vigorous and deadly as today’s democratic 
government. No news of university graduates being used as thugs or as agents of 
radicalization and destruction. Until we can painstakingly redefine what democracy 
means in Nigeria, the situation would always become worse for us.” 
A high-class business mogul expressed the following opinions: 
“Hmmm! Democracy is a setback for Nigeria. The first and the second republic were 
even better off. I am a citizen of Lebanon with a successful business venture in Nigeria. 
I have the opinion that Nigeria has not understood what democracy really is. I have 
been in this country for more than 30 years so I can say a few things about the political 
history of this country. Truly, the military regime was better for business men and 
foreign investors. Our businesses were going smoothly but the advent of democracy, 
particularly in 1999, cracked down the progress of our business with numerous 
policies emerging from the new political dispensation. In addition, we experience on 
daily basis socio-political, ethno-religious and economic crises of different groups. 
On many occasions here in Abuja, our business centres are suddenly closed down on 
the information that a crisis has emerged somewhere, particularly during this era of 
Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria.”  
He considered deeply and continued: 
“The worst part of it is that before we can succeed bountifully in our businesses now, 
we have to settle some political figures. The situations were never like this in the 1980s 
and 1990s of the military regime. The truth is that Nigerian democracy carries an 
emblem of severe corruption which has eaten up the social and economic fabric of the 
nation and slowed [the development of] so many activities in the country. As a result 
of day-to-day closure of Nigerian universities, I had to relocate my children to Ghana 
to complete their tertiary education. It is true that many graduates in Nigeria today 
are jobless and living in poverty. It is a pity that we private business organizations 
can not employ all of them. As we can think, those populations that remain unemployed 
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are used as instruments for political thuggery and later end up joining the Boko 
Haram sect out of frustration. This is why the Boko Haram war force grows day by 
day. Well, it’s funny enough, but it is a bitter truth! I am sorry to say this. I suggest 
the country needs a recolonization or reorientation of political values that will cater 
for the needs of millions of their youths across the nation.” 
The perceptions of a 72-year-old Islamic religious leader on the impact of democracy on the 
youth were expressed as follows: 
“Yes it helps…because it worsens the conditions of the youth which made some of 
them decide to fall prey of Boko Haram recruitment.” 
Also, according to a Christian clergyman, democracy failed the youth: 
“Democracy is a promising platform for Boko Haram to survive in Nigeria. It provides 
a good space for them to replicate and advance through youth recruitment.”  
To buttress the argument on democracy as an influential factor for youth recruitment into 
terrorism, an officer in the Nigeria prison service stressed the following: 
“Of course, the present political dispensation is a contributory factor. It provides a 
good platform for enlarging the war force of the sect through recruitment. It also gives 
room for corruption within the government and social system, which allows those 
alleged sponsors to divert public funds towards the sustenance of the insurgency.” 
Upon evaluating the insights of the participants as presented above, it was established that 
poor democratic practices were deemed a breeding ground for a wide range of adverse 
factors such as poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, a false religious doctrine, corruption, state 
terrorism and abuse of power that predispose and lure the youth of northern Nigeria into 
Boko Haram terrorism. 
The findings thus suggest that conditions of widespread unemployment and poverty among 
the youth in many of the northern states are predisposing factors that make them vulnerable 
to recruitment as Boko Haram terrorists. This finding aligns with that of Onuoha (2014), 
who argues that poverty and severe unemployment of youths in northern Nigeria provide an 
avenue for radicalization and religious-based violence in the region. This assertion was 
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echoed by a 60-year-old Christian leader and a postgraduate student of the University of 
Abuja. 
The Christian leader stated: 
“My son! Poverty is rampart in Nigeria and unemployment has become a common 
malady of our children. We struggle to sponsor our children through schools. On 
graduation, they have nowhere to work and remain jobless. As for me, I have two 
daughters and one son who have been jobless for more than four years now. Having 
sponsored them from schools, I still remain the one to fend for their needs. The 
possibility of getting jobs depends on who you know; and I can hold this horrible 
situation to corruption of the ruling class. We all know that poverty and unemployment 
issues are more rampant in north-eastern Nigeria than any other regions. I know 
Borno very well. In fact, poverty has eaten every household despite all the constituency 
allocations given by the government to improve the lives of citizens over there. 
Frustration is everywhere on the streets of Borno state. So, I am not surprised their 
youths are joining Boko Haram. It is true that those youths who do not have adequate 
parental care and guidance to help their conditions of unemployment and poverty may 
end up joining the Boko Haram sect so as to improve their conditions of poverty and 
unemployment.” 
A postgraduate student of the University of Abuja had this to say: 
“I am now 31 years of age. I finished my first degree at 23. Since then, I have been 
looking for jobs but none is available. After my NYSC, I tried all possible attempts to 
secure a job for four years but I could not, after which I went back for my Master’s 
degree. After the completion of the higher degree, yet no job elsewhere all because my 
father or my uncle is not in the House of Senate or Representatives. Now, I have started 
my PhD with no hope of even getting a job on completion. This even made me 
remember few years back when some PhD holders were applying for a driving job at 
Dangote Group of Company. My brother, you can see the worst situation of the 
Nigerian state, because a situation whereby PhD holders are now becoming jobless. 
It shows that Nigeria is finished. This is not government of the people. Kai!” 
Upon deeper reflection he continued as follows: 
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“The most interesting thing I want to tell you is that I did my first degree at the 
University of Maiduguri, which happened to be the source of Boko Harm terrorism. I 
could see back then when university graduates were tearing their certificates up and 
undergraduates dropping out of schools to join the Boko Haram sect in order to 
compensate for their conditions of need. Their conditions of poverty and 
unemployment made them also vulnerable to false religious teachings with which they 
are easily tricked and won into the sect. The truth is that the Nigerian system has 
collapsed in the hands of the corrupt leaders. This is why we have a large number of 
youths joining the sect.” 
To buttress the argument of the student above, a 60-year-old Islamic scholar had this to say: 
“Do we have democracy in Nigeria? Democracy that has changed to ‘corruptocracy’. 
The political leaders just inflict on the citizens ‘sufferingtocracy’. That is why Boko 
Haram can use the youth’s conditions of severe poverty and unemployment to 
brainwash them and turn them into members.” 
When further questions were asked on the influence of democracy as a breeding ground for 
youth recruitment into terrorism, the following excerpts were captured from the narratives 
of the following participants: A business man, a political office holder and a Christian 
religious leader. 
A 52-year-old business man stated: 
“Yes, democracy helps Boko Haram’s existence in Nigeria. Some of their sponsors 
are said to be in politics and they strengthen the war force of the sect against 
government efforts. Can you imagine such high level of corruption of political office 
holders?” 
A political office holder added: 
“They get easy money from evil and wicked citizens that misuse our democracy 





A substantial contribution to these arguments was also made by a Christian religious elder: 
“The influence of democracy is a big factor that helps their survival in Nigeria. The 
democracy is too porous to corruption and all sorts of immoralities such that some 
people could be using money stolen from government and public [funds] to finance 
Boko Haram so as to disrupt government administration so that they can assume 
power.” 
An Islamic scholar’s narrative complemented the argument given by the religious leader 
above: 
“The present democratic government is too corrupt, so it helps Boko Haram’s 
sustenance, unlike the military regime which was better.” 
A cross examination of the above data illuminated widespread corruption as a factor that is 
conducive to recruitment and radicalization of the youth into Boko Haram insurgency. The 
high rate of corruption in the Nigerian government and the neglect of citizens’ welfare also 
nourish the extremist endeavour. Widespread corruption in Nigeria has not only deprived 
communities of the necessary amenities and infrastructure, but has created an environment 
that is conducive for the recruitment and radicalization of young men into terrorism. What 
is really alarming in terms of the political establishment in Nigeria today as revealed by this 
study is the situation where students, especially in tertiary institutions in Borno state, 
withdrew from school, tore up their certificates and joined the Boko Haram group. In the face 
of such drastic measures by the youth, the study is compelled to warn that the phenomenon 
of youth recruitment into Boko Haram terrorism will continue to escalate with the dire 
possibility of impending future disasters if the ruling class continues to turn a deaf ear to the 
jingles that cry against the awkward situations that characterize the country’s democratic 
dispensation. This study found some similarity with the Cook’s (2014) finding that the 
Nigerian ruling class seems to ignore that fact that the daily increase in the number of lumpen 
class people who join the Boko Harm sect is a time bomb that will undermine the nation’s 
fragile structure in the near future. 
The high incidence of illiteracy in north-eastern Nigeria is another prominent factor that was 
attributed by the participants to the youth’s proclivity for recruitment into Boko Haram 
terrorism. It is a known fact that large numbers of poorly schooled and illiterate youths roam 
the streets of the northern states, which is a fact that was reiterated by the participants. It is 
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also obvious that people with low educational qualifications or no education at all can be 
easily manipulated and lured into criminal activities because of their state of social 
deprivation and socio-economic breakdown. A zero level of education is likely to deny many 
people the capacity and knowledge to critically question the narratives and doctrines of 
extremist groups like Boko Haram. It thus became evident in the study that poverty, 
wretchedness, unemployment, and the financial and socio-economic incapacity that 
illiteracy has bestowed upon many people made them vulnerable as cheap prey for Boko 
Haram recruitment and radicalization.  
Evidence in support of this assertion was expressed by a learned Islamic scholar: 
“Yes, the present democratic government has a role to play in this by giving room to 
Boko Haram to recruit more able-bodied youths. Of all the geopolitical zones in 
Nigeria, the northern region is undoubtedly the poorest and most educationally 
disadvantaged region so far, with the majority of the citizens living in absolute 
poverty. The zone should be the power house of Nigeria, yet the people are so illiterate 
and wretched compared to the south-western and other regions of Nigeria. I am of the 
opinion that loss of rightful access to educational opportunities is a factor that 
worsens their conditions of poverty. I am from Kastina and I know what I am saying.”  
Upon consideration, he offered even deeper insights: 
“The northern leaders are indeed so corrupt that they have to deny and deprive their 
citizens of the access to socio-economic and political goods such as formal education, 
free health facilities, internet and mass transit system, good shelters, food and 
clothing. These are the citizens’ rights that they are enfranchised to enjoy because I 
believe some other regions of Nigeria, particularly  the south-western and south-
eastern regions are still managing to meet at least a moderate percentage of their 
people’s needs. It is true that people with no formal education, no jobs and care 
increase the war force of the Boko Haram terrorists. Remember the adage that says, 
‘an idle mind is the devil’s workshop’. You may not understand what I am saying 
because you have never been there to see how the majority of the population are living 
in abject poverty. If you look at their situations, you may not want to blame them for 




An interview with a community police relation committee member revealed the following: 
“It creates a wide space for many factors that make the youth join the Boko Haram 
war force. It worsens poverty and the almajiri situation of illiteracy in the north. Those 
children that are supposed to be sent to school for formal education are left alone to 
roam the streets, turning into criminals as a result of severe poverty.” 
To buttress the above argument, a business woman had this to say: 
“Almajiris are many in the north and they have held thousands captive. They 
indoctrinated and trained them to become Boko Haram. So, as some are killed, some 
are emerging…this is encouraged by the corruption of political leaders who are 
supposed to give the children formal education so that they can be free from their 
inherent illiteracy that renders them vulnerable to false religious teachings.”  
The above submission unfolds that a high incidence of illiteracy in north-eastern Nigeria is 
accountable for a large number of their citizens wallowing in abject poverty and misery. 
Considering the opinions of the participants as expounded above, the findings echo Okoro’s 
(2014) submission that government corruption and its attendant mass poverty are rampant 
throughout the country, but that the rate of poverty in the northern regions is higher than the 
national average. This finding also supports the arguments of Lukman (2007) and Rogers 
(2012) that the dismal picture of the socio-economic situation in Nigeria is repulsive because 
of the government’s weakness and failure to provide in the basic human needs of the citizens, 
who are therefore encouraged to utilize violence as a bargaining chip to obtain concessions 
from the government. 
Brutality and abuse of power by members of the security forces were also identified as a 
prominent factor that renders the youth vulnerable to Boko Haram recruitment. The Nigerian 
security and military forces deployed against Boko Haram have been criticized by an 
enraged local population, social commentators, students, opinion leaders, the National 
Orientation Agency (NOA), Christian and Islamic leaders, business executives, community 
police committees, civil society organizations, and the media for their harsh attitudes and 
high-handedness in dealing with innocent, law-abiding civilians(See also Onuoha, 2014; 
Agbiboa,2013b). The data also revealed allegations of rape, robbery, unlawful killings, 
dragnet arrests, extortion, and intimidation as common misdemeanours and irregularities 
perpetrated by some security force members who had been deployed to maintain peace and 
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order in regions traumatized by Boko Haram insurgents. The findings suggest an urgent need 
for appropriate authorities to address the pervasiveness of human rights violations by 
security forces so as to improve public confidence and support for the security forces 
deployed to counteract terrorism operations. Findings in support of this argument are 
reflected in the narratives of the following participants: a Police Community and Relation 
Committee member, a religious leader, and a police officer. 
The Police Community and Relation Committee member stated: 
“The police deployed to counteract terrorism operations in Nigeria are indeed 
sometimes deadlier than the terrorists with the ways they handle innocent and law-
abiding citizens. Since the emergence of the Boko Haram crisis, I can tell you 
categorically that those police officers that were constitutionally enforced to protect 
the citizens and maintain order are the ones seen in public to initiate the death of many 
people, rape women and young ladies in the course of fighting Boko Haram and cause 
injuries to some through the usurpation of power vested on them. I saw on the street 
of Abuja where innocent people, students and civil servants going to their offices were 
arrested and accused of being an alleged Boko Haram member.”  
A highly regarded religious leader stated the following: 
“A video coverage from Borno also shows how innocent people were mistaken and 
killed by the security forces, all in the service of fighting Boko Haram. Some of these 
people were released safely while some did not return from police custody. Up till 
now, nobody knows the outcome of some of the arrest as they never returned to their 
community. The security forces mandated with the responsibility of protecting citizens 
end up killing more than the Boko Haram terrorists. As a community police officer, I 
hate the police and I don’t always like having anything to do with them, not only 
because of their brutality, but also their inordinate culture of distrust and insincerity. 
At this level, our relationship with the police to fight any terrorist groups, including 
the Boko Haram, has not been made productive.”  
He reflected and continued: 
“This is one of the reasons why Boko Harm terrorism has been difficult to submerge 
in affected Nigerian societies.  The community support is indispensable for winning 
the war against Boko Haram terrorism. The question is now, ‘Why do people join the 
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terrorist sect because of police brutality?’ They join to launch a reprisal attack on the 
security forces who have either violated their rights or killed their relations. For us to 
lessen the crisis, a good partnership between the community and the police must be 
established so that people can rekindle some degree of trust and confidence in them. 
Police respect and fair treatment of the citizens must also be encouraged, then the 
fight against any form of terrorism may not be difficult to accomplish.” 
In conclusion of this section, a comparative analysis and the interpretation of the various 
participants’ responses illuminated that the role of democracy as a breeding ground for a 
wide range of factors influences the Nigerian youth to join Boko Haram as terrorists. This 
dire finding cannot be wished away or ignored. Drawing upon the conceptual arguments of 
Freilich and LaFree (2016), it is reiterated that most youths in the north-eastern part of 
Nigeria are left with no other option than to respond to the recruitment of terrorist 
organizations like Boko Haram so as to be relieved of their perpetual frustrations and the 
pressures of life. Such youths include those with good educational attainment but who are 
unemployed, youths who have lost their jobs due to political corruption and socio-economic 
instability, youths with low educational qualifications and who come from poor socio-
economic backgrounds, and youths whose lives have been battered by abject poverty.  
At this juncture, it is noteworthy that this study buttresses the findings by the United States 
Institute of Peace (USIP, 2014), the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS, 2013 cited in 
Onuoha, 2014), and Awojobi (2014). A further contribution of this study is that an 
ineffective and generally corrupt ‘democratic’ government in Nigeria constitutes a breeding 
ground for the prevalence of youth unemployment, poverty, corruption, lack of income, 
frustration, false religious interpretations of Islamic doctrines, illiteracy, police brutality and 
abuse of power, and poor family structures. Some of these elements were researched by 
USIP (2014), Onuoha (2014) and Awojobi (2014), who also found that these factors 
predispose many northern Nigerian youths to becoming Boko Haram terrorist supporters. 
On account of the various findings that were presented and discussed above, it can be 
concluded that, until an amelioration occurs in the conditions of the vast majority of the 
Nigerian populace, and until such time as the human rights concerns of these people are 
placed at the top of the political agenda of all the democratically elected leaders of the 
country, there will always be a real danger of the systemic breakdown of the socio-economic 
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and political fabric of society, while many  human resources will remain a hotbed for a wide 
variety of terrorist activities.  
6.4. Intervention Strategies to Combat Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria  
More than seven years of Boko Haram supremacy in Nigeria has aroused the interest of 
many scholars and policy makers. One question that they all ask is why the crisis has defied 
all possible solutions for its resolution in northern Nigeria. Based on the findings obtained 
from the narratives of the participants of this research inquiry, techniques that can possibly 
be adopted to resolve the on-going problem do exist. One solution may be found in the 
development of more appropriate culturally acceptable conflict resolution strategies. The 
study thus suggest three basic approaches that may be used to resolve the crisis in Nigeria. 
These are: 
(a) Peaceful negotiations;  
(b) Community policing; and 
(c) Pre-emptive legal measures.  
The viability of each strategy is briefly elucidated in the next sections. 
6.4.1 A peaceful negotiation approach 
The study identified the paradigm shift from armed conflict to peaceful negotiation as a 
solution for addressing the Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria. This approach to Boko Haram 
terrorism is what Agbiboa (2013e) describes as “a soft-hand approach”. The Nigerian 
government once attempted this approach to resolve the crisis, but due to the negotiation 
committee’s insufficient memorandum of understanding in their negotiations with the group, 
the negotiations failed to come off the ground. Shortly after Nigeria turned to a military 
approach to resolve the problem, which Agbiboa refers to as “a heavy-hand approach”. 
Nigeria has subsequently witnessed more than half a decade of the so-called heavy-handed 
approach (otherwise referred to as the “fire-for-fire” approach) that was adopted by the 
Nigerian government to submerge the Boko Haram terrorist group. To date this approach 
has, regardless of the government’s declarations to the contrary, not produced the desired 
result. Based on a comparative evaluation of the findings of this research, enough evidence 
has been elicited to transmit the message not only to Nigeria but to the world that terrorism 
cannot be fought by means of deploying conventional weapons alone. Two questions guide 
the proposed approach: Are we winning the war against terrorism? and is the world a safer 
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place after the execution of Osama Bin Laden of Saudi Arabia? If everyone’s answer to this 
question is No, then the war against Boko Haram terrorism can only be won by diplomatic 
means and the adoption of psychological and ideological strategies through peaceful 
negotiations where combatants sit around a table on equal terms. In as much as this study 
has confirmed Boko Haram’s affiliation to other international terrorist organizations, this 
study suggests that all countries of the world must first unite in the common goal to eradicate 
this scourge before terrorism will be defeated. This is something that the United Nations has 
failed to achieve for over 50 years since its inception. Moreover, if an approach of violence 
against terrorism is deemed efficacious, then the starting point would be to address the 
Palestinian question and resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. If this can be achieved, such 
an approach can be adopted to resolve the Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria. However, as 
violence has not been the answer for any lasting solutions to conflict, it is this researcher’s 
contention that alternative approaches are the only option. 
Going down memory lane, the effectiveness of peaceful negotiation as the only option to 
resolve the on-going crisis in Nigeria took root in April 2014, when the militant Islamist 
Boko Haram group abducted 276 schoolgirls from Chibok in Borno state in north-eastern 
Nigeria. This event made global news (Abubakar, 2014). Widespread concern generated by 
the incident soon culminated in a global social media campaign entitled ‘Bring Back Our 
Girls’, with the accompanying Twitter hashtag #BringBackOurGirls, which featured in 
Tweets from notable world leaders and international celebrities. The Nigerian security forces 
have been attempting to neutralize Boko Haram since 2009. The largest of these efforts was 
the establishment of a special Joint Task Force (JTF) in June 2011, codenamed Operation 
Restore Order (JTORO) to submerge the terrorist group. However, this initiative failed 
dismally (Olofinbiyi, 2017).  JTORO’s eight thousand soldiers were deployed to the region 
in a direct military offensive against Boko Haram members—the largest deployment of 
troops since the civil war in Nigeria (Agbiboa, 2013a). In spite of these efforts, Boko Haram 
and its suspected collaborators remained active and persisted their insurgency in regions of 
Nigeria bordering Niger, Chad and Cameroon (Onuoha, 2012).  
In January 2015, Goodluck Jonathan, Nigeria’s then president, vowed to take every 
necessary action to halt the impunity of insurgents and terrorists by targeting every suspected 
enclave of Boko Haram (IRIN, 2013). Again, these efforts were in vain. The need for the 
Nigerian government to search for solutions to this problem from another dimension other 
than the military approach arose with the administration of President Muhammadu Buhari 
202 
 
during the last quarter of 2016 (Olofinbiyi, 2017). Subsequently, in September 2016, the 
newly-elected President expressed his willingness to work with the international community 
and local interlocutors to negotiate with a faction of Boko Haram for the release of the 
Chibok girls. Speaking during a meeting with the United Nations Secretary General during 
the seventy-first UN General Assembly in New York, President Buhari expressed the 
Nigerian government’s willingness to negotiate, but admitted that it was struggling to 
identify “credible and bona fide leadership of Boko Haram to discuss [the issue] with”. He 
stated that “the government had reached out, ready to negotiate, but it became difficult to 
identify credible leaders. We will welcome intermediaries such as UN outfits to step in” 
(Ehikioya, 2016). 
The two-week negotiation session between the Nigerian government and Boko Haram, 
which was brokered by officials from the International Federation of the Red Cross and the 
Swiss government, among others, arguably led to the release of twenty-one of the Chibok 
girls on 13 October  2016 (Al Jazeera, 2016). As the negotiations continued, another cohort 
of eighty-two Chibok girls was released on 7 May 2017. These successes served as a point 
of hope that all the girls would be released as negotiations progressed in the right direction 
with the continued intervention of international organizations as mediators (Olofinbiyi, 
2017). It is therefore posited through empirical evidence that the position of peaceful 
negotiations rather that a military approach is a   better option to resolve the on-going 
insurgency of Boko Haram in Nigeria. Some participants adamantly supported this position 
during the in-depth interviews.  
An officer in the Nigerian Army declared stated: 
“Well, I’ll say it’s possible to resolve the issue through peaceful negotiations, but it 
may take a long time. Anyway, the government is on it and we can see that it is yielding 
some results, especially with the release of those Chibok girls. So I will encourage our 
government to continue with the negotiations since it is presently producing some 
positive results, unlike when we engaged them in armed battle. Let’s wait and see the 
end of the negotiations. I believe there is no crime in trying an alternative option if 
one is failing. The most important point is to resolve the problem in Nigeria.  Well, 
maybe because I’m a soldier, I believe those people need iron hands.” 
To buttress the point on peaceful negotiation as an option to resolve the Boko Haram crisis, 
an officer in the Department of State Security (DSS) added the following: 
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“Yes, it will, if well managed. I want you to know that terrorism cannot always be 
fought by violence. Sometimes we may try the other option, which is peaceful 
negotiation. So let’s try it this time around and see where it will lead us. No crime in 
trial. As we can see now, [there was] no news of Boko Haram attacks during the 
continuance of the negotiations. This means that if both parties could reach consensus, 
the crisis would end.” 
Upon being further probed, he stated: 
“Negotiations could still be the best with the present situation in Nigeria. I think we 
should continue with the negotiation approach currently in progress since it appears 
to be more effective within a few weeks of execution. Look…over seven years of the 
military approach has not resolved the crisis. So, it will be best to try another option 
for a solution before our people are wasted away by the deadly group.” 
A community police offered the following insight: 
“…to a large extent! They need to invite the international organizations that are better 
than us in security prowess and intelligence gathering. This is part of what the 
International Federation of Red Cross and the Swiss government are doing for us as 
mediators.” 
A successful business mogul also supported a new approach: 
“The military approach has failed Nigeria already. Over seven years of their struggle 
with the Boko Haram yielded no good results. We hear on the news every day that 
soldiers killed 25 Boko Harams today, tomorrow they kill 90, yet they are still 
tormenting the country, going on shedding innocent blood. The media reports are also 
political and corrupt with their fake reports, and this is due to nothing but the Nigerian 
[political] system which is now corrupt beyond control. A peaceful negotiation 
approach will be better now that it is giving us positive results. Since the military has 
been fighting no single Chibok girl was released…can you see?” 
A-60-year old clergyman contributed the following: 
“Yes. Peaceful negotiations should be made with Boko Haram leaders and Hausa 
leaders as well. However, we are already in the line of negotiations with them and it 
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has been yielding some good results compared to the seven years of military approach 
with no positive result. So let’s pray it works out well. However, in this kind of situation 
any alternative may be consulted. Nobody knows which one will work, but with prayers 
all things are possible.” 
A 61-year old Islamic university scholar argued as follows: 
“Government should continue the peaceful dialogue with them to know what exactly 
they want. Government should put in place programmes that will reduce corruption 
and poverty among people, particularly in the northern zone…The military approach 
is not good because they kill innocent people in the course of fighting against Boko 
Haram. Even for over seven years of our military approach we have not won the fight, 
so let’s try the dialogue approach going on with President Muhammadu Buhari. May 
God give him good health to continue what he started. I think there is hope in this 
dialogue direction.” 
A political office holder disclosed the following: 
“The Military has failed [due] to corruption so let us try another approach which is 
currently going on with some good results. As we can see, no news of Boko Haram 
attacks throughout the process of negotiation. This means that if both parties could 
reach consensus, the crisis would end. Peaceful negotiation is making good progress, 
my brother, except that we don’t want to be sincere. It is not a sin if we try any 
approach…the most important thing is for us to solve the problem.” 
A university postgraduate student contributed to the discussion in this way: 
“Yes! Solution could come through peaceful negotiation if it were done through the 
right channels because that is what the “Bring Back our Girls” groups are talking 
about. Moreover, the government should negotiate with the real Boko Haram and meet 
their requests so that the killings can stop. The initial negotiation attempt failed due 
to government’s injustice and corruption by those who spearheaded the negotiations. 
I even heard that government was negotiating with fake Boko Haram then.  Now that 
an international organization is involved, we can see that the trend is making good 
progress. I think partnering with international organizations is a good idea since we 
have helped some in the past.” 
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The findings based on a comparative data analysis and interpretation process suggest that 
the Nigerian government should continue with the on-going negotiations with the sect until 
a final positive outcome has been reached. It ascribes the failure of the first round of 
negotiations with the sect to political corruption, injustice, difficulties experienced in 
identifying credible leaders of the group, as well as failure of the government to involve the 
intervention of international organizations as a go-between. On the basis of these findings, 
it is strongly argued that the Nigerian government should continue to engage authentic Boko 
Haram members in political negotiations and dialogue so as to unearth the exact causes of 
their rebellion and suggest what can be done to bring the insurgency to a close in Nigeria. 
The release of more than a hundred of the Chibok girls does not only represent a modest 
achievement for those campaigning for their release, but also shows that negotiations with 
moderate elements within Boko Haram offers one option, among several, in engaging with 
the group and similar extremist organizations in the world (Olofinbiyi, 2017). The release 
of the girls arguably marks a starting point for exploring forms of peaceful engagement with 
such groups. 
To accomplish this goal, the Nigerian administration must not portray the success of the 
negotiations as a political triumph to boost its power and legitimacy, nor should it 
manipulate the negotiations over the release of the Chibok girls remaining in captivity as a 
form of political propaganda. The fight to free the remaining Chibok girls and rid the country 
of Boko Haram extremists must continue until these aims are fully achieved, and the 
painstaking processes of reconstruction, reconciliation, and peace are able to take root in the 
traumatized region. 
6.4.2 A community policing approach 
What is commonly understood to be community policing is a philosophy that could be traced 
back to the introduction of community constables known as ‘Bobbies’ by Sir Robert Peel in 
the newly created London Metropolitan Police District during the 19th century (Patterson, 
2007; Brogden & Nijhar, 2005). For a clear understanding of the concept among global 
societies, Sir Robert Peel rationalized that “the police are the public and the public are the 
police”. This statement became the key principle of community policing, implying that the 
police should not be separated from, but should rather join in partnerships with the 
community for more effective crime control and prevention (Fridell, 2004). Community 
policing as a concept was first inaugurated in the US in the 1960s to strengthen police-
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community contact on crime reduction, control and prevention and it became a dominant 
policing strategy in this country, focusing on  problem-oriented policing and problem-
solving through community engagement.  
The concept of community policing is a paradigm shift in policing. It began many decades 
ago in the United Kingdom and the United States, but it was not introduced in Nigeria until 
2004. It was introduced into the Nigerian Police Force as a paradigm shift in combating 
crime. This became necessary as a result of the adverse relationship that existed between the 
police and the public in relation to crime control, prevention and reduction. However, the 
findings of this study suggest that this approach has not been very effective in Nigeria, 
because existing relationships between the public and Nigerian police officers are usually 
negative; this is primarily due to the attitude of the police officers in public. The 
effectiveness of the Nigeria Police Force has also not been accurately measured due to a lack 
of qualitative information to aid investigative studies on the police force. This lack of data 
has, in turn, greatly affected the efficiency of the Nigerian police as well as other security 
agents in execution of their civic and crime investigation, prevention and control duties. 
Moreover, the public are not favourably and psychologically disposed to giving out vital 
information, not only to the police but also to any security operatives that come their way. 
Cordner (1999) also argues that information collected from the community police always 
represents qualitative information to evaluate police effectiveness and efficiency and to 
assess their overall performance on a wide range of key indicators 
Because this study emphasizes the need for the Nigerian government to respond to a new 
paradigm shift in resolving the problem of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria, community 
policing is premised as a nostrum for resolving the on-going threat of Boko Haram 
insurgency and for preventing the future occurrence of a similar crisis. When the participants 
were probed on their opinions regarding community policing as an antidote to resolving the 
on-going Boko Haram crisis, their responses were generally favourable.  
An Abuja Metro Police Community Relation Committee member responded as follows: 
“The Nigerian government still has a long way to go to resolve this problem and its 
future occurrence because presently, there is no security in Nigeria. The Nigerian 
government should procure modern technological devices that can track and identify 
culprits and Boko Haram hideouts. We, the community police, have a secret remedy 
to Boko Haram terrorism, but before this can work, we must have a good working 
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relationship with the security operatives deployed to each terrorism operation. The 
military force has weapons, but they don’t have the information weapon all because 
they ignore the local communities within which they fight Boko Haram. We have some 
hidden information that I cannot share with you, but note that sometimes the local 
communities prefer to give information to Boko Haram rather than the military. This 
is why they constantly lose the battle against the sect. Security officials should carry 
the community along in the fight in order to win.”   
He also offered the following insights when probed for more information: 
“The problem is that societies underrate our capacity and efficiency, but I must tell 
you, a community police approach will make a better option in resolving the Boko 
Haram crisis than the military and peaceful negotiation approach. This is because we 
believe in a ‘prevention is better than cure approach’. So let us address terrorism 
issues before it even invades our societies. But for the present Boko Haram crisis, our 
collaboration with the government will go a long way if they try us. I will also advise 
government to make unbiased provisions for the needs of all eligible citizens. This will 
form part of our recommended preventive measures to avoid the future occurrence of 
other forms of terrorism.” 
On the question of community policing support as a source of help, a Christian leader had 
this to say: 
“But this idea of community policing can work! But the security operatives must be 
ready to work with the community police so that they can get good information from 
the local community about Boko Haram. One major problem is that our society does 
not really know how effective these people can be in terms of information gathering 
that will help control crimes.” 
Buttressing the above insights, an officer in the Nigerian Prison stated:  
“Community policing may be a good idea, but the problem is that they are not effective 
in Nigeria now. But I heard in those places where they are effective, they solve more 
problems than the police. We may also consider solution from that perspective.” 
An analysis of the above data suggests that community engagement will be indispensable in 
the fight against Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. Clearly, a solution can come from 
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community policing if governments (national and local) could put in place programmes that 
will strengthen community police forums and eradicate the trend whereby citizens condemn 
them as part of the security arm of the country. This particular finding submits that all the 
previous military attempts that the government has made could have resolved the crisis if 
the security operatives deployed to fight Boko Haram had worked with the local 
communities within which Boko Harm established their camp. Such as working relationship 
can only see the light of the day through community policing initiatives. Establishing a good 
working relationship with the community will restore people’s trust in the police and other 
security agents, and the public will in turn give them viable information about the hide-outs 
of the sect, their sponsors, and their connections within the larger society. This idea shows 
high similarity with that of Flynn (2004) and (Farrell (1988), who also argue that police 
partnerships through community policing initiatives need to be based on trust so as to 
develop information exchange. It is only then when the community will provide the police 
with information about problematic conditions and locations, crime concerns, active 
criminals, and stolen property. In turn, the police will provide the community with 
information pertaining to community fears, problems, tactical information and advice about 
preventing and reducing crime. A comparative understanding of the findings of this study 
and those of Flynn and Farrell suggests that partnerships between Nigerian security 
operatives and a community police that are based on adequate information exchange will 
help resolve the problem of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. 
The study also confirmed that the sect thrives on information from various communities. 
Community policing may therefore be a magic counteractive formula to facilitate a good 
working relationship between security operatives and the community who will then supply 
them with adequate information that may guide them in manipulating strategies against the 
sect. The study blends with Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux’s (1990) understanding of 
community policing as a powerful information network to assist the police system in its 
problem-solving agenda. According to Cordner (2007b), the utilization of problem-solving 
techniques has highlighted the requirement for community policing as a good source of 
information to aid in the identification and analysis of problems faced by the community, 
including the use of Geographical Information Systems (GIS).  
The study stresses that whether the government wants to continue with the negotiation 
process or not, one thing that has been clarified by the narratives of the participants is that 
community policing should be employed as a powerful information weapon for the police 
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and the Nigerian armed forces who are at the forefront of this war. If this is not done, it may 
always remain difficult to defeat the Boko Haram force, no matter how strongly the 
government reinforces the armed forces with new sophisticated weapons. And as long as 
Boko Haram maintains its relationship with local communities and their secret sponsors both 
at home and abroad, they will always have access to information that will advantage their 
strategies to defeat their opponents.   
A strident question that raised a red flag in this inquiry into Boko Haram insurgency was: 
How do Boko Haram insurgents get to know about an ambush or invasion plans by military 
troops each time they are about to attack? Clearly, they have a powerful information 
network that includes local population and informants. If Nigeria wishes to cripple their 
strength and break their connectivity with the larger community, there is a need to fish out 
their sponsors in the various communities both at home and abroad. The government needs 
to block their sources of income that are used to sponsor the sect and close all channels 
through which Boko Haram receives information, food clothes, vehicles and the weapons 
they are using to terrorize Nigerian communities. If such a strategy is put into place, it is 
believed that Boko Haram’s sponsors may be exposed and that their force will be reduced 
to nothing. The next option that might characterize their fate is that they will either surrender 
or abscond; but one thing that is certain is that the country will know peace again. Achieving 
this goal will require the government to strengthen community police forums around all 
Boko Haram’s traumatized zones and to establish a close connection between Boko Haram’s 
local supporters and security agents deployed in the zones. 
When the participants were asked about their views on community policing as a remedy for 
Boko Haram insurgency, their responses were very positive. The following excerpts 
demonstrate their views.  
A community police member stated: 
“Community support is one factor that has made Boko Haram difficult to resolve in 
Nigeria. The possible solution could come from community policing. The reasons 
are: We are the community. We are the closest to government, politicians and the 
public − this is why we can help foster good relationships between the police, other 
security operatives and the community. We are the closest to the police and other 
security agencies − this is why we can help the police enforce the laws in society and 
help the army with information that will lead them to success by providing good 
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authentic information. We assist generally in all areas that will enhance security 
within the society. We are well educated and intelligent − this is why we can help 
educate the public at large on community policing and to see the Nigerian police 
and other security agents as friends.” 
He also stated the following upon being requested to expand: 
“We have a first-class information system because we walk with other local 
securities like vigilantes of the neighbouring states. We have double power to execute 
our jobs; i.e., we combine traditional power with the little government authority 
given to us to help fight crime. We know who is who in society. We have all the 
information to sources of crimes and societal irregularities and we know those who 
are mostly involved in crimes in this city. We hold community forum annual meetings 
where we have discussed Boko Haram issues. Therefore, we have also found out who 
Boko Haram’s sponsors are in Nigeria. We know them and some of them know that 
we know them. They usually give out huge [amount of] money the moment they 
realize you know about them − this is why it is difficult to win the Boko Haram war”.  
Interviewer: Sir, have you ever collected money from them or have they given your 
association any money?  
Respondent: “I don’t know about that, but that is what is happening currently. We 
are well educated and we exhibit intelligence gathering, collective actions, 
community participation in the execution and investigation of crime issues.” 
A religious leader commented as follows: 
“Like I said earlier, the military approach can be revisited if the present approach 
[peaceful negotiations] fails again, but peaceful and proper dialogue with the right 
people may be a permanent solution. Well, if we are going to revisit the military 
approach, I would suggest we bring on board the community police idea. These 
people may help the fighting squads with relevant information from the local 
communities, because the public does not like giving information to the security 
people. You know, these people have some people who give them information also. 
With adequate information, provision of modern weapons and partnership with the 




A business woman had this to say: 
“Yes! Brilliant of you to mention community police. They saved my husband three 
years ago when he was kidnapped by a group of hoodlums. My husband was held 
hostage by these criminals for a good two weeks, demanding a ransom of 10 million 
to release him. While I told them that I was already looking for the money, I reported 
it to the police, but they did not have a clue of their hide- out. Someone now advised 
me to report to the community police assuring me that they would know where my 
husband was kept. To my surprise, within three days they had fished out information 
as to where to see my husband was. The community police then gave the information 
to the police and both of them now went there and found those hoodlums and caught 
them, with my husband released to me. As I said, one approach may not be enough 
again to resolve the Boko Haram insurgency, so let us try the community police input 
and make sure that they work with the military, helping them with information as to 
the hideout and connectivity of the Boko Haram to our community. We should stop 
looking down on the effectiveness of these people in crime control because they know 
every corner and likely the hoodlums of their community and their information 
network cannot be underrated…this may help.” 
A postgraduate student also expressed his opinion on the viability of community policing to 
resolve the Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria: 
“If negotiations fail, the idea of the community police may be tested. It is like we 
have one forum in Maitama but the government does not really recognize them as a 
serious security forum that can help in crime control. I must tell you, these people 
are the closest to the community. They know who is who and they are local and 
traditional in their own ways of investigation. Because they are there in the 
community, they understand the local environments [better] than anybody. In fact, 
they would be the best for information gathering regarding Boko Haram hideouts. 
Up till now, our military troops do not know where they hide those abducted 
hostages. And I am sure some of the local villagers may know where we can find 
them. But because the police relationship with community people is poor, this 
information is not coming out. And until we can have adequate information about 
these people, channel through which food, finance, clothes and weapons get to them 
as well as their sponsors who also live within us, they will keep winning the war.” 
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After some thought, he continued:  
“So this is where we may need the involvement of community police to do homework 
investigation with the Boko Haram local communities. Later they can now give the 
military the information, which will help them in the fight. Remember that Boko Harm 
lives on information from people and sponsors in community. Because there is no good 
relationship between the security operatives and the local communities. Community 
people fear them because of the way they terrorize them and take them as Boko Haram 
suspects.” 
A political office holder offered this contribution: 
“They are in my constituency…I know them very well. For instance, there was a time 
they wanted to give vital information to the security agents about this Boko Haram 
problem, but they shunned and ignored them. Our government, law enforcement 
agents, and even members of society look down upon these people as inexperienced, 
uneducated, security ignorant and a category of people that has nothing to offer the 
public in terms of crime control and prevention. We always think that solutions to all 
problems come from state terrorism. This is where we missed it on several occasions.” 
The comparative data analysis and interpretation of the participants’ viewpoints in this 
instance suggest that the effectiveness of community policing in resolving the Boko Haram 
crisis could be adopted as a good litmus test, perhaps if the negotiations fail. The findings 
also point to the government and civil society as obstacles to achieving this goal, because 
they are not helping the matter as they look down on these people, calling them all sorts of 
names such as ‘riff-raff’, ‘charlatans’, ‘unqualified’, ‘ineffective’, and ‘uneducated’. They 
are also seen as groups that cannot offer anything that will help in solving crime issues. The 
data strongly suggest that the government, society and official security forces should change 
their perception towards community policing and they should embrace them for the role they 
can play in public security and safety. It will only be then that they will be able to showcase 
their value and effectiveness towards resolving the Boko Haram problem in Nigeria.  
The study argues that, without revealing the secret sponsors of Boko Haram who reside 
within the three geo-political zones of the north, it might be difficult to resolve the 
insurgency problem. Because information is vital to Boko Haram’s ability to maintain its 
position among local communities, there is an urgent need for official agencies to use every 
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available information system against Boko Haram and to block all channels and sources 
through which information, food, clothing, finances, weapons and other materials reach 
them. Then, even without carrying arms and ammunition against them or ferreting out their 
sponsors both within the local communities and abroad, the sect will die a natural death. The 
study thus submits that, with an adequate information network, the provision of more 
sophisticated weapons, digitalized electronic detectors and, above all, partnerships with the 
community police, the state may stand a good chance of winning the armed war against 
Boko Haram terrorism. However, it is also strongly suggested that the armed war be replaced 
with peaceful negotiations and diplomatic interventions.  
Whether military engagements or peaceful negotiations can solve the problem or not, 
whether it is a religious, economic or political crisis, the study emphasizes the need for the 
government to always do everything in its power to prevent the continuation of the crimes 
committed by groups such as Boko Haram. The study firmly established that the 
effectiveness of community policing in crime control is anchored in a “prevention is better 
than cure” approach which can only be facilitated by a powerful information network. 
Therefore this approach, if exercised, may work much better and more effective than the 
recent military and on-going negotiation approaches currently embarked upon. Until civil 
society and government can appreciate the value and effectiveness of community policing 
across all Nigerian societies, communities will continually remain vulnerable to all sorts of 
crime and violent insurgencies. 
Most importantly, government should look into this approach and engage intelligence 
officers both in the army and the police to work hand in hand with the community police in 
order to unearth the primary Boko Haram instigators and their sponsors both at home and 
abroad. This finding aligns with Reno et al. (1998), who argue that the implementation of 
community policing in crime control will be more successful if commanders and sergeants 
had a better understanding of community policing and are supportive of and committed to 
working collaboratively with them. Furthermore, Skogan (2005; 2002; 1996) argues in 
support of the viewpoint of Reno et al., believing that organizational support, structures and 
crime prevention should be measured in terms of the effectiveness and collaborative efforts 
of community policing rather than just focusing all efforts on the engagement of police 
officers. The latter author argues that we should also stop undermining the efficiency of 
these people in crime reduction and control. The current study affirms community policing 
as the best avenue to easily access and liaise with local communities where Boko Haram 
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activities are rife. These members can work more effectively with locals than security 
operatives and elicit vital information to strike down the notorious terrorist sect. This 
argument is also strongly supported by Mastrofski (2006), who contends that community 
policing is “the only channel to link the police more closely to the community in partnership 
arrangements, joint activities to co-produce services and desired outcomes, giving the 
community a greater say in what the police do, or simply engaging with each other to 
produce a greater sense of police-community compatibility” 
There is evidence that community policing is a good source of information that is needed in 
security partnerships to help other security operatives re-strategize their operations against 
the Boko Haram insurgents in Nigeria. The current study found that some village people 
within the regions traumatized by Boko Haram, whether they may be residing or hiding in 
Chad, Niger, or Cameroon, may know where the insurgents are hiding out, and getting this 
information depends on a good working relationship between the security operatives 
deployed in these regions and their local communities. 
To conclude this section, the study recommends that, even with ongoing negotiations, the 
government should start looking at this solution as plan B in case the negotiations fail. The 
idea of community policing, if formally and officially incorporated into the security system 
of Nigeria, could eventually emerge as the best approach to resolve the Boko Haram scourge 
and prevent the future occurrence of crime, terrorism and other related social vices lurking 
dormant to plaque the peaceful coexistence of all people within Nigeria. 
6.4.3 The pre-emptive approach            
This approach is also closely related to the “prevention is better than cure” approach 
associated with community policing. It combines community engagement, institutional 
ability and legal procedures to respond to the needs that will cater for the prevention of any 
impending signals of crime, terrorism and other related offences. An overall review of all 
the participants’ narratives on the contributions of international organizations to help resolve 
the problem of Boko Haram terrorism suggests that the numerous efforts made by United 
Nations Member States in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attack in the US to prevent terrorist 
acts both within American borders and across its regions should also be inaugurated into the 
Nigerian security system. This should occur either through constitutional reforms or creating 
public awareness. From the standpoint of the United Nations Member States, the study 
uncovered a number of measures that could be implemented by the Nigerian state to enhance 
215 
 
its legal and institutional ability to counter terrorist activities. The steps that could be taken 
in this direction are the following: 
 Criminalize the financing of terrorism across the six geo-political zones of 
Nigeria. 
 Freeze without delay any funds related to persons involved in acts of terrorism 
both at home and abroad. This will have to be done with the assistance of 
international organizations should the funds be lodged in foreign accounts. 
 Deny all forms of financial support for terrorist groups. This can best be 
achieved through government efforts, institutional ability and community 
engagement. 
 Suppress the provision of safe havens, sustenance or support for terrorists. This 
can best be facilitated through community policing and government efforts. 
 Share information with governments, local and national, on any groups that 
practise or planning terrorist acts. This can best be facilitated through 
community policing. 
 Cooperate with other governments in the investigation, detection, arrest, 
extradition and prosecution of those involved in terrorist acts. This can best be 
facilitated through community policing and government efforts. 
 Criminalize active and passive assistance for terrorism in domestic law and bring 
violators to justice. In this situation, people that support terrorism either directly 
or indirectly should have to face the wrath of the law (CTCED, 2015).  
Arguably, the above measures alone cannot effectively end the war of terrorism in Nigeria. 
The question of amelioration of human conditions with respect to unequal hegemonic power 
configuration as expressed in socio-economic, political, ethno-religious and cultural forms 
should be considered as highly essential as an integral part of the United Nation’s measures 
to prevent terrorism in Nigeria. By the same token, the government and democratic leaders 
should make information, basic needs and services available to the citizens so that they can 
understand the adverse consequences of insecurity on the quality of life of fellow citizens as 
well as its long-term effects on sustainable development. This will enable them to design and 
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adopt more appropriate policies and intervention strategies that will enhance the general 
well-being of the populace. More importantly, United Nations, European Union, African 
Union, government and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) should be sensitized 
towards making the special needs and concerns of global citizens a priority. Moreover, socio-
economic and political infrastructure should be available to all the citizens of the country. 
This may safeguard our moral rectitude and ensure individuals’ effective contributions to 
national development. Because the study exposed prevailing corruption as the number one 
public enemy in Nigeria, the government of Nigeria should, as a matter of urgency, put strict 
legal measures in place against individuals caught in the act of corruption so as to prevent 
future occurrence of terrorism and other related offences in Nigeria. Taking such positive 
steps would definitely deter terrorists and all terrorist sponsors from taking undue advantage 








SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
7.1 Summary 
The study encompassed a critical focus on the public perceptions on the emerging socio-
economic context of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. Based on an extensive literature 
review and in-depth interviews, it was able to illuminate a constellation of factors that serve 
as the root cause of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. The study addressed these influential 
factors as a patterned tapestry of the perpetuation of Boko Haram insurgency by examining 
the socio-economic consequences of the insurgency, identifying possible techniques that can 
be adopted to resolve the crisis (with particular  reference to the development of more 
appropriate culturally acceptable conflict resolution strategies), and offering suggestions for 
the eradication of the insurgency in order to bring peace and stability that will give credence 
to the dream of a democratic Nigeria. In order to achieve the aim of this research inquiry, 
secondary data in the form of published literature such as journal articles, newspaper reports, 
textbooks and academic studies were examined, while electronic media as well as oral and 
institutional data were also scrutinized. Data that were collected directly from the field were 
utilized as the primary source of information that was relevant to the study of Boko Haram 
terrorism in Nigeria. By reviewing and comparing the data as well as the theories and ideas 
put forward by various scholars and theorists in the field of criminology, issues pertaining 
to research methodology, conflict studies, terrorism and counter-terrorism were elucidated 
and utilised as a springboard for the study. A theoretical integration of the social exchange, 
the social conflict and the rational choice theories was advanced to explain each of the 
research questions that gave impetus to the study. Primary data collection involved extensive 
fieldwork engagement which involved qualitative data collection by means of in-depth 
interviews to interrogate the phenomenon of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria through the 
lens of key informant perspectives.  The data that had been collected were analyzed with 
consistent reference to the specific objectives of the research endeavour, using the 
transcriptions of the data followed by content analysis. The fieldwork exercise successfully 
elicited rich and saturated qualitative data by means of in-depth interviews using semi-
structured interviews guided by lead questions. The participants were selected using the 
purposive sampling technique. 
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The study report was structured into six chronological and related chapters.  In brief:  
 Chapter One introduced the research topic and provided the background of the 
research, the statement of the problem, and the significance of the study. This 
chapter highlighted the aim, scope, objectives, and research questions. A 
clarification of key concepts was also provided.  
 Chapter Two presented an in-depth review of a wide range of related literature.  
 Chapter Three illuminated the theoretical framework and theoretical models that 
underpinned the study with the aim of providing a blueprint upon which Boko 
Haram terrorism could be better explained and understood.  
 Chapter Four focused on a description of the methodological strategies that were 
employed in the execution of the study. The ethical considerations that guided 
the study and the strengths and limitations that impacted the study, and how 
these latter challenges had been overcome, were also put under a discursive lens.  
 Chapter Five focused on the analysis, interpretation and presentation of the data. 
The findings were discussed with reference to emergent themes for comparison 
and scholarly reflection.  
 Chapter Six also discussed part of the study findings with reference to emergent 
themes for comparison and scholarly reflection.  
 Chapter Seven (the current chapter) concludes this thesis. A summary of the 
main findings is presented, conclusions are drawn, policy recommendations are 
offered and suggestions for future studies are made. 
In summarizing the salient findings of this study, the ‘whiskey and hotel’ principle of 
investigation was applied. This translates as the 5xW+H questions principle, where the 
answers to the research questions (i.e., the who, what, when, where, why and how) of the 
study became central to information-gathering in order to shed light on the root causes of 
Boko Haram terrorism, the patterns that maintain this phenomenon, the socio-economic 
consequences of this phenomenon, and solutions for improvement. The 5xW+H principle 
facilitated a capturing of data to address all the research questions of the study. In summary, 
the questions were arranged as follows. 
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W1: Who are the Boko Haram terrorists? 
W2: When did they emerge in Nigeria? 
W3: Where are they located in Nigeria? 
W4:  What are the causes and consequences of the crisis in Nigeria? 
W5:  Why is the insurgency still surviving in Nigeria despite all attempts to stamp it out? 
H   : How can the problem be resolved in Nigeria? 
The above guiding questions were advanced to facilitate a summary of the research findings 
according to each objective of the study. Therefore, the main findings of the research are 
summarized on the basis of the structure and objectives of the study.  
7.1.1 The ‘who’, ‘when’ and ‘where’ of Boko Haram terrorism 
This section briefly addresses the questions of who the Boko Haram terrorists are, when they 
emerged in Nigeria, and where they are located in this country.  
Boko Haram is an Islamist jihadist terrorist sect whose activities are endemic to the northern 
geo-political zone of Nigeria, but the sect is predominantly domiciled in the six north-eastern 
parts of the region. The guerrilla force is known to have established its notorious colony 
within the Nigerian system as far back as 2009, from whence it emerged more powerfully 
in 2010. In light of its nefarious activities in Nigeria, the group has been described as the 
most dangerous insurgent group that has ever featured in Nigeria because it poses a great 
threat to national security by destructively attacking organizations, both local and 
international, and laying a veritable foundation for gradually undermining the Nigerian state. 
Taking into account the widespread controversies underpinning Boko Haram’s credo, the 
study found that the ideology of the sect is not focused on turning the Nigerian state into an 
Islamic country as many researchers have submitted (Pham, 2011; Cook, 2011; Adesoji, 
2011; Idahosa, 2015; Pham, 2016; Thurston, 2016), but that its insurgency efforts 
predominantly attempt to eradicate a Western-oriented state that is perceived as undermining 
the rightful place of all Nigerians in society. Their agitating ideology is that Western secular 
education should be forbidden as it is accountable for the prevailing corruption of political 
leaders who routinely inflict hardships on civil society. The findings strongly suggest that 
the Boko Haram terrorists believe that the implementation of Sharia laws in lieu of 
constitutional laws should function better to provide solutions to the attendant crises of 
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corruption, poverty, youth unemployment, human rights violations, moral decadence, 
structural inequality, material deprivation and the socio-economic needs of people within 
the Nigerian system (see Danjibo, 2009). 
7.1.2 Addressing the ‘what’ question pertaining to Boko Haram 
The study addressed questions that endeavoured to unearth the root cause of Boko Haram 
terrorism in Nigeria, and it was found that the root cause of Boko Haram terrorism is not 
only religiously inclined but also subject to the non-fulfilment of people’s socio-economic 
goals emanating from the violation of their fundamental human rights, corruption, poverty, 
and poor and unconstitutional democratic practices in the northern part of the Nigerian state. 
The findings thus illuminate by adding that the phenomenon of Boko Haram terrorism is a 
response to socio-economic crises, political and moral decadence, and dehumanization that 
pervaded in the north of the country after years of mismanagement and corruption by northern 
so-called democratic leaders. The research findings, thus, do not debunk the widespread 
assumption that the root cause of Boko Haram terrorism is founded on Islamic injunctions. 
Rather, the study positions the Islamic religion as a platform from which Islamist terrorists 
vent their anger and grievances against what they perceive as a corrupt, westernized system 
that denies the Nigerian society its rightful place.  
The study also concludes that socio-economic factors vis-à-vis religious injunctions are the  
key elements in the emergence of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. Factors such as 
poverty, youth unemployment, illiteracy, human rights violations, a false religious doctrine, 
economic deprivation, state-actor terrorism, bad governance occasioned by leadership 
deficits and failure, non-fulfilment of the social contract as regards the provision of basic 
amenities to the citizenry by the political state, severe corruption, greed, political deceit and 
injustice are highlighted as the offshoot of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. 
7.1.3 Why is Boko Haram maintained in Nigeria? 
The question was asked why Boko Haram seemed to grow from strength to strength in 
Nigeria despite all attempts to stamp it out. The answer illuminated various influential 
factors that fuel the pattern of their operations and the maintenance of the crisis in Nigeria. 
The findings identified a high incidence of pervasive elite and political corruption within the 
Nigerian democratic system as the leading factor that fans the flame of Boko Haram 
insurgency in Nigeria. Community support for and affiliations to international organizations 
were reported as further leading factors that keep the ship of Boko Haram terrorism afloat 
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in Nigeria. The study found evidence to suggest that a powerful information network is the 
lifeline of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. The study also successfully linked the survival 
potential of Boko Harm terrorism to the soft, weak and porous administration of the former 
president, Goodluck Jonathan, whose governance was open to pathological corruption and 
irrational embezzlement of public funds. He headed a regime that committed acts of 
corruption that were much more rife and rigorous than the actions of any democratic 
government that has ever ruled in Nigeria. The sustainability potential of the sect was also 
attributed to the unabated growth of Boko Haram’s war force through the frequent 
recruitment of able-bodied and willing youths in northern Nigeria. Evidence-based reports 
that were uncovered by this study also attribute the disturbing trend of Boko Haram terrorism 
to the youth’s rational behaviour that erupts due to poor democratic practices, 
dehumanization, poverty and unemployment, socio-economic crises, frustration, aggression, 
disenfranchisement, political dissatisfaction, and  human rights violations, which all seem to 
have prompted many youths to join the terrorist group, thereby increasing the magnitude of 
the Boko Haram force that fights in large numbers against the state’s security forces, recording 
repeated  triumphs against them.  
The study also identified Boko Haram members as ‘freedom fighters’ whose rationale for 
erupting into rebellion against an existing authority is, according to the theoretical 
underpinning of this study, fundamentally rational. Consequently, the study submits that it 
may be difficult and irrational for the sect to surrender at this point because their motives for 
the revolt have not been addressed, and this may account for the reason why the insurgency 
continues unabated in Nigeria. 
7.1.4 What is the socio-economic impact of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria? 
Pertaining to this question, Boko Haram terrorism may be described as an anathema to 
sustainable development in Nigeria, causing the protracted stalemate of recent times. Boko 
Haram was found to be a significant factor in the gradual decline of the socio-economic 
conditions of the country. On the one hand it has apparently discouraged both local and 
foreign investments, thereby eroding the socio-economic development of the Nigerian state, 
and on the other hand the insurgency has dramatically reduced the quality of life and 
standards of living of the populace by exacerbating conditions of poverty, wretchedness, 
unemployment, and health risks across the nation. Moreover, it has caused education 
disruptions across different levels of academic pursuits; created religious misconceptions 
and loss of trust among people; promoted the phenomena of kidnapping, unwanted 
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pregnancies and teenage motherhood; generated day-to-day panic; caused the loss of 
property and the deaths of thousands of people and incidents of internally displaced persons; 
destroyed human and social capital; lowered agricultural productivity in affected areas; 
produced political instability by truncating the relationship between citizens and the political 
state; and undermined democracy and the rule of law as well as the capacity of the country 
to promote growth and development. The findings thus revealed the adverse effects of Boko 
Haram terrorism that have hampered the socio-economic development of the Nigerian state 
by truncating all prominent sectors of the economy that could have influenced the positive 
growth and development of the nation. The study suggests that the adverse socio-economic 
conditions of the country are the consequences of Boko Haram terrorism as a punishment 
reward for the government and the political state for their breach of the social contract with 
respect to the provision of basic amenities to all eligible citizens. 
7.1.5 How can the Boko Haram crisis be averted and eradicated? 
Three basic approaches are suggested for the resolution of the Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria.  
 Peaceful negotiations should be used as a new paradigm shift in addressing the 
Boko Haram crisis.  
 Community policing should be employed as a secret but concerted remedy to 
resolve the on-going issue of Boko Haram insurgency and to prevent the 
sustainability of the crisis in the near future.  
 Pre-emptive legal measures should be taken as the third approach. This principle 
is premised on the ‘prevention is better than cure’ approach which is based on 
the proposed United Nations counter-terrorism measures. This approach will 
require the collaborative efforts of the community, the government and 
institutions for efficient implementation. 
Generally speaking, the study submits that poor democratic practices in Nigeria have 
encouraged a wide variety of terrorist activities in recent times. Since the Nigerian state’s 
conversion from a military to a democratic state in May 1999, political hoodlums, who 
present themselves as eminent personalities, have abused the democratic dispensation by 
significantly and ruthlessly undermining the country’s internal security environment and 
employing young men as foot soldiers to fulfil a host of their selfish goals (Onuoha, 2014). 
On the whole, the study therefore recommends that the Nigerian state should respond, as a 
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matter of urgency, to a new paradigm in counter-terrorism strategies by shifting from its 
adopted violent military approach to adopting more appropriate culturally acceptable 
conflict resolution strategies in order to win the war against Boko Haram terrorism. This can 
best be accomplished through intelligence gathering, an emancipatory struggle, 
collaborative efforts, peaceful negotiations, and partnerships with local communities 
through a strong community policing system. 
7.2 Conclusion 
It is envisaged that the findings of this study as a scholarly inquiry may be used as a platform 
to reach a broad range of role players in contemporary society who may embrace the thesis 
that terrorism, which is best viewed as the most notorious societal monster and whose 
presence will always remain inimical to the progress of any nation, is entrenched in global 
society. Based on the findings of this study, it is posited that terrorism will constantly move 
forward to survive and, indeed, to succeed across generations if extreme appropriate 
measures are not taken to change its course and to eradicate this scourge. Terrorism is 
perceived as a perennial and ceaseless struggle that has long characterized conflict in human 
society. It was in this context that the research focused on Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria 
in its endeavour to elicit suggestions for a new approach to replace the ineffectual armed 
struggle strategy that has been adopted in Nigeria to address and mitigate the sustainability 
of the Boko Haram insurgency in its affected societies. A review of the literature revealed 
that Boko Haram terrorism has existed for over seven years and owes its survival to its ability 
to adapt and adjust to multi-national challenges and countermeasures, as well as its capacity 
to continue to identify and exploit its opponent’s vulnerabilities. Moreover, an unjust 
‘democratic’ political dispensation in Nigeria has created sympathisers for the Boko Haram 
cause among local communities who serve as its ears and eyes in many instances. To achieve 
any successes against Boko Haram terrorism, the findings suggest that efforts must be as 
tireless, innovative, and dynamic as those of terrorism itself (also see Hoffman, 2002). This 
suggests that the adopted armed struggle strategy by security forces in Nigeria is outdated 
and will remain ineffective, regardless of the government’s declarations to the contrary. 
This study thus engaged in an extensive and in-depth research inquiry to unravel the 
intricacies surrounding the phenomenon of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. It dwelled on 
theoretical reflections of the social exchange, social conflict and rational choice theories to 
bring to the fore a better understanding of the socio-economic variables that produce, 
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reproduce and sustain the crisis in Nigeria. The outcome of the research confirms Boko 
Haram terrorism as a political crisis that stems from the failure of the Nigerian state to make 
socio-economic facilities available to all eligible and law-abiding citizens of the northern 
states – an effect that is now keenly felt across a wide range of the Nigerian society, with an 
extension to neighbouring states’ communities as well. The study found sufficient evidence 
to argue that religious extremism and the evolution of the Boko Haram sect into terrorism 
can be associated with the failure of the government to engage in a uniform and fair 
distribution of socio-economic resources to the north-eastern citizens of the country. The 
findings furthermore attribute Boko Haram’s infamous ‘successes’ over seven years of 
irrepressible and nefarious activities in Nigeria to a high incidence of pervasive elite and 
political corruption; community support; affiliations to international organizations; a 
powerful information network; a security deficiency in the country; the soft, weak and 
porous administration of an erstwhile president; poor democratic practices; and frequent 
recruitment of able-bodied and willing youths in northern Nigeria. The study suggests, at 
this juncture, that the only way to impede the progress of and the sustainability patterns of 
the insurgency group is to address the causal efficacy of each of the foregoing trigger factors 
that have for a long time fanned the flame of terrorist insurgency in Nigeria.  
It was found that numerous efforts had been made and were being made at the time of the 
study to alleviate the various problems associated with Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. 
However, these efforts have been largely ineffective in curbing terrorism in Nigeria; thus 
the suggestions made by this study to eradicate the problem will certainly leave the door 
wide open for further contributions by societies, governments, and non-governmental and 
international organizations to the discourse so that the effects of all efforts can be maximized 
in resolving the affliction of the communities that are affected by terrorism in Nigeria.  In 
this context, the essential contribution of the study to the terrorism discourse in Nigeria is 
that the conception of a religious Islamic fervour as the root cause of Boko Haram terrorism 
has not been contested, and that a paradigm shift in the counter-terrorism strategies to 
resolve the Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria is recommended.  
The study projects that, as long as the pervasive socio-economic problems caused by unequal 
hegemonic power exchange as expressed in socio-political, ethno-religious and cultural 
forms persist in the Nigerian society, the insurgency by terrorists will recur and will be 
sustained as an inevitable enterprise and a social reaction to the unsatisfactory state of affairs 
in Nigeria. On the whole, whether military or peaceful negotiations resolve the problem or 
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not, and whether it is a religious, economic or political crisis, the study emphasizes the need 
for governments at various levels to put in place more effective life-changing programmes 
that will mitigate socio-economic hardships and prioritize satisfactory conditions of living 
for all law-abiding citizens. This will hopefully prevent the sustained perpetration of 
violence, terrorism and other crime-related social vices that may persist in plaguing the 
peace of the Nigerian state. 
7.3 Recommendations 
Following a wide array of calamities inflicted on Nigeria by the Boko Haram terrorist group 
and the failure of all attempts to resolve the problem and find lasting solutions, it has become 
pressing to design and subsequently implement effective, pragmatic and curative policy 
recommendations as well as prevention and intervention programmes that will resolve the 
problem and prevent the future occurrence of similar phenomena in Nigeria. On the basis of 
the findings of this study, the following recommendations are offered. 
7.3.1 Provisions to address socio-economic needs  
Because the study has identified socio-economic problems as a primary cause of Boko 
Haram terrorism in Nigeria, governments at both national and local levels should ensure that 
socio-economic resources are uniformly distributed to the wider society. In this regard, the 
government of Nigeria is mandated to provide instrumentality towards the sustenance and 
amelioration of the human condition. This should chiefly occur through the provision of 
basic goods and services that will fulfil the needs of the citizens such as job opportunities, 
political recognition, formal education, housing, nutrition, health care facilities, clothing, an 
effective public transport system, internet facilities, communication and other resources 
needed to improve citizens’ standard of living and quality of life. By the same token, local 
governments and democratic leaders should make information and basic services available to 
the citizens so that they can understand the adverse consequences of state of insecurity on 
their quality of life and on sustainable development. This will enable policy makers to design 
and adopt more appropriate policies and intervention strategies that will enhance the general 
well-being of the populace.  
More importantly, government and NGOs should be sensitized towards making the special 
needs and concerns of common citizens a priority, as well as making socio-economic and 
political infrastructures available in all regions. This may safeguard moral rectitude and 
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ensure effective individual and group contributions to national development. Because the 
study exposed prevailing corruption as the number one public enemy in Nigeria, there is a 
need for the government of Nigeria to establish strict legal measures at all levels against 
individuals who are caught in the act of corruption, with particular reference to the 
embezzlement of public funds to sponsor terrorism. This will help in preventing the 
sustainability of terrorism and other related offences in Nigeria. Also, due to pervasive 
corruption that seems to be embedded within the government system and which hinders the 
efficiency of the armed forces, the government should start looking at solutions from socio-
economic and political angles rather than maintaining a military approach in its efforts to 
eradicate terrorism. This recommendation is premised on the fact the cause of the crisis was 
shown to have had its origin in socio-economic and political issues rather than in a particular 
religious ideology. 
By taking such positive steps, terrorists and all terrorist sponsors will be dissuaded from 
taking undue advantage of human conditions to lure and recruit law-abiding citizens into 
their web of terrorism.   
7.3.2 Re-orientation of political values 
There should be a re-orientation of political values in among members of the Nigerian 
government and potential leaders. The ruling elite must re-orientate their mindset to 
accommodate political and ideological values to serve the people selflessly and 
magnanimously in accordance with the interests of the populace. There is an urgent need to 
change the perceptions of political office holders towards democratic dispensations, making 
them believe that the interests of civil society are paramount and should be taken into 
consideration in decision-making. They should always remember that democracy implies a 
government of the people by the people and for the people. In this regard, they should be 
made to realize that they occupy that political position by election and not by selection. 
Therefore, it is mandatory that they give back to their respective societies who elected them. 
In the broader context, and based on lessons learnt in this study with reference to terrorist 
insurgency in neighbouring countries, politicians across the African continent should stop 
making politics a do-or-die affair or recruiting able-bodied youths as foot soldiers for 
political violence and radicalization. There is a need for people to stop being desperate for 
political positions with the ultimate intention of misappropriating public funds to the 
detriment of the poor masses. The fact that this study identified an African democratic 
government as a breeding ground for predisposing the youth towards terrorism demonstrates 
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that there is an urgent need for African leaders, particularly in Nigeria, to adjust this aspect 
of their political culture that tends towards corruption, youth brainwashing, hooliganism, 
oppression, and the dehumanization of the poor masses rather than serving their people 
through transparency and accountability.  
7.3.3 Accountability and transparency among government officials and political 
office holders 
Transparency and accountability among political office holders is a good recipe for the 
reduction and prevention of corruption, oppression, radicalization, misappropriation of 
public funds, and societal conflict that torment civil society. The principle of joining 
accountability and transparency should guide the activities of state functionaries, thereby 
making them answerable to the public and accepting accountability for their actions 
according to moral and ethical standards. This is what is referred to as ‘accountability’.  
Transparency is conceived as the process whereby government officials and political office 
holders are meticulously open and honest in the performance of their duties and functions. 
Conforming to the joint principle of transparency and accountability should help alleviate 
tendencies for widespread corruption among topmost civil servants and political office 
holders. However, government should make arrangement for appropriate incentives and 
motivations for officials as standard institutional practices. When the objectives of 
accountability and transparency of government functionaries are established across different 
government institutions, there is a high possibility of good governance and a uniform 
distribution of socio-economic resources which form the backbone of human existence. 
Hence there should also be a radical reduction in incidences of corruption and institutional 
conflict such as those that pioneered Boko Haram terrorism in north-eastern Nigeria.  
7.3.4 Youth empowerment programmes 
This has to do with the provision of equitable opportunities for young men and women who 
possess competence and abilities to enable them to participate in key aspects of life. Such 
empowerment programmes should incorporate decision-making strategies in political and 
economic aspects of social life, as well as the provision of vocational skills for able-bodied 
unemployed youths. The Federal Government of Nigeria should lift the embargo on 
employment and embark on a recruitment exercise for all categories of able-bodied youths 
who are willing to work, but who have remained unemployed through no fault of their own. 
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If jobs are made available to millions of unemployed youths, it is hoped that there will be a 
radical decrease in their involvement in terrorism and extremism in Nigeria.  
Many effective policies should be put in place to combat violence and terrorism in Nigeria. 
These include economic policies aimed at eliminating poverty and hunger, which are the 
springboard of Boko Haram terrorism in the country according to the findings of this study. 
Other policies should address youth welfare. A rehabilitation and health policy should also 
address the needs of youths that need rehabilitation should they be released from the clutches 
of the likes of the Boko Haram group, and programs and support mechanisms should 
facilitate youths’ full absorption into society as worthy citizens who will contribute to the 
sustainable development of the country in the future.  
7.3.5 Collaborative fight against corruption 
This study exposed corruption as the number one public enemy in Nigeria; its presence is 
pervasive and inimical to the progress of the Nigerian nation and sustains the Boko Haram 
crisis in the country. The government should therefore engage in collaborative efforts to 
fight corruption at all levels of government and to rid the Nigerian system of this menace. 
Strict legal measures should be taken against individuals (regardless of their socio-political 
status) who are caught engaging in any form of corrupt practices, who demonstrate an 
inordinate ambition to misappropriate public funds, and who violate the fundamental human 
rights or moral code of behaviour in favour of a selfish agenda to the detriment of the poor 
masses. Achieving this goal will require state governments to strengthen and reform anti-
corruption agencies such as the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) and 
the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC).  They should be compelled by 
regulations and regular evaluations to function more effectively in accordance with the 
motives upon which they were established. If corruption is totally wiped out of the Nigerian 
socio-political system, the possibility of people stealing public funds and government 
resources to facilitate and finance terrorism will be eradicated. More importantly, the study 
suggests that the important legacy of the Magna Carta of 1215 be enshrined, strengthened 
and enforced to function within the Nigerian social system so that everyone, including all 
leaders irrespective of socio-political status, should be made equal before the law. 
Implementing this time-honoured agreement will then serve as a renewed antidote to 
corruption, treasonable felony and the illicit violation of fundamental human rights across 
Nigeria and, eventually, across a broad range of African societies that may become inspired 
by the Nigerian success story of a true democracy. 
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7.3.6 Enactment of draconian laws against terrorism and terrorist sponsors 
This study found that most terrorist activities are difficult to submerge because of their 
affiliation to some powerful group or groups of people and disreputable organizations in 
society who volunteer to sponsor them from their financial and information reservoirs. It is 
therefore unavoidable that, while a terrorist group has covert connections with its sponsors, 
terrorism will always be sustained and continue to eat deep into the social and economic 
fabric of a society. On this account, this study suggests that some draconian measures be 
enacted against anyone who is found guilty of, or who is even suspected of, sponsoring 
terrorism in Nigeria. Such measures may include the death sentence or life imprisonment; 
criminalizing the financing of terrorism across the six geo-political zones of Nigeria; and 
freezing without delay any funds or resources related to persons or organizations involved 
in acts of terrorism both at home and abroad. This will have to be done with the assistance 
of international organizations as the funds may be lodged in foreign accounts. All forms of 
financial support for terrorist groups should thus be blocked and withheld. This can best be 
achieved through governmental efforts, institutional initiatives, community engagement and 
cooperation, suppressing the provision of safe havens, and blocking any sustenance support 
for terrorists. This can be facilitated through community policing and governmental efforts 
and the sharing of information regarding any terrorist group or groups that plan to engage in 
terrorist acts. Community policing, cooperating among government departments and with 
other governments in the investigation, detection, arrest, extradition and prosecution of those 
involved in such acts are practices that should be honed if terrorism is to be combated 
effectively. This can best be facilitated through community policing and governmental 
efforts. Taking such positive steps will discourage terrorism, terrorist sponsors and those 
who are still planning covertly to finance terrorism in order to achieve a number of selfish 
goals. 
7.3.7 Enforcement of the rule of law 
The government of Nigeria should engage in constitutional reform to ensure that everyone 
is equal before the law, irrespective of one’s official position and social status in society. 
Therefore, anyone caught or suspected of encouraging terrorism should face the wrath of the 
law, regardless of the position he or she may be holding in society. More importantly, the 
supremacy and the enforcement of the rule of law must be adjudged sacrosanct and 
inviolable so as to ensure the sanctity of fundamental human rights and to mitigate against 
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the possibility for fundamental conflicts of interest which may eventually engender the 
eruption of crises such as Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. 
7.3.8 A paradigm shift in counter-terrorism measures: the peaceful negotiation 
approach 
The comprehensive findings of this study suggest undeniably that the Nigerian government 
should engage in a new epistemological shift in its approach to counter-terrorism strategies. 
This implies that it should shift from the militarized, armed conflict approach to more 
culturally acceptable conflict resolution strategies in order to fight Boko Haram terrorism 
effectively. The study argues that more than half a decade of the ‘fire-for-fire’ approach 
towards the terrorist group has not produced any desired results. This pragmatically suggests 
that terrorism cannot always be fought by means of deploying conventional weapons alone. 
On this note, it is suggested that the Nigerian government should, at this crucial point, seek 
remedies of another dimension. One such remedy is the adoption of a diplomatic approach 
involving psychological and ideological strategies such as peaceful negotiations on equal 
terms in order to achieve success in the fight against the insurgents. Empirical evidence to 
showcase the efficacy of this approach is reiterated: “The two-week negotiations between the 
Nigerian government and Boko Haram—brokered by officials from the International 
Federation of the Red Cross and [the] Swiss government, among others−arguably led to the 
release of twenty-one of the Chibok girls on October 13, 2016 (Al Jazeera, 2016) and “…as 
the negotiations continued, another cohort of eighty-two Chibok girls was released on 7 May 
2017” (Olofinbiyi, 2017).   
Conversely, the findings related to the military approach suggest that, over seven years of 
violent struggle with the terrorist group, the armed forces have not achieved any noteworthy 
successes other than the death of some terrorist, who must have been quickly replaced by 
the recruitment of more young people as the data revealed that many youngsters have 
become quite willing to join the insurgents for food, clothing, weapons and safety. 
Therefore, a growing intensity of Boko Haram terrorism has been experienced in the 
traumatized regions. The advent of relatively successful negotiations (the reader should note 
that not all the girls were subsequently released) thus serves as a point of departure and hope 
for all nations that negotiate with extremist groups such as Boko Haram. In brief, it is 
submitted that a ‘soft-handed’ option could be a better option than a ‘hard-handed’ approach 
in resolving violent radicalization and terrorism. 
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7.3.9 A community policing approach 
This study identified a community policing approach as another practicable paradigm shift 
in the counterterrorism strategy. The study suggests that the Nigerian government should 
adopt this approach as a litmus test in resolving the Boko Haram problem should the 
negotiation strategy fail. The findings revealed that community policing holds a hidden 
secret as it is a powerful information channel which is a viable tool in criminal 
investigations. It therefore has high potential for achieving greater results in crime 
prevention, reduction and control than any other strategy. Based on this finding, the 
government should institutionalize and strengthen non-uniform community police forums 
across the northern region as an extended arm of the police force by, if possible, empowering 
them with a policing mandate but making them remain within their local communities where 
they can still have access to the information network that will help resolve crises and prevent 
the occurrence of any terrorist attacks that may pose a threat.  
Secondly, the study urges the government to look into this approach and to engage 
intelligence officers both in the army and the police to discharge a collaborative plan with 
community police members to unearth authentic Boko Haram members and their supporters 
both at home and abroad. There is also an immediate need for government and civil society 
to stop undermining the efficiency of these people and to recognize their powerful role in 
crime reduction and control. It should be noted that these people have the potential to easily 
access and liaise with members of the local communities where Boko Haram operates. The 
study further suggests that the government should, even though negotiations are on-going, 
start looking in this direction as plan B in case the negotiation approach fails.  
Thirdly, the government should strengthen community police forums across all states of the 
Federation by making them collaborate with the security forces. In this manner the military 
will be better prepared and informed as the community police will work with them as a 
powerful information weapon to augment the efforts of the military troops. The idea of 
community policing, if formally and officially incorporated into the security system of 
Nigeria, could eventually be one of the best approaches to prevent future occurrences of 
crime, terrorism and other related social vices that may disrupt the envisaged peaceful 
existence of the Nigerian populace. Though community police members are also human. 
However, potential for (for example) bribery, manipulation, intimidation and exploitation, 
which characterize the Nigerian system should be carefully addressed in achieving this goal. 
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7.3.10 Youth education, orientation and development 
Several studies have shown that education has a strong capacity to modify the behaviour of 
the youth either negatively or positively, depending on the quality of the information 
provided. Thus, education has a high potential for influencing the minds of the youth in a 
positive direction if appropriate information and incentives are provided. The study thus 
urges the governments of the federal states to incorporate a new module into the curriculum 
that should focus on terrorism and conflict studies. This should be enough to provide the 
youth with information on the social, emotional and psychological ills of terrorism on 
society and youth development. Based on the findings of the research, the lack of access to 
formal education as a factor that renders a sizeable number of northern youths vulnerable to 
Boko Haram brainwashing and recruitment is highlighted. Because education stands out as 
a major factor that influences behaviour, it can be used effectively to introduce behaviour 
modification in youths and in society as a whole. With improved education, various aspects 
of human life will be addressed, thereby facilitating a positive perception of people’s 
worldview and a rise in the general living standards of society. To achieve this goal, 
government should sensitize northerners to the importance of education and contribute more 
to education in order to change the perspectives of northerners on Western education in order 
to prevent future occurrences of terrorism. Secondly, there is an urgent need to implement 
programmes that will cater for the conditions of illiterate youths in the northern states by 
making formal education available to them all. This programme could be initiated and 
tagged “Operation flushing out ignorance from the North” with the primary objective of 
sweeping away high incidences of illiteracy and ignorance caused by a lack of access to 
educational opportunities in the region. The study pays tribute to the formal education efforts 
of the Almajiris in the north, stressing that they should be trained and empowered with 
educational facilities and good jobs. The study also adds that daily spiritual discussions that 
will question the basis of the ideology of violence should be encouraged among the youth 
who are most susceptible to terrorist recruitment. With these strategies in place, the 
possibility of youths falling prey to terrorists’ false religious teachings and recruitment 
should become issues of the past.  
Finally, it is hoped that by taking these positive steps towards solving the various problems 
of the youths of the north in terms of their educational development, their potential for 
degenerating into terrorism as a means of compensating for their conditions of hopelessness, 
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poverty and severe unemployment will be minimized. This could also result in a drastic 
reduction of the effects of terrorism on the region. 
7.3.11 Fortification of the coercive security apparatuses of the state 
This study found that the Nigerian security forces, particularly the armed forces and the 
police, are weakened by a lack of modern and sophisticated weaponry and a digitalized 
infrastructure to ensure effective and efficient operations in their effort to  protect and defend 
the territory against internal aggression. These lapses are reportedly caused by severe 
corruption in the administration of the military, circumstances which can allegedly (and 
sadly) concern the army chiefs too. This implies that there is an urgent need for the 
government to formulate and implement appropriate policies that will ensure the provision 
of modern technology and improved weaponry to allow the armed forces to discharge their 
duties more effectively. Until state governments can review their policies and eradicate 
corruption, the military will remain the inefficient puppets of a corrupt regime. If the military 
is placed in a position where it has access to better technology, informed intelligence and 
security administration systems to fight terrorism, it will achieve the desired results.  
The engagement of United Nations forces may also be cardinal in resolving the problem of 
terrorism in Nigeria. For example, intelligence training of members of the armed forces and 
the procurement of military aircraft or much cheaper modern drones to monitor and track 
down Boko Haram hideouts should be considered. Achieving this would go a long way in 
strengthening the security network of the Nigerian Army.  
There is also a need to strengthen the border security network by sanctioning armed forces 
to secure the borders using sophisticated apparatus so that all immigrants coming into the 
country can be properly checked by detectives and powerful computerized investigative 
tools. 
Finally, for the military approach against Boko Haram terrorists to be more efficacious, 
government should abide by the code that what the Nigerian Army does is ‘secret till the 
day of execution’. By adhering to this approach, the media must be compelled to refrain 
from announcing on radio and television what the armed forces’ strategies and plans of 
action are. Training more security forces and the deployment of military troops to the 
Sambisa Forest are also imperative. If the suggested measures are taken into cognizance, the 
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military will be afforded better opportunities to reposition their strategies for greater 
efficiency. 
7.3.12 Community sensitization 
Designing awareness programmes about terrorism and the adverse effects of such acts and 
disseminating the information among communities are vital requirements, particularly in 
deep rural communities that are most vulnerable to attack. The level of awareness of the 
implications of terrorism should be heightened among the populace. There should be more 
enlightenment programmes by the government, international organizations such as the 
United Nations, the European Union, the African Union and NGOs. Such programmes 
should emphasize the extent to which terrorism can bring a nation and her future to ruin. 
The media, schools, churches, mosques, market centres and relevant associations should be 
actively involved in this campaign. Portable electronic devices such as cellular phones, 
tablets, and I-pads that are fast and reliable means of disseminating information across the 
country should be encouraged in creating awareness about terrorism and its perilous effects 
on sustainable development. This also implies infrastructural upgrading to ensure that these 
devices function optimally. 
7.3.13 Rehabilitation of and care for terrorist abductees     
A programme that involves the provision of psychological and emotional support to 
individuals who were abducted and set free by terrorists is vital. Based on the conceptual 
and theoretical argument of the differential association theory, this study suggests that there 
is a high possibility that these people were indoctrinated due to the long-term interaction 
that they shared with the insurgents. It is noteworthy that anyone who has been abducted by 
a terrorist group is like a time-bomb that can explode at any time. Therefore, state 
governments should not take their well-being after their release for granted, but they should 
put rehabilitation programmes in place that will constantly examine and re-examine the 
psychological and mental conditions of these people, particularly the released Chibok girls. 
Special attention should be given to these girls because there is a high probability that some 
may sympathise with their abductors and thus with further acts of terrorism if no adequate 
psycho-medical help is rendered to them. These efforts should continue from time to time 
until they are confirmed medically and mentally stable from the depression they suffer from, 




7.3.14 Discouraging the usurpation of power and authority 
The illicit abuse of power and authority by government officials, political office holders and 
security operatives should be strictly discouraged and monitored. The study established that 
the undue abuse of power and authority is among the factors that usually pioneer non-state 
terrorism which led to the emergence and contributes to the escalation of Boko Haram 
terrorism in Nigeria. There is therefore an urgent need to re-orientate all government 
officials, be it politicians or security operatives, to stop inflicting wickedness and unfair 
treatment on citizens. This will go a long way in establishing a good working relationship 
between security operatives and citizens, as well as averting any impending conflicts that 
may arise between the citizens and the political state. 
7.3.15 Provision of  pre-emptive safety measures 
Pre-emptive safety measures that involve the use of modern technology should be placed at 
strategic points on the streets of each city to record any untoward activities. Safety measures 
such as emergency call boxes, cameras, emergency notification systems (phone, emails, and 
text messages), mounted speakers and sirens, access locks, remote sensing satellite imagery, 
a border movement control system, information linkage devices, video cameras in strategic 
places and CCTV will help promote an environment that is safe from crime and terrorism. 
The eradication of arms and ammunition dealings that result in illicit arms falling into the 
hands of civilians is another measure to prevent terrorism in society. For the effective 
functioning of this measure, it is suggested that the community police be mostly mandated 
with the responsibility of monitoring these devices so that they can alert the security 
operatives within their jurisdiction for rapid response in case of any emergency or impending 
crime-related challenges. 
Finally, the study suggests a review of Nigeria’s Constitution and the Bill of Rights, as well 
as the institutionalization of strict regulations that compel the federal government to monitor 
and evaluate state governments in order for some of the above recommendations to 
materialize and produce more effective and desired results that will give the country a 
facelift from all sorts of ethno-religious, political and socio-economic problems which have, 




7.4  Suggestions for further research 
It is important to do more research on the topic of this study because it will result in a greater 
understanding of why acts of terrorism are prevalent in human society in general, and in 
Nigeria specifically. Although terrorism may not be totally eradicated from society, having 
more knowledge will help security structures prevent acts of terrorism from increasing 
unabatedly. In addition, it may provide appropriate aid and support for those who have 
already been victims of terrorism. More specifically, systematic research in the area of 
terrorism and conflict studies is constantly needed to devise appropriate policies and laws 
that should curtail incidences of terrorism in Nigeria and elsewhere.  
In this context, the nature, design and the findings of this study provide high quality 
assurance that the information that has been made available can be used for much broader 
research in this field, particularly if a larger pool of the population is sampled. Such a pool 
may include captured terrorists and surviving victims of attacks and kidnappings as well. 
Irrespective of the array of limitations encountered in the study, this research can be 
modelled as a baseline for informative inquiries by similar studies. It is thus believed that 
this research will inspire others to explore the gaps that were left by design or by accident 
in this study. For the benefit of such researchers, the areas in the northern geo-political zone 
which the researcher could not cover due to the growing intensity of the nefarious activities 
by Boko Haram should be attended to. Because the research participants were concentrated 
around the Abuja Municipal Area Council of the Federal Capital Territory alone, other 
interested researchers may extend their sample to include representatives from other 
senatorial districts and interest groups as well. This will open the door widely for future 
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